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The sovereign power of the state is in its most manifest form at its borders, embodied 
in the border guards, surveillance mechanisms and border regulations. But the 
negotiations between the border civilians and the state apparatuses are as integral to 
the understanding of the border milieu as are the state apparatuses themselves. This 
thesis looks at some aspects of border narratives with reference to the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border, which has its genesis in the partition of Bengal in 1947. 
Secondary sources have been used in framing the research agendas, and field studies 
conducted in the border areas of West Bengal and Bangladesh have provided the 
evidence for the arguments made.  
Thesis: 
There are two parts to this thesis: 
The first part emphasises that a study of the various strands of border narratives 
along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, represented here mostly through personal 
experience-centred narratives of border dwellers, hint towards the existence (and 
continuous evolution) of a unique spatial consciousness, that has been termed here as 
a ‘border consciousness’. The various socio-cultural and economic practices which 
the border people along the said border, including the civilians and the border guards 
devise over the years, crystallise into a consciousness, made unique by the specificity 
of the spatial status of borderland. Such practices and narratives include unique 
forms of interaction, co-operation and even enmity between the civilians (of diverse 
socio-economic backgrounds), border guards, administrative officials and police on 
either side of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border as well as across the borderline. 
The practices gain significance because of their spatial vulnerability and sensitivity 
of being an international border between India and Bangladesh. The involvement of 
the border guards on both sides, as representatives of the states, in the border 
narratives and consequently the border consciousness, makes for a very interesting 
study of borderland psyche along this border.  
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The second part emphasises that border consciousness along the said border is 
characterised by a re-interpretation of statist agendas of both India and 
Bangladesh, of sanctifying their borders, reinterpreting and reproducing the border 
space, in the process. The border people devise alternative access to certain basic 
resources which might not be available to them otherwise, given the underdeveloped 
state of being of this borderland area. In doing so, they often question the sovereignty 
of the state and the premise for the creation of the border, in the first place. Border 
narratives along this border, thus, question the active user-passive victim roles of the 
states and the civilians, respectively.  
The research takes up four strands of narratives along the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border to argue that socio-political and economic narratives (also seen elsewhere in 
non-border areas but which attain a new perspective in this borderland area) 
converge at the borders and eventually crystallise into a larger spatial narrative of the 
borderland. Livelihood, Enclave, Caste and Gender forms the four strands of 
narratives which have been chosen to support the argument. 
The main contributions of this thesis towards knowledge are: 
• Its stress on the territorial predicament of the states in a globalised world, 
and emphasising the fact that border narratives often question the discourses 
on borderlessness by highlighting the increasing significance which borders 
around the world are attaining.  
• Its emphasis on the need to consider ‘border psyche’ in understanding 
borderlands and the everyday practices of borderlanders, which are 
spontaneous and rudimentary in nature, and at the same time, questions 
statist discourses on state/nation, citizenship/infiltrator, inclusion/exclusion, 





My dissertation would not have seen the light of day without the infrastructural and 
academic support, and most importantly the studentship support of the University of 
Westminster. I am immensely grateful to the university for the studentship and for 
the help and encouragement I have received from the university staff. This 
dissertation would also have been unaccomplished had it not been for the excellent 
guidance and supervision provided by my Director of Studies, Dr Radha D’Souza. 
To her and to Professor Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, my second 
supervisor, I can only express a lifetime of gratitude.   
I sincerely thank the institutions without which I would not have progressed: the 
British Library and the School of Oriental and African Studies Library, the National 
Library, Kolkata, especially Mr Ashim Mukhopadhyay and Mr Partha Ghosh; the 
Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Kolkata, the West Bengal State Archives, 
especially Mr Anandalal Bhattacharya; West Bengal Legislative Library; Bureau of 
Applied Economics and Statistics, Government of West Bengal, especially Mr Satya 
Bhattacharya, and the Office of Indian Census, Kolkata. I am also indebted to 
Shaktidas Roy, Chief Librarian, ABP Pvt. Ltd., Kolkata for providing me with useful 
information and helping me with the right documents. I thank the Centre for Studies 
in Social Sciences, Calcutta and the Development Research Communication and 
Services Centre (DRCSC), especially Ms Subhadyuti Mitra, for providing 
appropriate secondary material.  
In similar vein I wish to thank the National Archives of India, Delhi, the Directorate 
of Archives and Libraries, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and 
the Library support staff of the Library of the University of Dhaka. I am extremely 
thankful to the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, Dhaka and especially Professor 
Sharifuddin Ahmed and Md. Abdul Awal Miah for not just providing me with 
hospitality but also relevant inputs. I fondly remember Professor Fakrul Alam of the 
University of Dhaka for putting me into touch with the relevant people.     
Professor Subhendu Dasgupta and Professor Keya Dasgupta’s support and 
motivation with regard to my field work cannot be expressed in words. Without the 
v 
 
help of Mr Debiprasad Roy Chowdhury, of the Association for Protection of 
Democratic Rights (APDR) I could not have been able to conduct my field studies. I 
also take this opportunity to convey my heartfelt thanks to those who made my field 
visits not just possible but safe and enjoyable: Samiran Biswas, Swapan Sanyal, 
Diptiman Sengupta, Krishnapada Ghosh, Subham, Sudipta and Ananda Ghosh. I am 
deeply obliged to Binoy Krishna Mullick of Rights Jessore, Bangladesh for 
providing me with the necessary logistical support and field assistants during my 
field visits in the border districts of Bangladesh. My field visits in Bangladesh was 
also made possible by Rostom Ali Mondol and Sarwar Hossen.  
Most of the photographs reproduced in this dissertation are mine, and therefore they 
appear without acknowledgement. For the others, their sources are duly mentioned. 
In cases where I have not been able to locate the exact source, copyright holders are 
welcome to contact me.   
Without inspiration from Professor Subhas Ranjan Chakrabarty, Professor Parimal 
Ghosh, Dr Paula Banerjee and Professor Lipi Ghosh I would not have been able to 
pursue academic research. My sincerest thanks to Rajat Kanti Sur for helping me 
with every kind of support for my research and for the wonderful discussions and 
inputs, and most importantly, for having faith in my abilities. I also thank Ishita Dey 
for her encouragement and inputs.     
I do not have enough words to thank Tanmayee Banerjee and Sayandip Mukherjee 
for being my oxygen and sunshine in London. Without them, I doubt if I would have 
survived the grey days. Dr Devika Rangachari appeared as a life-saver at the right 
moment. I take complete responsibility for all the shortcomings in this dissertation.  
I thank my in-laws for their trust in me and to Mashi and Holi for always being the 
sweetest presence in my life. Last, but by no means the least, I thank my parents, my 
brother and my husband Saurav for being my patient listeners, punching bags and 










I Creation of the West Bengal-East Pakistan Border 2 
II Complex nature of the West Bengal- Bangladesh Border 6 
III Features of the West Bengal-Bangladesh Border 9 
 i Topography 9 
 ii Habitation 10 
 iii Livelihood 10 
 iv Local governance 11 
 v Border guards 11 
 vi Border fence, border roads and floodlights 13 
 vii Border zones 15 
IV The root of my interest in the West Bengal-Bangladesh Border 18 
V Nurturing my interest 19 
VI Literature survey: preparation for field studies 20 
VII Field Studies 25 
VIII Shaping the thesis 27 
IX Choice of experience-centred narratives in shaping the thesis 30 
X Focus of the thesis 31 
XI Post-field studies literature survey 33 
XII Flexible approach towards establishing the thesis 37 
  
Chapter 1 Livelihood Practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
Border 
38-109 
I Introduction 38 
II Agriculture 39 
 i Crisis of the ‘fenced-out’ lands 40 
 ii Legal consequences of fencing 47 
 iii Effect of the border on the nature of cultivation along it 48 
vii 
 
III Labourers 50 
 i Agricultural labourers 50 
 ii Labourers in other parts of the country or abroad 50 
 iii Brick-kilns 51 
 iv Rice-mills 54 
IV Land Ports 56 
 i Coolies in Land Ports 56 
 ii Traders at the Land Ports 57 
V Currency-exchange counters, restaurants and shops at the Land Ports 59 
 i Currency-exchange counters 59 
 ii Restaurants 59 
 iii Border shops 60 
VI Office of the border guards 61 
VII Fishing 62 
VIII Livelihoods not directly related to the border 64 
 i Beedi-making 64 
 ii Tailoring 65 
 iii Other options 66 
IX Illegal livelihood practices 66 
 i Drugs 68 
 ii Illegal human crossing 73 
 iii Cattle 74 
 iv Fire-arms 83 
 v Fake currency notes 84 
 vi Currency coins 85 
 vii Items of daily necessity 86 
 viii Chars and ghoj as strategic locations for smuggling 90 
 ix Obstacles in curbing smuggling 93 
 x Nature and flow of contraband products 94 
 xi Gendered aspect of the nature of involvement in smuggling 95 
X Prospects for formalisation of border markets 98 
XI Conclusion 102 
 i Effects of the border on the role of the states, border guards 
and civilians 
103 





 iii Border as thirdspace 105 
 iv Border consciousness 107 
  
Chapter 2 Narratives of the India-Bangladesh Enclaves 110-169 
I Introduction 110 
II India-Bangladesh enclaves: historical background 112 
III Bilateral Agreements concerning the India-Bangladesh Enclaves 117 
 i Nehru-Noon Accord (1958) 117 
 ii Indira-Mujib Agreement (1974) 118 
 iii Manmohan-Hasina Agreement (2011) 119 
IV Deprivation from access to basic facilities 122 
 i Land documents, identity proofs and other basic amenities 122 
 ii Land issues 125 
 iii Commercial transactions 127 
 iv Adverse position of some neighbouring territories 127 
 v Schools, hospitals 128 
 vi Marriage, women, sexual violence 129 
 vii Religious aspect 130 
 viii Relation between the enclave residents and the 
Panchayat/Union 
133 
 ix Trespassing and ‘push-backs’ 134 
 x Lack of voting rights 135 
V Livelihood 135 
VI Attitude of the border guards towards the enclave people 137 
VII Platform for miscreants 139 
VIII Haven for smugglers 140 
IX Counter-enclaves 142 
X Local administration 143 
XI A ‘State of Exception’ 147 
XII Demand for citizenship 150 
XIII The Tinbigha narrative 154 
XIV Organised initiatives 160 
XV Conclusion 165 
 i Enclaves as thirdspace 166 




Chapter 3 Ethno-Religious Narratives along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh Border, with Caste as a Specific Index 
170-221 
I Introduction 170 
II The Marichjhapi Massacre of 1979 173 
 i The event 173 
 ii Official explanation 179 
 iii Caste factor 184 
 iv Ethno-religious factor 185 
 v Territorial implication 187 
III The Matua trajectory 188 
 i Ideology—organised 189 
 ii Overlapping of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ 194 
 iii Ethno-religious factor 195 
 iv Legal implication 196 
 v Political implication 197 
 vi Territorial implication 199 
 vii Anti-hegemonic aspects in the history of the Namasudras 201 
IV Caste narratives elsewhere along the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
Border 
203 
 i Caste-profile 203 
 ii Livelihood 207 
 iii Festivities 209 
 iv Recognition of caste status 213 
V Conclusion 215 
 i Effect of the border on caste and ethno-religious aspects 216 
 ii Uniqueness of caste and ethno-religious narratives along the 
West Bengal Border 
218 
 iii Border as thirdspace 219 
 iv Border consciousness 220 
  
Chapter 4 Gender Narratives along the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
Border 
222-279 
I Introduction 222 
II Education 224 
III Marriage 226 
IV Migration and Trafficking 232 
x 
 
V Lands outside the border fence 243 
VI Physical and verbal abuse 247 
VII Sexual intonation in the treatment of women civilians by border 
guards 
254 
VIII Pradhans as patriarchs 255 
IX Unstated patriarchy 257 
X Other forms of gendered border narratives 259 
XI Women border guards 261 
XII Restriction on the use of lethal weapons by border guards 262 
XIII Mixed reaction of the civilians towards the border guards 265 
XIV Relations between Bangladeshi border civilians and the BGB: 
language as a decisive factor 
266 
XV Bonding attempts 273 
XVI Conclusion 276 
 i Forms of control 276 
 ii Uniqueness of gender narratives along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh Border 
277 
 iii Border as thirdspace 277 
 iv Border consciousness 279 
  
Conclusion 280-297 
I Experience-centred narratives 282 
II Role of language 283 
III Cognition 283 
IV Narrator and listener 285 
V Time 285 
VI Life-cycle approach 286 
VII Border identity 287 
VIII Identification/disidentification 290 
IX Contribution to knowledge 292 








Appendix 2 Brief description of interviewees 318-340 
  
Figures  
1 Map showing the India-Bangladesh border 5 
2 Diagrammatic Sketch Map of Cooch Behar Enclaves 111 
3 Location of Tinbigha 154 
4 Location Map of Tinbigha 155 
5 Sundarbans with location of Marichjhapi 181 
6 Map showing Thakurnagar 189 
  
Plates  
1 Zero point cutting through border pond 9 
2 ‘Zero Point’ marker 16 
3 Indian border pillar 17 
4 Bangladeshi border pillar 17 
5 Border fence 40 
6 Brick-kilns 52 
7 Disrupted railway line 56 
8 Petrapole truck terminal 58 
9 Petrapole border 61 
10 Land Customs Station Office 62 
11 Riverine border 64 
12 Cattle haat 78 
13 Cattle being transported 79 
14 Border map in BSF camp 91 
15 Road leading to ghoj 92 
16 Ghoj 92 
17 Informal border market 99 
18 Bangladeshi enclave 117 
19 Indian enclave 122 
20 Hut within an enclave 142 
21 Enclave council members 145 
22 Enclave residents 151 
23 Hospital in Dahagram 157 
24 Higher Secondary School in Dahagram 158 
25 Tinbigha Corridor 160 
xii 
 
26 BBEECC rally 162 
27 Settlements at Marichjhapi 179 
28 Matua Religious Fair 194 
29 Holy Bath at Matua Fair 196 
30 Women at border river 231 
31 Fenced-out border civilians 247 






The effects of the partition of India in 1947 have been way more far-reaching and 
complex than the existing partition narratives of violence and separation reveal. The 
immediacy of the movement of refugees between India and the newly-formed state 
of Pakistan overshadowed, for the time being, the actual effect of the drawing of the 
border between the two states. As communal violence and refugee exodus subsided 
after 1947, the ground reality of the creation of the border started revealing itself. 
Partition affected almost everyone in India and Pakistan, directly or indirectly, 
although the effect was most strongly felt in the provinces of Punjab and Bengal, 
which underwent the cartographic partition. West Pakistan was carved out of Punjab 
and East Pakistan was carved out of Bengal. For the people who were settled and 
rehabilitated in the mainland territories of India and Pakistan, i.e. those not in close 
proximity to the newly-created border, the effect of partition gradually began 
subsiding as they went about resettling their lives and livelihoods. However, for the 
people whose lives, homes and livelihoods were directly affected by the creation of 
the border, a new struggle began. The effect of partition did not remotely subside for 
the people who now found themselves along the newly-created border, by fate or by 
choice. Partition literature (both non-fiction and fiction)1 ended with the ‘creation’ of 
                                                          
1
 Following are some of the more important non-fictional and fictional works on the partition 
of India, and specifically Bengal: Non-Fiction— Samaddar, R. (ed.). (1997) Reflections on 
Partition in the East. Delhi: Vikas Publishing House; Butalia, U. (1998) The Other Side of 
Silence: Voices from the Partition of India. New Delhi, London: Penguin; Kaul, S. (ed.). 
(2001) The Partitions of Memory: The Afterlife of the Divisions of India. Delhi: Permanent 
Black; Chatterji, J. (1994) Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Menon, R. and Bhasin, K. (1998) Borders and 
Boundaries. Women in India’s Partition. New Delhi: Kali for Women; Chatterji, J. 
(February 1999) The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal’s Border 
Landscape, 1947-52. Modern Asian Studies. 33(1). pp. 185-242; Talbot, I. and Singh, G. 
(eds.). (1999) Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent. 
Karachi: Oxford University Press; Fraser, B. (2006) Bengal Partition Stories: An Unclosed 
Chapter. (trs. Sheila Sen Gupta). London: Anthem; Pandey, G. (2001) Remembering 
Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press; Ahmed, I. (ed.). (2002) Memories of a Genocidal Partition: The Haunting Tales of 
Victims, Witnesses and Perpetrators. Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies; 
Chatterji, J. (2007) The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India,1947-1967. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Fiction— Zaman, N. (1999) A Divided Legacy: The Partition 
in Selected Novels of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Dhaka: University Press Limited; 
Bandyopadhyay, A. (1971) Nilkantha Pakhir Khonje. Calcutta: Karuna Prakashan; Ganguli, 
S. (1988) Purba Pashchim. Calcutta: Ananda Publishers; Sengupta, M. (2003) 
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the Bengal border but rarely, if at all, ventured into discussing the border as a space 
where socio-cultural and spatial identities continued to be made and unmade.   
In this regard, this thesis aims to look at the lives and narratives of the people living 
along the India-Pakistan border, with specific focus on the West Bengal-East 
Pakistan border, later the Bangladesh border from 1971, in order to analyse how 
border identities are made, unmade and remade.  
 
I. Creation of the West Bengal-East Pakistan Border 
The basis for the creation of the West Bengal-East Pakistan border was faulty from 
its inception. The drawing of the border was far from a ‘clean-cut vivisection’2 of a 
territory, ‘executed with clinical precision’.3 The Chairman of the Boundary 
Commissions and the author of the Boundary Awards, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, was a 
complete outsider when it came to knowledge about India and its administration. He 
had no prior experience in adjudicating disputes such as the ones leading to the 
partition and no knowledge of the settlements in the areas to be partitioned. It was no 
surprise then that Radcliffe’s drawing of the border on the maps was flawed.  
Moreover, the basis of the partition, as revealed from partition votes obtained from 
the Bengal Legislative Assembly, seemed to bend more towards territorial 
considerations rather than communal aspirations, contrary to the general idea that the 
partition was executed on a communal basis.4 The Bengal Legislative Assembly 
divided itself into two parts—one consisting of the representatives of Muslim-
majority districts and the other consisting of representatives of Hindu-majority 
districts. The two units met at the Bengal Legislative Assembly on 20 June 1947 to 
indicate their views on partition. Neither of the units, though, had any knowledge of 
the actual plan of the Boundary Commission nor to which state their constituencies 
would eventually belong when the Award was finally made.5 From the very 
beginning, territorial considerations gained stronger favour with the units rather than 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Bishadbriksha. Kolkata: Subarnarekha; Sikdar, S. (2008) Dayamayeer Katha. Kolkata: 
Gangchil.  
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 Ibid., pp.188-189.   
5
 Ibid., p.189.   
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the communal right to self-determination, as Joya Chatterji rightly points out.6 This 
explains the meeting between the representatives of Hindu and Muslim-majority 
districts rather than Hindu and Muslim members ‘to determine their collective 
communal will on what was, in its primary form, a communal question’.7 While 
communal autonomy might still be achieved within a single state, i.e. without 
territorial separation per se, the principle of territorial autonomy demands a 
sovereign, bounded space which, in the case of Bengal, could only be achieved 
through territorial separation.8  
The self-interest and bias of the political parties involved in the partition plan, 
namely the Congress and the Muslim League, also played significant roles in the 
formation of the Boundary Commissions and, hence, the final execution of the 
boundary plan. This was coupled with the influence of Lord Mountbatten (the then 
Viceroy of India) on Radcliffe in the drawing of the boundary. The immediacy of the 
need to finalise the boundary was stressed by Jawaharlal Nehru, member of the 
Indian Constituent Assembly and Prime Minister-designate, on the premise that once 
the Boundary Awards were finalised, India and Pakistan would sort out the rest of 
the disputes themselves and come to a mutually satisfactory agreement.  Hence, 
Nehru emphasised on a make-shift border for the purpose of a quick transfer of 
power.9 Along with the ‘contiguity of majority areas of Muslims and Hindus’, 
another index called the ‘other factors’ was also taken into account in demarcating 
the boundary.10 The fact that ‘other factors’, however much vaguely defined, played 
a crucial and far-reaching role in the creation of the border has been amply proved, 
as will be evident from subsequent chapters. Short-term gains conceived by the 
political parties and a rushed execution of the transfer of power by the Viceroy 
resulted in a territorial fabric which would have long-term effects way beyond the 
conception and life span of its creators.   
                                                          
6
 Ibid.   
7
 Ibid.    
8
 Ibid., p.190; Jinnah’s two-nation theory, in fact, was not a territorial concept but a demand 
for parity between Hindu and Muslim representation in the soon-to-be-formed government 
of independent India. Jalal, A. (1985) The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and 
the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
9
 Chatterji, 1999, pp.191-193.   
10
 Ibid., p. 196.  
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The fact that the Boundary Commissioners were judges and the Chairman a lawyer 
created an impression that the Boundary Award was a matter involving ‘legal 
expertise, resting on judicial rationality’11 and that the ‘rulings met the technical 
requirements of legal justice’.12 But, as some studies of the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border have shown and later chapters will reveal, socio-cultural, political and 
economic factors have had an overwhelming effect on the creation and evolution of 
the border. Such effects challenge and call into question the legal basis of the 
creation of the border.  
That ‘territory’ was the most crucial factor underlying the demands of the various 
political parties in the partition plan has been proved by their conflicting claims over 
territory. Each party had its own reasons and interests in demanding the maximum 
area of Bengal to accommodate a religious majority, including the refugees (refugee 
exodus had already started by 1946 following the Noakhali riots),13 and to ensure the 
latter’s economic requirements, even if that meant laying claims over some of the 
other religious-majority areas. The decisive political figures behind the creation of 
the border had realised that the Radcliffe line would not simply ‘demarcate the 
boundaries between two nations’,14 but would also ‘shape the very contours of 
control and influence in the divided successor states’.15 They had no doubts about the 
fact that ‘the shape of the border would have implications for the future of their 
respective parties’.16 Therefore, the choice and claim over space required careful 
consideration. Territory, thus, played a central role in the vision of the new states to 
be created.17  
                                                          
11
 Ibid., p.197.  
12
 Ibid.   
13
 The Noakhali Riot was a communal riot that broke out in the Noakhali district of the 
Chittagong division of the eastern part of Bengal in October 1946 following the decision to 
partition Bengal on religious grounds. The then undivided district of Noakhali, with 80.57% 
of Muslims and 19.31% of Hindus, became the hotbed for a communal breakout, where 
Hindu lives and properties came under attack from the Muslims, and included forceful 
conversions of Hindus to Islam. Mohandas K. Gandhi camped in Noakhali and toured the 
district for four months in an effort to restore peace, though with little positive outcome. A 
majority of the survivors of the riot migrated to West Bengal, Tripura and Assam.  
14




 Ibid.    
17
 Ibid., pp.199-202.   
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Eventually, the Radcliffe line created two states where the ratio of the majority to the 
minority population was almost exactly the same. Thanas (police stations) were 
taken as the unit for partitioning. The Muslim-majority districts of Murshidabad and 
Nadia went to West Bengal, while Hindu-majority Khulna went to Pakistan. ‘The 
Award placed 71% of the Muslim population in East Bengal (East Pakistan) and 
70.8% of the Hindu population in West Bengal’.18 Though the Boundary Award was 
generally accepted without much discontent, some of the Hindu and Muslim areas 
(especially in Murshidabad, Nadia and Khulna) were disgruntled because of their 
inclusion in the wrong side of the border and for being ‘shut out of their promised 
land’.19 The most affected were the people who ended up near the borderline, since 
the chances of their incorporation into the other state were the highest.  
Figure1. Map of the India-Bangladesh border. Source: Maps of India, 2008. 
                                                          
18
 Ibid., pp.215-216.   
19
 Ibid., pp.217-219.   
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II. Complex Nature of the West Bengal-Bangladesh Border 
As noted earlier, the border was, from the very beginning, vaguely demarcated as it 
was based on outdated maps of thana and district boundaries. Moreover it ran over 
rivers and agricultural land which were difficult to demarcate clearly except for an 
imaginary line. The rivers specifically posed a major problem for the border because 
of the seasonal nature of some of them, implying a drying-up during winter and 
flooding during the monsoon with disastrous effects on the demarcation as well as 
the security of the border. Moreover, these rivers often changed (and still do) their 
course, resulting in perennial confusion over disappearing and reappearing lands 
(Chars)20 along the borderline. In the event of disputes over territories, the resolution 
would have to depend completely on the goodwill and co-operation of the concerned 
states. Confusion regarding the borderline was enhanced because of the 
contradictions between the thana maps and the settlement maps, on which the 
demarcation was based.21 None of the political parties or commissioners thought it 
necessary to survey the land before drawing up the final borderline. It is, thus, no 
surprise that the border that was finally created was full of flaws and inaccuracies, 
the price for which has been paid ever since by the people who live along the line.  
It is easy to imagine what the outcome of such a hastily-created border pushed by 
narrow self-interests and planned without prior ground-knowledge might have been. 
The Bengal landscape, therefore, saw the border running right through the homes, 
hearths and lands of the rural communities, separating people from their families and 
livelihoods, and the towns from their hinterlands. The border, as Chatterji puts it, 
‘ruptured agrarian communities all along its lengths’.22 The border also had 
                                                          
20
 Char is the Bengali term used for a strip of land which appears on the riverbed when the 
river changes course. The Chars along the riverine borders gain strategic importance due to 
their location on the border and, hence, become reasons for dispute between the states on 
both sides of the border who claim control over the Char.  Dispute over Chars became a 
perennial source of dispute between India and Pakistan given the formation of new chars 
every year due to the changing course and flooding of the rivers. The idea of treating the 
Chars as ‘no-man’s land’ did not work out well for either of the states given that these often 
housed entire villages who had lost lands to river erosion and had, thus, re-settled on the 
chars when they happened to appear mid-river. A lot of such chars had actually to pay the 
price for being located along the borderline, when its people had to prove their allegiance to 
either India or Pakistan as the situation demanded. A lot of the char residents lost their lives 
to cross-border firing between the border guards and the police.  
21
 Chatterji, 1999, pp.220-222.   
22
 Ibid., p.226.  
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disastrous consequences for peasant movements like Tebhaga23, cutting off 
jotedars24 from the sharecroppers.25 Traditional kin and associate links and economic 
ties were disrupted, and illegalised, and traditional practices criminalised by the 
creation of the international border. The communication system was heavily 
jeopardised and public institutions, like administrative headquarters, hospitals and 
courts, were cut off from the suburbs.26  
The Bengal border became all the more complex in nature due to the official 
intention of the Nehru government to keep it porous, and the regulations regarding 
property evacuation and compensation flexible. While this flexibility and porosity 
remained merely on paper for those migrants who settled in places far away from the 
border, it meant physical attempts for those settled near the border, as they tried to 
access and exercise their control over their property that was left behind on the other 
side.27 This implied that even after years of the partition and the creation of the 
border, the cross-border movement of people and goods was a fact, and an officially 
recognised one at that.28 Yet such government policies failed to have the desired 
effect of a peaceful border obtained through porosity due to the interpretations of the 
border by the border police and militias. In their zeal to protect the religious 
majorities and control the borders, the border police violated the official policies of 
porous borders and physically abused (and even killed) the border crossers.29 This 
was the root of an uncomfortable relation between the state, on the one hand, 
represented through the government policies and the border police (border guards 
                                                          
23
 The Tebhaga movement was a militant campaign of the peasants (mainly tenants or 
sharecroppers) led by the Kishan Sabha (peasant front of the Communist Party of India) in 
Bengal in 1946, where the peasants demanded that only one-third (Tebhaga) of the harvest 
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Zamindars and Jotedars: a study of Rural Politics in Bengal. Modern Asian Studies. 9(1). p. 
82.  
25
 Chatterji, 1999, p.226.   
26
 Ibid., p.230.   
27
 Ibid., pp.232-233.   
28
 Ibid., p.232.   
29
 Ibid., p.233.   
8 
 
created for the purpose), and the border civilians, on the other, that continues till date 
in modified versions all along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.  
By the time porosity threatened India and Bangladesh with security concerns and the 
states took steps to stop cross-border movements, the latter had become 
commonplace and integral to the lives of the border people on both sides of the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border. Stringent border rules failed to stop such well-networked 
movements; it simply tagged such movements as illegal and criminalised the 
participants.  
The newly-created West Bengal-Pakistan (Bangladesh) border changed the lives, 
livelihoods, economies and politics of the people it directly involved itself with. 
‘Village politics that had, so far, revolved around the caste councils, union boards 
and tenancy disputes, now began to be the site where citizenship and patriotic duty 
were propagated, where ideological battles between nations were fought.’30  
The West Bengal-Bangladesh border can, thus, be viewed as an example of what 
Oscar Martinez terms an interdependent borderland—characterised by symbiotic 
links between societies on both sides of the border, resulting in a considerable flow 
of economic and human resources across it.31  
It is in this context of the links between border societies that the following chapters 
aim to analyse certain aspects of the negotiations between the civilians themselves 
and between the civilians and the border guards along the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border.  The need to understand patterns of such negotiation in a complex border like 
the Bengal border not only enlightens one on the uniqueness of state-building 
ideologies in South Asia but also contributes in a large way to the genre of border 
studies in general in a global context. 
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Plate 1. The ‘zero point’ cuts through this pond. The right bank belongs to 
Bangladesh and the left to India, 2011.  
 
III. Features of the West Bengal-Bangladesh Border 
 
i. Topography 
The stretch of Bengal (including West Bengal and Bangladesh) through which the 
border passes can be broadly categorised into plain land and riverine, with no natural 
obstacles. It is heavily populated and cultivated ‘till the last inch of the border’.32 The 
boundary line, in most places, is marked by border pillars. The riverine borders are of 
specific concern to the border guards because of the difficulty in marking the border 
through the rivers. Borders, in the case of rivers, are merely imaginary lines 
perceived as equidistant from the banks on both sides. Moreover, the changing 
course and flooding of the rivers also pose a challenge to border management due to 
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the disappearing of border lands and the reappearing of chars in the midst of the 
rivers. Chars are strategic locations both for control of the border by border guards 
on both sides, as well as for the cross-border smugglers and infiltrators who use the 
ambiguous location of the chars to operate in.33 Border rivers have, perpetually, been 
a cause of concern and dispute between India and Bangladesh over their sharing of 
waters, building of dams and maintenance of navigability. Disputes over the Farakka 
Barrage and the sharing of the water of the river Tista are examples of such disputes 
between India and Bangladesh.34  
ii. Habitation 
The entire stretch of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border is densely populated.35 
Hence, the border passes through residential areas, cutting through houses and plots 
of lands. The profile of the people on both sides of the border is largely similar in 
terms of ethnic origin (Bengali), physical characteristics, language (Bangla) and 
culture. 
iii. Livelihood 
Given the vast stretch of farmlands along the border, it is easy to understand the 
predominance of agriculture and agriculture-related occupations along it. Fishing 
constitutes the next prominent livelihood activity due to the presence of rivers in the 
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 Roy, A. (6 May 2012) Bangladesher arthamantri ke shangey niyei Dhakaye Pranab. 
Ananda Bazar Patrika. [Online] Available from: 
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region. Cottage industries like beedi-manufacture,36 handicrafts and gardening also 
contribute towards the economy of the border area, as do small-scale industries like 
brick-kilns, rice-mills and jute-mills. The border itself has created a vast range of 
livelihood opportunities for the people, including the camps of the border guards, 
border Land Ports (LP) as well as illegal trade. The currency of West Bengal is 
Indian Rupees (Rs.) and that of Bangladesh is the Bangladesh Taka (Tk.), though 
that does not hamper cross-border transactions (especially the illegal ones) in any 
way.   
iv. Local governance 
West Bengal has its own Legislative Assembly (Bidhan Sabha) where the various 
constituencies are represented through elected ministers (MLAs) and are represented, 
in turn, in the House of the People (Lok Sabha) of the Parliament of India (Sansad) 
through elected ministers (MPs).  The districts of West Bengal also have their local 
three-tier governance system, consisting of the Gram Panchayat (at village level), 
the Panchayat Samiti (group of Gram Panchayats) and the Zilla Parishad (group of 
Panchayat Samities). There is a local governance system at the village, block and 
district levels of West Bengal consisting of elected representatives from the 
respective villages.   
The districts of Bangladesh are represented by their elected ministers (MPs) from 
respective constituencies in the Parliament of Bangladesh (Jatiyo Sansad Bhavan). 
The districts also have their own local governments (Union Parishad) consisting of 
nine wards (1 village is considered a single ward), each ward containing a chairman 
and twelve members. The number of wards in a district depends on its size.  
v. Border guards  
The origin of border guards along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border can be traced 
to the initiative of the Pakistani government to build a non-official military 
                                                          
36
 Beedi is a thin, Indian cigarette filled with tobacco flake, and wrapped in a tendu leaf tied 
with a string at one end. It is widely popular in South Asia and parts of the Middle East—the 
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industry with home-based women workforce predominantly employed in beedi rolling, while 
males continue to be employed in all aspects of beedi production.  
12 
 
organisation called the Ansar Bahini in February 1948 for the purpose of guarding its 
borders with India,37 though a separate paramilitary force was also formed out of the 
existing Eastern Frontier Rifles (EFR: formed under the colonial administration in 
1920) and was renamed East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) in 1947 following the partition. 
After the creation of Bangladesh as an independent state in 1971, the EPR was 
renamed Bangladesh Rifles (BDR). Following a coup in February 2009, the BDR 
underwent organizational changes and was renamed Border Guards Bangladesh 
(BGB). The BGB is under the administrative control of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. The BGB has its 
Central Headquarters in Pilkhana, Dhaka, besides its North Eastern (Sarail), North 
Western (Rangpur), South Eastern (Khagrachari) and South Western (Jessore) 
Regional Headquarters.    
West Bengal also created its own semi-military frontier corps in March 1948 called 
the Jatiya Rakshi Dal (Bengal National Protection Brigade) formed of volunteers 
from the six border districts of Jalpaiguri, West Dinajpur, Malda, Murshidabad, 
Nadia and 24 Parganas. This force was administered in each district by the 
Magistrate, Superintendent of Police, the president of the District Congress 
Committee and the local Assembly Member.38 Following the Indo-Pakistan War of 
1965, the Border Security Force (BSF) was officially created as a part of the Central 
Armed Police Forces for the purpose of guarding its international borders. The BSF 
is under the administrative control of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of 
India.  The BSF has its Force Headquarters at New Delhi, its Western Theatre 
Headquarters at Chandigarh, and its Eastern Theatre Headquarters at Kolkata. The 
Eastern Theatre Headquarters includes North Bengal, South Bengal and Malda 
Frontier of West Bengal (besides other frontiers in Assam, Tripura and Mizoram).  
Both the BSF and the BGB have their respective Border Outposts (BOP) along the 
border. There are approximately 725 BSF BOPs (located at a distance of 
approximately 2-3 kilometres from each other) and 650 BGB BOPs39 (located at a 
distance of approximately 5-6 kilometres from each other) along the 4096.7 
kilometres long border between India and Bangladesh of which more than half the 
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BSF BOPs are along the 2216.7 kilometres long border between West Bengal and 
Bangladesh.40 
The exchange of fire between the BSF and BGB is a common occurrence along the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border, especially over issues of infiltration and attacks by 
miscreants of the neighbouring state.41 However, the BSF and BGB also meet at the 
border to discuss issues related to infiltration, smuggling or any other border-related 
incident that might be resolved between the border guards of the two states, without 
resorting to violence. Such meetings are called Flag Meetings42 in official parlance. 
These meetings are usually held at a particular place on the land between the zero 
point (borderline) and India’s border fence, which in official terms is known as No-
Man’s Land. Flag-bearing troupes of the border guards, led by the Company 
Commanders of the concerned outposts, meet to discuss the issues at hand. Meetings 
are also held in mid-river in riverine border areas where the BSF and BGB meet in 
the middle of the river at an equidistant location from both the banks on official 
speed boats which carry the flags of both states.  
vi. Border fence, border roads and floodlights 
The Ground Rules formulated by the Military Sub-Committee of the Indian and 
Pakistan delegations on 20 October 1959 stipulated that: After an identifiable 
boundary line whether real or working has been demarcated, neither side will have 
any permanent or temporary border security forces or any other armed personnel 
within 150 yards on either side of this line. Also no permanent posts will be 
constructed till the final demarcation has been done….If defensive works of any 
nature including trenches exist in the stretch of 300 yards (150 yards on each side of 
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the working boundary) they must be destroyed or filled up.43 These Ground Rules 
were confirmed in the Joint India-Bangladesh Agreement for Border Authorities of 
the Two Countries in 1975.44 Consequently, India planned and began executing the 
construction of a border fence (on grounds of preventing infiltration) and a border 
road at a distance of 150 yards (137 metre) from the ‘zero point’ (actual borderline), 
which left substantial areas of Indian farmland and homesteads (about 450 villages)45 
outside the fence.46 These lands and houses can be accessed through gates 
constructed along the border fence guarded by BSF guards, on presenting identity 
cards at the check-posts. Whenever a person needs to cross the gates either for 
cultivating his land outside the fence or for moving in and out of his house across it, 
he needs to submit/present his identity card (Voter Cards, in most instances) to the 
guards or the commander at the check-post near the gate.  
Bangladesh, on the other hand, objected to the construction of fences within 150 
yards from the International Border (IB) on the pretext that fencing and border roads 
violated the guidelines of the Ground Rules.47 Hence, Bangladesh neither has border 
fence nor border roads.  
Till 2012, 1222 kilometres of fencing of the sanctioned 1528 kilometres had already 
been completed48; of the 1770 kilometres of border road sanctioned in West Bengal, 
1616.57 kilometres had been constructed49; of the sanctioned 2840 kilometres of 
sanctioned flood lighting along the India-Bangladesh border road, 775 kilometres 
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had been completed (including 277 kilometres of flood lighting along West Bengal-
Bangladesh border), while another 750 kilometres was in progress.50  
vii. Border zones 
The definitions of the various zones of a border region by Willem van Schendel and 
Michiel Baud51 help us to understand the characteristic features of the geographical 
region of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. The border heartland consists of the 
zone on the border or zones dominated by the border. Here, the social networks are 
directly shaped and affected by the border. The networks depend on the border for 
their survival and have no option but to adapt to its caprices; the intermediate 
borderland consists of the region which is affected by the border with varying 
intensity, from moderate to weak; and outer borderland consists of those regions 
which feel the effect of the border at certain times and under specific 
circumstances.52 It would be helpful to keep these definitions of the border zones in 
mind while studying the West Bengal-Bangladesh border in order to understand the 
effect of the border on the people and the extent of its influence on the surrounding 
regions. It would also help in our understanding of the nature of what the thesis will 
aim to establish as, border narratives, border people and border consciousness.  
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Plate 3. Border pillar facing India with Bangladeshi road beyond, 2012.  
 




IV. The root of my interest in the Wes Bengal –Bangladesh Border 
In March 2008, I was working as a research associate in an organisation in Kolkata 
that researched issues related to refugees, migration, human rights, social justice and 
gender politics. I went on an official visit for two days to a border village in the 
border district of Nadia (West Bengal) for a survey of the situation of violence 
perpetrated by the BSF on the civilian53 population living along the West Bengal 
border.  I had certain pre-conceived notions about life in the border areas, especially 
along the international borders—notions pertaining to the stringency of border 
regulations and the patrolling of border guards. I had never been a border resident 
and so my knowledge about border areas was restricted to newspaper reports and a 
few official survey reports. Most of the existing literatures on borders pertained to 
dealing with them as issues of international relations and bilateral affairs between the 
states concerned, i.e. India and Bangladesh, and were, understandably, a simplistic 
narrative of diplomacy and international relations.  
The works of Avtar Singh Bhasin54, Farooq Sobhan55 and Garry Purcell56 constituted 
literature which dealt with bilateral ties between India and Bangladesh at a purely 
diplomatic level, highlighting aspects of trade and economy which these states could 
pursue for improved relations. Narratives of (and from) the border between the two 
states were conspicuous by their absence in these literatures. While these works gave 
me a fair idea about bilateral ties between the states, they failed to highlight the local 
narratives of the people who negotiate the border—which was the purpose of my 
visit to the border village.   
A brief survey of reports and articles prepared by the government officials of India 
and Bangladesh before the visit exposed the dearth of literature which dealt 
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essentially with border life.57 These reports were primarily viewing the border areas 
as disorderly spaces in need of stringent disciplining mechanisms and as sites in need 
of strengthened security apparatuses.58 Literature prepared by the various NGOs and 
human rights organisations, on the other hand, emphasised more on the hapless 
condition of the border residents under the state machinery.59  As part of a research 
organisation working on human rights and social justice, my visit was meant to serve 
a similar purpose, i.e. to take stock of the situation in the border village with regard 
to the condition of the border villages in general under the stringent presence of state 
machinery.  
The visit served a bigger purpose than initially it aimed. Apart from giving me an 
idea about the various instances of human rights violations of the border civilians by 
the border guards and the hazards associated with the daily lives of the people along 
the border (these formed part of my official study), the visit made me realise that the 
responses, perceptions and activities of the people living along the border reveal 
much more than meets the eye. The everyday lives and activities of the people 
produced a narrative which might be vastly different from the narratives of a person 
who lived away from the border, like myself. I was convinced that a closer study of 
such narratives would yield an interesting and possibly unique understanding of the 
border as the state’s space for wielding control and as the civilians’ space for 
negotiating such control mechanisms. Though my ideas about these narratives were 
still vague, given the short length of my stay in the village, I came back with a wish 
to study them in-depth in the future. 
 
V. Nurturing my interest 
On my return, I took to learning more about the West Bengal-Bangladesh border and 
the India-Bangladesh border at large, apart from surveying literature on border 
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studies in general. Eventually, my interest led me to pursue the study of the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border as a doctoral project.  
I realised that a study of the entire India-Bangladesh border60 would be too big a 
project. So I had to narrow the scope of my study in ways that would help me 
analyse the border narratives in practically feasible ways without compromising the 
theoretical or empirical rigor. The fact that I shared the same language (Bangla) and 
similar ethnic origin/cultural traits (of being Bengali) with the majority of the people 
living along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border61 acted as an encouraging catalyst 
behind my decision because I could grasp their socio-cultural aspects, being Bengali 
myself. To add to this was my western education that put me in a unique position to 
amplify the voices from the border to a larger audience.  
Before I embarked on my field visit to the border areas as part of my doctoral 
research, I gave myself time to understand the evolution of border studies in 
literature, since its inception during the later phases of the Cold War, i.e. from the 
1960s.  
 
VI. Literature survey: preparation for field studies 
The literature survey gave me a broad overview of border studies from the 1960s till 
about 2011, which is when I visited border areas as part of my empirical research. I 
understood that the study of borders had moved from being primarily a theorisation 
of the bordering process and understanding terminologies associated with borders,62 
to being sociological and cultural studies of borders and the people who live in 
proximity to it.63  
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There has also been much writing on borders as geographical spaces of exclusion and 
the formation of peripheral subjectivities,64 besides works studying them in the 
context of state and security issues.65 These works are studies of the vulnerable 
nature of the border as demarcations of the state’s sovereignty and how these 
vulnerabilities are policed by the state.   The other significant contribution of these 
works towards border studies has been their emphasis on going beyond discursive 
studies of borders, and highlighting the importance of empirical studies as integral 
parts of methodological questions in studying these. The shift from studying borders 
as a straightjacketed political phenomenon to understanding them as catalysts for 
identity formations was also highlighted in some works in the second half of the 
twentieth century.66 Of the works mentioned so far, those of Ranabir Samaddar and 
Willem van Schendel pertain specifically to the India-Bangladesh border (including 
the West Bengal border).  
The lack of a specific focus on the responses of the people living along the border in 
the existing literature disturbed me. Whatever empirical studies did exist either 
related to certain specific issues (mostly smuggling or trafficking)67 or focussed on 
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the deprivation of civilians from resources and basic facilities. The focus on such 
pressing issues brought out the conflicting nature of the relation between the state 
and its people. They studied the active-user and passive-victim roles of the state and 
the civilians, respectively, as witnessed along the border—a structure which some of 
my own interactions with civilians in 2008 failed to fit into. Most of the existing 
literature treated the geographic reality of the border as a pre-given condition on 
which such narratives were produced. But the geographical and cognitive production 
and reproduction of the border by the border people hardly found a place in the 
literature. The works of Van Schendel was, by far, the closest indicator to what I was 
aiming to examine, i.e. border narratives of the people living along the stipulated 
border.  
The aim of my doctoral research was, thus, to study the lives of the people living on 
both sides of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, including civilians and border 
guards, and to understand if their narratives did, in fact, reproduce and reinterpret the 
border. My aim was also to understand if such narratives fitted into the frame of 
subaltern narratives more as being alternate routes to resources rather than essentially 
subversive or even belligerent narratives against the presence of the state at the 
borders (embodied in the border guards, border fences and surveillance 
mechanisms). The goal was to keep the study interdisciplinary so as not to choke the 
potential of the research.  
A study of secondary materials in the various libraries and archives in India and 
Bangladesh in 201068 formed my initial knowledge of the areas which I was to study, 
in terms of an idea of the changing profile of the population (from the first Census of 
the states in the second half of the twentieth century till date) and statistical 
information about the economic, ethnic and religious aspects of the people whom I 
intended to interact with during my field visits. Newspaper reports related to the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border played an important role in shaping my idea about 
the chosen area of study. Both national and regional newspapers from India and 
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Bangladesh were consulted during the pre-field visit period as well as later, during 
analysing the field data. Ananda Bazar Patrika, the Bengali-daily published from 
Kolkata, has been the most frequently cited newspaper, due to its consistency in 
reporting border-related issues, at least in its district supplements, as well as its effort 
in addressing some border issues, otherwise neglected by official reports or other 
media.  
Of the 10 border districts in West Bengal69 and 16 border districts in Bangladesh,70 I 
chose to focus on 6 border districts of West Bengal71 and 11 border districts of 
Bangladesh72 between September 2011 and March 2012. My choice was informed by 
the geographical peculiarities of the areas (covering land borders and riverine 
borders), as well as their being important areas in terms of strategic location and 
economy (covering Enclaves,73 Chars and Border Land Ports).74  
Having equipped myself with a fair idea of my chosen field of study, and an aim to 
frame my thesis in a multidimensional approach, I set out on my fieldwork in the 
chosen areas along the border between West Bengal and Bangladesh. The plan was 
to interview the people living in the border areas, including civilians involved in a 
wide variety of livelihood practices, and across gender, religion and caste; border 
guards posted along the border outposts; public figures associated with 
administrative offices, mainly Panchayat members and heads (since most of the 
border areas are rural in character and, hence, form parts of local village governance) 
and political figures. The aim was to understand the strands of social, political and 
economic narratives produced along the stipulated border.  
Methodological questions and theoretical frameworks were only vaguely formed in 
my mind when I set out on this journey—a journey that turned out to be far more 
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interesting but complicated than I had initially envisioned. The paraphernalia 
associated with fieldwork served as an indication of the complexities associated with 
studying sensitised areas such as the borders.  
Borders, as territorial delimitations of a state, are spaces which mark the strongest 
manifestations of a state’s sovereignty.  Thus, they are also the spaces which witness 
the most visible presence of state machinery in terms of border fences, border guards 
and surveillance mechanisms. While the people living along the border areas 
negotiate such state presences in their everyday lives, the borders are virtually 
inaccessible, if not completely out of bounds, for a person living elsewhere but 
wanting to visit/study the borderlands, as in my case.  My interactions with the senior 
members of the border guards regarding my plans of field visits also indicated the 
sensitivity of the state towards its borders. A feeling of suspicion and apprehension 
was present throughout our conversation as they took note of my plans. The 
paraphernalia included obtaining consent from the ethics committee of my university 
for conducting field studies and convincing them of my plans for handling possible 
risk hazards; preparing the Questionnaire, Consent Form (CF) and Participant 
Information Sheets (PIS); obtaining permissions from the Headquarters of the border 
guards of BSF and BGB for visiting the border areas and talking to border guards 
(written permissions were not available); contacting key persons and field assistants 
in the field areas which I planned to visit; arranging for my accommodation and 
travel in and around my field areas and chalking out the dates for my visits. The 
process of setting up the scene for the actual field work to take place was tedious and 
bothersome. This also, in a way, made me realise the gap between institutional 
research procedures and actual field studies. The formalities associated with 
institutional research procedures often fail to address or gauge the complexities of 
lived reality, especially when it comes to sensitised places like the borders. They 
often fail to see the everyday survival negotiations from their straightjacketed 
viewpoints. These gaps became visible to me even before I started my field visits. 
My experiences during my field visits only confirmed my apprehensions about the 
gap. Having gone through the ordeal of preparing for my field work, I finally set out 
on the much-awaited experience. Equipped with a recorder, a notepad and the 
pertinent field documents, I went about interacting with the people living along the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border.  
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VII. Field Studies 
The idea was to cover as many categories of people across caste, religion, gender and 
livelihood so as not to restrict myself to a particular strand of narrative. Accordingly, 
I did not chalk out focus groups for my interviews and deliberately kept the 
questionnaire open-ended.75 Apart from some fundamental questions related to the 
identity (name, age, religion, caste, gender, profession) of the person, the 
conversations were left to follow their own path, though roughly centring on certain 
larger issues which I had planned beforehand.76 The aim was to provoke various 
kinds of outcomes from the conversations and not restrict them to a set pattern of 
responses.  
The experience of carrying out the actual field work was far more exciting and 
challenging than I had imagined it would be. Getting access to the border areas, 
interacting with the local people (sometimes as individuals, sometimes in a group), 
interacting with the border guards, staying in the residences of the local civilians or 
in a tourist lodge in the border area, moving from one area to another in the private 
vehicles of the local people (mostly motorbikes and sometimes bicycles) and 
sometimes in hired cars as well: none of these activities turned out to be trouble-free, 
and understandably so. To travel around the border areas alone and as a woman, to 
be ferried around the place on a bike/bicycle driven by a man,77 having to answer the 
border guards every now and then about my identity and purpose of visit,78 being 
prevented from visiting certain areas of the border by them on the grounds of 
‘security issues’, and getting them to speak to me were some of the recurrent troubles 
throughout the visits. To add to that was the expanse of area that I had planned to 
cover on both sides of this border within a limited period of six months.  
Carrying out fieldwork in sensitised areas such as the borders, especially 
international ones, posed several challenges in not just interacting with the local 
civilians or the border guards, but also on deciding the ways of data collection, since 
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organised settings for carrying out interviews were often not available.79  Recording 
every response or using recorders was often not possible or even welcomed.  This 
made the process of data collection and data storage difficult. Field dairies played 
important roles in filling up these gaps. Besides being used for noting down the 
details of the places and circumstances of the interviews, they were often used for 
jotting down entire interviews as well.  
Briefly put, the fieldwork enriched me not simply as a researcher but, more 
importantly, as a person, as it helped me know myself better. My capacities, 
incapacities, stamina or sometimes the lack of it were revealed to myself during the 
process. I returned with a huge amount of field data and larger amount of questions 
than what I had with me before the study.  
The open-ended interactions brought out certain responses which I had least 
expected, which provided new dimensions to my thesis. The themes which I 
eventually categorised my thesis into, i.e. livelihood, enclaves, caste and gender—are 
common to sociological literature. In the course of the field work, they fell into 
thematic clusters reaffirming not just the resilience of analytical categories in 
contemporary sociological discourses, but also the fact that these themes reflected 
the border narratives in their most spontaneous forms. Conversations around those 
themes seemed to have emerged, almost automatically, in every interaction. 
Likewise, the process of categorising my data into chapters became easy, with some 
of the recurrent themes forming the topics for each of the chapters—themes which 
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27 
 
VIII. Shaping the thesis 
I noticed a pattern in the responses of my interviewees that was characterised by the 
overwhelming presence of the reality of the border in their lives. Many of the issues 
which formed parts of the interviews were no more unique to the border than to any 
other non-border area, either in Bangladesh or in India. However, what was 
noticeable was the recurrence of the border in the responses regarding such issues 
and, more importantly, how the same issues seen elsewhere in India and Bangladesh 
went through a modification in the context of the specificity of their operation along 
the border.  The responses also suggested (a hint of which I had borne with me right 
from my first interaction with the border people) that the people living along the 
border have their own ways of perceiving and interpreting its reality. The 
(re)interpretations are neither necessarily engineered by the state, nor are they 
necessarily signs of victimisation of the people. This is not to suggest that 
victimisation is absent along the border, but is meant to draw attention to the 
complex relation between the state and the border people which might not always be 
addressed through the straightjacketed binaries of the perpetrator-state and 
victimised-civilians.  
Such re-interpretations of the space of the border formed a binding factor among the 
people living along the border which, surprisingly, included the border guards as 
well.  In fact, the responses of the border guards and their spontaneous answers to 
some of my random curiosities revealed the irony of their situation—uncomfortably 
wedged between their duties as representatives of the state at the borders and their 
everyday negotiations with the reality of border life. In the process of living along 
the border over a period of time (ranging from six months to few years depending on 
the terms of their posting), the border guards undergo similar hazards as the civilians 
do, albeit in different versions. But the reality of surviving the border is true for both. 
Border life, thus, makes the border guards more a border people, often 
overshadowing their roles as representatives and spokespersons of the states 
concerned. It is the overarching presence of the spatial uniqueness of the border and 
the everyday negotiations of the civilians and the border guards which form the 
fundamental content of what I choose to call border narratives in my thesis.  
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Border narratives, discussed in the following chapters, also contribute towards the 
understanding of the negotiations between the border people and border laws and 
regulations. Many aspects of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, including the 
undercurrents of violence and cross-border smuggling practices, have been 
consequences of the very laws designed to contain and control it. Having been 
affected by the partition and the border culturally, historically, linguistically and 
economically, the border people have devised ways of negotiating the laws and 
regulations which were devised to control them— through violation, re-interpretation 
and reproduction. The subsequent chapters aim to highlight aspects of such 
negotiations through discussions on the border narratives along the stipulated border.  
While the basic idea and knowledge about the West Bengal-Bangladesh border was 
premised on the existing secondary materials (census reports, survey reports, 
newspaper reports) and literature, my understanding of this border as a socio-spatial 
process required me to look at the border lives myself as an active observer and as a 
direct communicator with the border people. Analysis of the interviews cleared my 
thoughts with regards to the re-interpretation and reproduction of the border space by 
the people who negotiate it every day. It also highlighted the pattern of psyche, i.e. a 
particular mind-set or mental make-up, in the people that expressed itself 
spontaneously but persistently, nevertheless, in their responses. Newspaper reports 
were used in support for some of my arguments as well as in highlighting the 
recurrence of some of the border-related issues in the narratives. In the process of 
understanding the responses, some of my pre-conceived ideas about the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border changed considerably. The more difficult parts of 
analysing the data were:  
• Narrowing down the relevant data, i.e. deciding the importance of one 
set of data over another, largely because of the overwhelming amount 
of data collected. 
• Interpreting and analysing contradictions in the responses of the 
interviewees in support of my argument.  
Methods of tackling such difficulties were, interestingly, found in the data 
themselves. I could recognise that there was an internal logic to the narratives. This 
logic bound the smaller socio-cultural narratives into a larger spatial narrative, 
29 
 
though some of the responses in the narratives seemed contradictory on the surface. 
From here, the field data started shaping up into a thesis.  
Theoretical discourses dealing with spatiality and subalternity in the context of the 
omnipresence of the state machinery vis-à-vis the marginal people (geographical 
marginality as seen from the state’s perspective) seemed to form the basic tools of 
analysis. While the works of Henri Lefebvre81 and Edward Soja82 provided me with 
the tools to understand spatial reproductions, James C. Scott’s83 concept of everyday 
forms of resistances helped me realise the rudimentary nature of such border 
narratives. Works by scholars of subaltern studies84 provided the necessary 
understanding of subalternity in the context of Indian social, political, economic and 
cultural discourses.  
I have used the concept of subalternity here, more as a form or set of practices by 
which people find alternative ways of accessing many of the basic resources as 
access to livelihood, sanitation, health, education etc. which they are otherwise 
devoid of. Subalternity, in the case of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, has been 
used to define the practices which the border people, i.e. people living along the this 
particular border, including the civilians and the border guards alike, have devised 
over the years to gain access to such basic resources which they have been denied by 
the state machinery, due to the vulnerability and sensitivity of the space that they live 
in, i.e. the international border between India and Bangladesh. Thus, the concept of 
subalternity has been used here more as a definition for their practices rather than a 
definition of their state of being.  
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Over years of negotiating the border, the space of the borderland turns into a unique 
space—a space beyond the limited scope of binaries as perpetration-victimisation. It 
becomes a space which sees the creation and evolution of certain unique practices, 
customs, culture, language, co-operation and even enmity between the civilians and 
the border guards on either side of the border as well as across the borderline, 
between the border people of the two states. It is a space which not just sees the 
civilians devise access to resources which they are otherwise devoid of, but also sees 
the border guards, as representatives of the states, get enmeshed in the survival 
practices. The concept of the thirdspace has been used here to define this unique 
nature of the borderland, where the production of space moves beyond the first space 
of the state’s vision, second space of the civilians’ resistance and creates a thirdspace 
that sees many of the generalised notions of state-civilian relations questioned and, 
often, redefined. The concept of thirdspace has also been helpful in explaining the 
role of the borderland space in being the joining line or meeting space of the two 
states, rather than as the line of separation. The border life brings the people on either 
side of the border together developing some common ways of negotiation, common 
forms of practices and a given understanding between the two, mostly in a 
spontaneous, unplanned manner. The concept of thirdspace helps in defining this 
uniqueness of the border because it explains how the space of the borderland moves 
beyond the first space of defining the territorial limitations of the state and containing 
the civilians within that territorial boundary, the second space of the civilians either 
accepting the delimitations or resisting it in an organised manner (for example a 
separatist movement) and creating a thirdspace where the border people redefine the 
definition of the border and question the very foundation of the borderline through 
their everyday practices, but which is spontaneous and rudimentary in nature.  
 
IX. Choice of experience-centred narratives in shaping the thesis 
The border narratives obtained in the course of the interviews have themselves been 
powerful texts and foundations for my thesis. The subaltern nature of the narratives 
has been amply reflected in the resistant or rather re-interpretive nature of the 
narratives, as expressed in the interviews. The narratives bear possibilities of 
questioning the sovereign nature of the state, though the narratives themselves are 
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open to interpretations in various different ways. The narratives obtained through the 
interviews have been mostly experience-centred,85 though event-centred narratives 
have also been recorded from time to time. Given the vast scope of interpretation that 
the narratives created, it has often been difficult for me to logically interpret or 
analyse the data. Yet I sincerely believe that the everyday life experiences of the 
narratives (which is what the narratives mostly consisted of) have been the nearest 
credible expressions of reality—as constructed by the narrators—the border people 
themselves. Experience-centred narratives often ‘vary drastically over time, and 
across circumstances within which one lives, where a single phenomenon may 
produce very different stories, even from the same person.’86 This explains the 
challenge I faced in accommodating contradictory responses, while, at the same time, 
baring their spontaneous nature. But despite such challenges, the choice of 
experience-centred narratives of the border people was driven by their human nature 
and their capacity to ‘re-present experience, reconstituting it as well as expressing 
it.’87 Their capacity to ‘display transformation’ has helped me highlight the evolution 
of border narratives expressed by the border people over a period of six decades.  
 
X. Focus of the thesis 
My argument in this thesis is that spontaneous and everyday forms of negotiation 
which the border people produce over the years crystallise into a pattern of 
consciousness characterised by a common psyche among the people which is not 
always necessarily consciously designed. The consciousness is spatial in character in 
being a result of and tied to the specificity of the borderland. The border 
consciousness thus produced constitutes other social, political or economic 
narratives, which might also be witnessed in other non-border spaces within the 
territorial limits of a state. Yet these smaller strands of narratives get engulfed by the 
larger spatial narrative of the borderland, producing, in the process, a unique 
psyche—a border consciousness.  
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The term ‘border consciousness’ has been adapted from Gloria Anzaldua’s concept 
of ‘Mestiza consciousness’, which she describes as a specific form of consciousness 
resulting from hybrid ethnicities of people born out of mixed parentage between the 
US and Mexico.88 While people belonging to such hybrid ethnicities can mostly be 
found along the US-Mexico border, she uses the Mestiza or border consciousness as 
more of a social consciousness—born out of social marginalisation that these people 
of hybrid ethnicities (as also alternate sexualities) face. I have used the concept of 
border consciousness as more of a spatial consciousness in analysing how the 
specificity and the reality of surviving the border bind all those who live along it.  
Spatial consciousness in the context of the border differs from spatial consciousness 
witnessed elsewhere; for example, in spaces where a specific 
social/ethnic/religious/gendered community comes together. In such instances, it is 
the coming together of the community in a specific bounded space that eventually 
produces the spatial consciousness.  But in the case of borderlands, as exemplified by 
the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, it is the specificity of the space itself that 
produces the consciousness and not the other way around. Moreover, few other 
spatial psyches are seen to affect such a wide variety of people across age, class, 
caste, religion, gender and economic position, as those seen to be affected by the 
spatial psyche of the borderland.   
Since this study is primarily based on empirical study, the methodological challenge 
lay in justifying such claims, purely through the process of analysis of the field data.  
The recurrence of the spatial disposition of the borderland in the responses of my 
interviewees, including the border guards, helped me give shape to my understanding 
of the border consciousness. In fact, the varied nature of my interviewees, in terms of 
their socio-political, economic and professional locations, helped me realise that the 
spatial specificity of the borderland engulfs all those living along the borderline into 
forming the border culture. Some of the more recent works on the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border, as well as some of the contemporary debates on state sovereignty 
and globalisation, helped me give shape to my ideas.  
                                                          
88Anzaldua, 1987; For further understanding of Anzaldua’s concept of Mestiza 
consciousness, see Feghali, Z. (2011) Re-articulating the New Mestiza. Journal of 
International Women’s Studies. Special Issue. 12(2). pp. 61-74; Aigner-Varoz, E. (Summer 
2000) Metaphors of a Mestiza Consciousness: Anzaldua’s Borderlands/La Frontera. Melus. 
25(2). pp. 47-62.  
33 
 
XI. Post-field studies literature survey 
Debates on globalisation have emphasised the imminent possibilities of a borderless 
world,89 especially in the context of economic interaction between states and the 
increasing flexibility of border rules in some parts of the globe. These literatures 
have focused on the need for states and business corporations to adapt to 
globalisation and the borderless world.90 Yet studies by some scholars of border 
studies have, in fact, emphasised the significance of borders amidst such debates on 
borderlessness.91 While it is a fact that the blurring of boundaries has, indeed, been a 
significant feature of economic interaction around the world from the mid-twentieth 
century, it is also worth keeping in mind that such economic interaction has found 
more relevance in certain parts of the world like Western Europe, where inter-state 
borders increasingly became irrelevant with the free movement of the inhabitants of 
the European Union.92 While the borders of the EU became much more 
interdependent and integrated, that of others like India and Pakistan (also Israel and 
Palestine) hardened and became increasingly alienated.93 Moreover, the increasing 
stringency of immigration regulations highlights a contradictory trend—that of 
making the borders of states non-flexible like never before. Movement of people 
across a border has been far more problematic than the movement of wealth around 
the globe.   
Some of the recent works on the West Bengal-Bangladesh border have studied the 
distortive nature of the border narratives of the border people in the context of the 
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various cross-border practices that they practice.  According to Reece Jones (2012), 
these border practices challenge the state sovereignty by refusing the existence of 
either India or Bangladesh along the border and where the presence of either India or 
Bangladesh is disregarded by the border people.94 My understanding of the border 
narratives of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border differs from Jones’ understanding, 
in terms of the perception of the border residents about the bordered spaces. My field 
study suggests that these border narratives do indeed challenge the sovereignty of the 
states concerned, i.e. India and Bangladesh, at their boundaries. The nature of the 
contest is not through the blurring of the border through cross-border practices but, in 
fact, by making it more visible and real.  The border, thus, becomes a space where 
both states meet, i.e. a space of both India and Bangladesh rather than the ‘neither 
India nor Bangladesh’ discourse suggested by Jones.95 Moreover, Jones’ idea of 
borderlands as spaces of ‘refusal’ indicates a conscious decision on the part of the 
border people to refuse and in the process, challenge the state. My study suggests  
that the everyday forms of re-interpretation and reproduction of the border space is 
not an organised or planned narrative of refusal of the state as suggested by Jones, 
but rather rudimentary narratives of survival well within the hegemonic structure and 
model of the state machinery (as suggested by Scott)96, as the following chapters will 
reveal.  
The West Bengal-Bangladesh border becomes a meeting space of states, India and 
Bangladesh, and their border people. I argue that this poses a bigger challenge to the 
respective states since the primary aim of the states at their borders is to separate one 
people from the other. The dominant presence of the state at the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border is highlighted in the official journals of BSF where one comes 
across ‘suggestions to improve border domination’ along this border.97 In the context 
of this border, the border people’s act of re-interpreting the border as the meeting 
point is a bigger challenge for India and Bangladesh since territorial imperatives 
formed the basic premise for partition, as mentioned earlier. In re-interpreting the 
border as a meeting space for states, the border people question the foundation of 
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partition as well as the role of the ‘state as a container’.98 The borders of the states 
act as the separating line between the state’s ‘inside’ (internal political interactions) 
and the ‘outside’ (international relations), making the state a self-enclosed container 
of political territory within a nested hierarchy of geographical arenas.99 But border 
practices, including cross-border ties and linkages as seen along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border, question this role of the state. Such ‘horizontally articulated 
rhizomatic linkages among states’ put the vertically scaled ‘hierarchical conceptions 
of political spaces’ to test.100 Globalisation and capital flows perform a similar 
function of blurring borders and questioning the role of the ‘state as the container’. 
But the movement of people across states (mostly with official documents as 
passports and visas) and the flow of capital through investments, and the everyday 
movements of people and goods across the border mostly through illegal means, 
must not be confused.101 While there has been an increasing flexibility of borders in 
some parts of the world and a growth of global money through computer and 
telecommunication technologies102, which hint at an apparent blurring of borders, the 
reality hints at a re-interpretation and reproduction of the border (rather than blurring 
or even refusal), making it all the more visible and significant in the backdrop of 
debates regarding a borderless world.  Gearoid O Tuathail (1999) rightly observes: 
‘The development of borderless worlds does not contradict but actually hastens the 
simultaneous development of ever more bordered worlds’.103 Border narratives 
provide discerning ways of analysing cross-border practices which are neither 
universal nor planetary, despite constituting long-distance networks across 
borders.104  They also provide hints to questions as to who the benefiters and 
promoters of borderlessness are. They reveal that the people who survive along the 
                                                          
98
 Taylor, P. F. (2003) The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World-System. In 
Brenner, N., Jessop, B., Jones, M. and Macleod, G. (eds.). State/Space: A Reader. Malden, 
Oxford: Blackwell. p.101.  
99Walker, R.B.J. (1993) Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
100
 Brenner, N., Jessop, B., Jones, M. and Macleod, G. (2003) Introduction. In Brenner, 
Jessop, Jones and Macleod, 2003, pp. 14-15.  
101Glassman, J. (August 1999) State power beyond the ‘territorial trap’: the 
internationalisation of the state. Political Geography. 18(6). pp.669-696.  
102
 Taylor, 2003, pp.109-110.  
103Tuathail, G.O. (1999) Borderless Worlds? Problematising Discourses of 
Deterritorialisation. Geopolitics. 4(2). p.143. 
104
 Cooper, F. (2001) What is the Concept of Globalisation Good For? An African 
Historian’s Perspective. African Affairs. 100. p. 189.  
36 
 
border and depend on it for their livelihoods rarely, if at all, are champions of 
borderlessness.   
The nature of questioning the sovereignty of the state by the border people is not 
through a ‘refusal of the state-imposed border’ but rather through a re-interpretation 
and reproduction of the border—producing, what Soja calls, a thirdspace105 of lived 
reality in the process. It becomes the space that the people construct, characterised 
both by confusion and clarity, direct experience and conceptual elaboration.106 Re-
interpretation of the border poses a bigger discomfort and challenge for state 
sovereignty, since it is the borders which mark the strongest manifestations of the 
sovereign nature of the state.  
Involvement of the border guards (as embodied representations of the state) in the 
creation of border consciousness together with the civilian border population is 
integral to the understanding of the subaltern nature of border narratives. The role of 
the border guards is often plagued by deceptiveness. While it seems that as 
representatives of the state, they administer and control the border space, ‘in practice, 
however, they substitute another space for it, one that is first economic and social, 
and then political. They believe they are obeying something in their heads—a 
representation (of the country etc.). In fact, they are establishing an order—their 
own.’107 And it is through this re-ordering of the border that the border guards re-
interpret the border differently from the order of the state.  
Borders always have been seen as a space of expropriation, peripheral subjectivity 
and a platform for claiming inclusion—which is not always the case.108 It has also 
been a space for redefining certain statist definitions like belonging, citizenship, 
legal, illicit and so on. The spontaneous and free-flowing nature of the interviews 
during my field study contributed towards such unique revelations regarding the 
creation of border narratives and their gradual evolution into a border consciousness.  
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XII. Flexible approach towards establishing the thesis  
My attention towards the spontaneous narratives of lived experiences of the border 
people and my flexibility with methodological and theoretical questions, have helped 
me understand the complex nature of border life at the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border. They have helped me reveal the multi-dimensional narratives which are 
produced by the border people—narratives which accommodate religious, social, 
political and economic factors and yet cut across all these strands to create a psyche 
that has its foundation in the unique spatiality of the borderland. An interdisciplinary 
approach towards analysis of the narratives, bringing together discourses on state 
theories, space, geography and subaltern studies, have helped me in explicating the 
complex yet interesting web of relations laid out along this border. That the 
fruitfulness of a research lies not in ‘proving the correctness of a hypothesis’109 but in 
‘finding out something’110 has been amply qualified by my own research trajectory. 
A flexible approach has helped me find some unique aspects of the border narratives 
created along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, hitherto unnoticed.   
Livelihood, enclaves, caste and gender have been identified as the four strands of 
narratives, which, as the responses suggest, have converged in the spatial uniqueness 
of the borderland to be modified and crystallised into a larger spatial narrative. All 
the four strands of narratives contribute in their own way towards the production of 
border narratives. These four strands form the four following chapters, each one 
highlighting the spatial specificity of each of the four narratives.  The four chapters 
together knit into what I have chosen to call the border consciousness, as witnessed 
along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. As Maria Tamboukou explains, 
narratives constitute realities and shape the social, rather than being determined by 
it.111 Border narratives, as revealed in the following chapters, do indeed shape other 
social narratives into a spatial narrative to produce a psyche that binds the narrators 
together. The following chapters aim to establish this claim.  
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Livelihood Practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh Border 
 
I. Introduction 
This chapter aims to look at some of the aspects of livelihood practices along the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border. The specific livelihoods which have been discussed 
here are directly or indirectly dependent on the border. Some of them are traditional 
practices (i.e. existing from pre-border days), which have been affected by the 
creation of the border in 1947. Others have come into existence as a result of the 
creation of the border. This chapter looks at some of the livelihood practices in the 
light of their relation to the border. 
The chapter proposes to establish that the spatial uniqueness of the borderland affects 
both traditional and non-traditional livelihood practices to form a larger spatial 
narrative. This narrative is characterised by the overwhelming presence of the 
borderland milieu in the responses of both the civilians and border guards.  
It also proposes to establish that years of creation of such narratives result in a unique 
pattern of consciousness among the border people, including the civilians and border 
guards, which has been termed the border consciousness. 
Traditional livelihood practices seen along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border have 
been studied as narratives of general livelihood practices in rural India,1 rather than 
practices which have been affected and moulded by the presence of the border. Other 
practices which have been a result of the border have been mostly studied in the 
context of their vulnerability2 and/or illegality.3  But a closer study of the various 
aspects of livelihood practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border reveals the 
complex web of narratives which run through the more visible forms of practices.  
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The predominant means of livelihood in India is agriculture, which provides for more 
than 70% of the population. The rural areas of India are dependent almost entirely on 
agriculture-related livelihoods.4 Most of the post-1947 migrant peasant communities 
crossing the West Bengal-Bangladesh border settled along it and took up agriculture 
as an obvious occupation. While their traditional agricultural skill was one reason for 
the choice, the topography of extensive farmland along the border5 was another 
reason. Most of the original inhabitants of the areas which became the border areas 
after partition were already pursuing agriculture-related livelihoods.6 This implied 
that agriculture-related livelihoods became, and still are, the predominant means of 
livelihood along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.  
The predominance of these livelihoods is characteristic of almost all the rural areas 
of India and Bangladesh.7 Yet the nature of some of the aspects of these livelihood 
practices attains a unique feature in the context of their performance along the 
border. These features make agriculture-related livelihoods along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border different from their non-border version.     
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Plate 5. Fencing along the South Dinajpur border, West Bengal, 2012.  
 
i. Crisis of the ‘fenced-out’ lands 
As mentioned in the introduction, the regulations of the Ground Rules followed by 
India’s decision to fence its borders left large parts of lands (both residential villages 
and cultivated land) outside the fence.8 The issue of being fenced-out has, over the 
years, been the most persistent crisis for the people living and earning a livelihood on 
the West Bengal side of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.   
The farmers require official attestation of the fact that they live and/or cultivate their 
lands or work as agricultural labourers outside the fence.  They receive cards of 
different colours (farmers get red cards, agricultural labourers get yellow) for the 
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purpose.9 The attestation needs to be provided by the Panchayat10 head. Submitting 
the attested documents along with proofs of his identity (mostly voter cards) to the 
BSF constables at the fence gates every morning constitutes the daily routine of a 
farmer.11 The gates are opened for the farmers to access their lands at certain 
scheduled times of the day.12 This implies that the farmers’ access to fenced-out 
lands depends on the border regulations and whims of the BSF. ‘If only the 
documents are considered sufficiently valid by the BSF, will they let us pass through 
the gate. Otherwise they do not accept them, even if it is in order,’ says Rashid 
Hossein while complaining about how the farmers live and work according to the 
whims of the border guards.13 The farmers are also required to attest names of other 
possible male members of the family (son, brother or a male relative) who might 
need to attend work in the fenced-out lands in the absence of the farmer himself.14 
Women are, most often, not allowed to cross the fence at all, even if they need to 
take food to the male members working in the fenced-out land.15   
There are restrictions on the cattle, tools and other agriculture-related products 
(seeds, fertilisers) which a farmer can carry to his land outside the fence. The type 
and number/amount of such items also require attestation from the Panchayat official 
and cannot be violated under any means. The BSFs often have the last word in 
matters of disputes regarding such regulations.16 ‘We have to work in the fields 
according to their (BSF’s) whims. They are creating problems regarding our 
agricultural tools, fertilisers. They do not let us carry more than 5 kilograms of 
fertiliser and in these cases, permissions from Panchayat members do not 
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help’,17says Balaram Mahato who cultivates lands outside the fence.  The measures 
are meant for preventing smuggling across the border, explains a BSF official: ‘The 
tendency to carry more than what is required outside the fence and illegally sell the 
extra amount to the Bangladeshis on the other side of the fence is rampant among the 
border population.’18  
The process of submission of documents at the gate, followed by entrance to the 
lands, one at a time, delays the farmers’ work schedule. This, specifically, becomes a 
serious concern in the summer months since farmers have to work late in the 
afternoons in the scorching heat.19 Moreover, once past the gate, the farmers cannot 
come back even if they need to and have to wait for the next opening slot. Incidents 
of farmers falling sick during work and not being able to access a doctor because 
they have been fenced out for that while, or even of farmers being hit by hailstorms 
at work and unable to run to a shelter because of being fenced out, are common.20  
Negotiating the fence is as hazardous for agricultural labourers as it is for owners of 
farmlands outside the fence. The latter often employ agricultural labourers to 
cultivate their lands. The labourers are often not local residents of the border areas 
and, thus, not accustomed to border regulations. They are apprehensive about 
submitting their voter cards to the BSF for fear of them being misplaced.21  Being 
dependent on the whims of the BSF affects the labourers as well, who are often seen 
to be engaged in other forms of livelihood practices to support their meagre earnings 
as agricultural labourers. However, the gate restrictions prohibit them from utilising 
their time. ‘Even if the labourers finish their work, they have to wait in the field for 
hours till the gate reopens on the next scheduled time’,22 says Imtiaz, a farmer 
cultivating fenced-out land.  
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For those whose homesteads have been left outside the fence, living by and surviving 
the border has become a challenge in itself. The scheduled timings for the opening of 
the fence gates are, in no way, made flexible for them, implying that they also have 
to abide by the timings like the farmers. Access to schools, colleges, hospitals, 
relatives, friends and any other basic amenities depends on the opening of the gates 
at scheduled timings. Registering their names at the BSF checkposts near the gates is 
a daily routine for them as well. The villages outside the fence lack every civic 
amenity, which forces the inhabitants of the fenced-out lands to cross the gate for 
every little need.23  Incidents of death, for not being able to cross the gate and access 
a doctor, are not rare.24 
The anxiety of being fenced out rings loud in the responses of the people who 
negotiate the fence every day. ‘There is a feeling of being imprisoned when we are 
on that side of the fence, when we cannot enter the gates even if we want to. We 
want the gates to be left open all day so that we can move in and out freely’,25 says 
Animesh. Given the confinement of the people outside the fence for about 20 hours 
every day, such responses make perfect sense and are indications of how the process 
of double-bordering affected by the fence has affected the perceptions of the farmers, 
like inside-outside, free-imprisoned. 
It is important to keep in mind that this ordeal of negotiating border fences by the 
farmers is to move within their own state and not across an international border. The 
construction of the fence has re-defined the spatial perception of what constitutes the 
border, acting, in a way, as a second border between two territorial locations—the 
‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of the fence. ‘An Indian is devoid of the freedom to move 
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around freely at the borders,’ is how Narendranath Ghosh expresses his anguish,26 
when explaining the irony of having to prove one’s identity when moving around in 
one’s own country in the border areas, let alone crossing the borders. Neil Brenner’s 
idea of a ‘scalar structuration’27 helps us in understanding the re-interpretation of the 
scales of the border space by civilians as well as border guards, where the creation of 
the border followed by the construction of the fence has redefined the sense of 
inclusion-exclusion for the people who negotiate state apparatuses at the border 
everyday.28   
The demand for shifting the fence and the BSF outposts to the ‘zero point’ rings loud 
in most of the responses. ‘The BSF must be posted at the zero point...they must man 
the actual border’,29 says Samsuddin. The phrase ‘actual border’ indicates the 
perceptions of double-bordering that the fence has led to.   
The theft of crops or attack on farmers by miscreants on the fenced-out lands is a 
common occurrence along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.30 Once the gates 
close for the day, the crops on these lands lie unattended and exposed to theft by 
miscreants from the Bangladesh side.31 Despite the farmers being witness to such 
thefts, the BSF constables prohibit them from accessing their lands and stopping the 
theft. Complaints to the BSF officials regarding such ocuurences rarely bear fruit,32 
as they cite reasons of jurisdictional complications in justifying their inactivity. 
According to the BSF officers, such occurrences are not under their jurisdiction since 
the theft is by foreign nationals, i.e. Bangladeshis, and that, too, outside the fence 
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and, hence, outside the realm of their control.33 Officially, the land between the ‘zero 
point’ and the border fence is Indian territory, by virtue of being located within the 
territorial delimitations of the state. But the construction of the fence has virtually 
turned these lands into no-man’s lands—unguarded by Indian border guards and 
vulnerable to criminal activities by Bangladeshi miscreants.34    
Interestingly, responses confirming the decrease in the number of burglaries in 
homes inside the fence are also not rare. This implies that while the fence safeguards 
the houses inside the fence from ‘Bangladeshi burglars’, it also exposes the fenced-
out lands and homes to the same miscreants.35 Ambivalent feelings regarding the 
fence are discernible among the respondents. Kuddus Rahman expresses his concern 
in the following way: ‘Let there be fencing. We do not have a problem with that. 
They have to do whatever it takes for the security of India. But our humble request is 
to let the farmers work in their fields without problem. And BSF is the main obstacle 
to this end.’36 
Recorded cases of trespassing have noticeably increased after the fencing. This does 
not necessarily suggest that the actual number of trespassing incident has increased 
but only that the presence of the gates now makes the movement of people more 
visible and easy to locate, unlike the previous unfenced border where unhindered 
movement across the border often went unnoticed and, hence, unrecorded. The 
following response from a Bangladeshi interviewee, Md. Zia-ul Haq, explains how 
the fence has made the border more visible and cross-border movement more 
traceable than it was previously: ‘There are a large number of Indian convicts in 
Dinajpur jail in Bangladesh. Most of them are convicted of illegal infiltration. Some 
of them might have crossed over to the Bangladesh side for agriculture. Some of 
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them have been caught from their own land in India. From 2005 onwards, the 
number of Indian convicts in Dinajpur jail has increased.  Most of these convicts 
used to be set free before the fence had been constructed. After the fencing, the 
number of officially-convicted tresspassers has increased. Many of them are Indian 
farmers who mistakenly cross over to the Bangladeshi side without an official 
document. Many of them are afraid to go back in fear of being apprehended by the 
BSF. So they surrender to BGB and are, then, sent back to India through Flag 
Meetings between the BSF and the BGB’.37  
The issue of the violation of fencing rules by the BSF has been one of the more 
important issues regarding fencing.38 ‘The rule of leaving a 150 yards gap between 
the ‘zero point’ and the fence is not being observed everywhere. Often the fences are 
constructed way inside the villages, at a distance of more than 200 yards from the 
‘zero point’. The fence should at least be moved to its stipulated position. And still 
after that the land that will be fenced out should be taken over by the government 
against a compensation to the farmers who lose their land,’ says Pranabesh, a farmer 
with ‘fenced out’ farmlands.39  
Demands for exchanging the ‘fenced-out’ lands in return for compensation from the 
government are frequent in the responses of the farmers owning lands outside the 
fence. In some parts of the North-West frontier provinces in India, including 
provinces like Rajasthan and Punjab, government compensation for fenced-out lands 
is already in place, where the government pays a fixed amount of Rs. 3,000-4,000 to 
farmers who have their lands outside the fence, irrespective of the yield. While the 
government of West Bengal is aware of such a scheme, no definite policy has yet 
been designed.40 ‘We have requested government officials to look into this 
possibility of compensation. In spite of assurances, no such policy has been, so far, 
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announced,’ says Hirak Kanti Munshi, secretary to the local committee of a political 
party at Balurghat in South Dinajpur district (West Bengal).41  
ii. Legal consequences of fencing 
The fence violates some of the aspects of the Indian Constitution, specifically aspects 
of Article 19 and 21. Article 19(1) says that all citizens of India shall have the right 
(d) to move throughout the territory of India and (e) to reside and settle in any part of 
the territory of India. The state can only make reasonable restriction of the right in 
the interest of the general public or for the protection of the interest of any scheduled 
tribe [Article 19(5)]. The fence violates Article 19(1) of the Constitution by 
restricting the movement and settlement of people outside it, inspite of the fact that it 
is neither in public interest nor are the lands outside it, tribal areas (i.e. not officially 
designated). The issue of security cited by India as a reason for fencing does not hold 
good for two reasons: one, unless there is a state of emergency, martial law or war, 
such construction in the name of security is a violation of the fundamental rights of 
Indian citizens; two, even after the construction of the fence on security grounds, 
India is unable to prevent or even trace illegal Bangladeshi infiltrators into its 
territory.  
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution ensures the life and personal liberty of its 
citizens. Yet by preventing them from pursuing livelihoods (and, hence, life), by 
denying the citizens their access to basic amenities and by illegally confining the 
citizens outside the fence for 20 hours every day, the latter is a serious violation of 
some of the basic  rights of Indian citizens.  
The Right to Property (Article 300-A) is also being violated by depriving the citizens 
of free access to their property outside the fence, rendering the property valueless, 
and also by depriving them of any compensation for such forceful devaluation of 
their property through the construction of the fence.  
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 Interview with Hirak Kanti Munshi, resident of Balurghat (South Dinajpur district of West 
Bengal, 24 January 2012); there have been government-level talks between ministers and the 
BSF regarding the fence issue, but to no fruitful effect. Staff Reporter (4 November 2009) 
BSF Pranab Katha: Simanta basi der jonyo udyog. Ananda Bazar Patrika. [Online] 
Available from:  http://www.anandabazar.com/archive/1091104/4mur4.htm. [Last accessed: 
17 September 2013].  
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iii. Effect of the border on the nature of cultivation along it 
The whole stretch of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border boasts of fertile land fed by 
a number of rivers, making this belt and almost the whole length of the border zone a 
highly cultivable territory, with a three-crop record in one year.42 Apart from the 
usual food crops such as paddy, wheat, lentils and mustard, and cash crops such as 
jute, a variety of fruit cultivation is also practiced by the cultivators.  
Certain crops that are harmful to the health of the farmers and also have addictive 
features such as tobacco and poppy43 are also seen to have increased along the border 
because they constitute profitable smuggling items.  
Poppy: Poppy cultivation is illegal in West Bengal,44 though that has not stopped 
cultivators from growing it due to its high profitability. Out of the seven districts in 
West Bengal where poppy cultivation has been reported, four are border districts—
Nadia, Murshidabad, Malda and South Dinajpur (the other three being Bardhaman, 
Hooghly and Birbhum).45 According to the police, an organised criminal network is 
encouraging poppy cultivation by offering greater profit margins to cultivators. As 
newspaper reports suggest, thousands of acres46 of poppy plantations have been 
burned down through government initiatives in January 2011 (January being the time 
of harvest). In January 2012, about 340 acres were burned down, while another 3,000 
acres were still being cultivated illegally.47 The role of the border becomes clear in 
the explanation given by a section of the police department with regard to the failure 
in completely preventing poppy cultivation. According to them, while most of the 
poppy plantations are traced with the help of satellites, a major portion lying near the 
border or on the chars/enclaves cannot be detected due to satellite restrictions in 
border areas.  Sometimes poppy plantations are also surrounded by other plantations 
to escape detection. No amount of warning, awareness programmes or legal steps 
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 Interview with a BSF official at BRC-pur BSF camp (Nadia district of West Bengal, 22 
October 2011); Jamwal, 2004, p.8.   
43
 The dried latex of the poppy is called opium—an addictive drug, which again can be 
chemically processed for making heroin—a stronger narcotic.  
44
 In India, only in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan can poppy be 
cultivated legally, according to the regulations of the Central Bureau of Narcotics.   
45
 De Sarkar, S. (1 October 2012) Posto chash rukhtey ebar SMS-e pulishi prochar. Ananda 
Bazar Patrika. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.anandabazar.com/archive/1121001/1raj1.html. [Last accessed: 27 July 2013].  
46
 640 acres= 1square mile.  
47
 De Sarkar, 1 October 2012,  Ananda Bazar Patrika.  
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have succeeded in preventing the illegal cultivation of poppy, especially along the 
border.48  
Tobacco: The cultivation of tobacco is yet another widespread occurrence along the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border despite the harmful effects of tobacco plantation on 
the cultivators. There are no official restrictions on tobacco plantation, either in India 
or Bangladesh, to act as a deterrent in this case. But cultivating tobacco has its share 
of hazards. ‘Green Tobacco Sickness’49 and lungs problems are some of the hazards 
associated with it. Tobacco companies around the world encourage its cultivation, 
especially in developing countries, and the government subsidies add to the problem. 
Poor farmers fall prey to such inducements. West Bengal is an important area for 
tobacco cultivation— Cooch Behar, Jalpaiguri, Malda and Murshidabad being the 
most widely-cultivated districts, apart from other areas, including Nadia.50 All the 
five above-mentioned districts happen to be border districts in West Bengal.  
Cannabis: Cannabis51 production has also been on the rise in the border district of 
Cooch Behar because of high profits52 and, more importantly, the district’s close 
proximity to the ‘Siliguri Corridor’53 that caters to the neighbouring states of 
Bangladesh, besides Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet. The riverbeds or the kitchen gardens 
of the local inhabitants of Cooch Behar, a border district in West Bengal, are being 
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   Ibid.  
49
 Green Tobacco Sickness is a form of nicotine poisoning. When wet leaves are handled, 
nicotine from the leaves gets absorbed by the skin and causes nausea, vomiting and 
dizziness.  
50
 Dinhata Jute Tobacco Co. Indiamart. Available from: http://www.indiamart.com/dinhata-
jute/profile.html.  
51
 Cannabis is a genus of flowering plant and is grown mostly in Central and South Asia. 
Though traditionally used for fibre, oil, medicinal purposes and recreational drug, the dried 
flowers are also widely used to make marijuana—a narcotic, while extracts of cannabis are 
used for making hashish—yet another narcotic, and hash oil.  
52
 15,000 square feet of cannabis production gives a return of about Rs.5,00000. Sarkar, D. 
(15 June 2012) Cultivation of illegal cannabis flourishing in Coochbehar. The Economic 
Times. [Online] Available from: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-06-
15/news/32254673_1_cannabis-kitchen-garden-coochbehar-district. [Last accessed: 27 July 
2013].  
53
 The Siliguri Corridor or Chicken's Neck has its origin in the partition of India in 1947 and 
is a narrow stretch of land that connects India's north-eastern provinces to the rest of India, 
with the countries of Nepal and Bangladesh lying on either side of the corridor. The kingdom 
of Bhutan lies on the northern side of the corridor. The city of Siliguri in the state of West 
Bengal is the major city in this area. The city is the central node that connects Bhutan, Nepal, 
Sikkim, the Darjeeling hills, north-east India and the rest of India. Apart from being the 
hotbed of illegal infiltration, this stretch of land has also become an important corridor for 
narcotics and weapon trafficking.  
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used for cannabis production, making Cooch Behar a flourishing cannabis-producing 
district.54 The Siliguri Corridor takes care of the merchandising of the product. 
Despite the police destroying truckloads of cannabis or burning produce in the field, 
cannabis cultivation contuinues in full swing, much like poppy cultivation55— 
drawing attention to the territorial importance of the border in the context of the 




i. Agricultural labourers 
Though working as agricultural labourers is an important source of livelihood along 
the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, it is clearly not sufficient to provide for the 
entire population living along it. ‘My husband works as a labourer in other people’s 
jute cultivations where his job is to bring the harvest from the field and then to wash 
and dry them. The whole job fetches him a meagre sum of Rs.120 a day. Do you 
think a whole family can survive on that? It is like being a daily-wage worker. There 
is no income on the days when there is no work,’56 says Rupali Mahato.  
ii. Labourers in other parts of the country or abroad 
The lack of alternative livelihood opportunities at the border drives the border 
civilians to other non-border and affluent areas in search of their livelihood, both in 
India and Bangladesh.57 ‘We do not have any industry at this border, which is why 
more than fifty per cent of the population goes abroad as labourers’, says Ranjit.58  
Male civilians are more prone to migration to non-border areas as labourers in 
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 About 10,0000000 square feet of agricultural land is under cannabis production in Cooch 
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 Interview with Hirak Kanti Munshi, resident of Balurghat (South Dinajpur district of West 
Bengal, 24 January 2012).  
58
 Interview with Ranjit, resident of Jamalpur village, Hili (South Dinajpur district of West 
Bengal, 24 January 2012).  
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factories.59 In recent times, MGNREGA (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act 2005)60 is taking initiatives, through various 
employment schemes, to hold back people in their own areas and to prevent 
migration to faraway places as labourers. ‘But through NREGA, at best 50 to 70 
people can be employed at a time, but not 500 to 700,’61 says Animesh. The 
indication is clear. The West Bengal-Bangladesh border areas are ill-equipped in 
providing enough livelihood opportunities to their inhabitants.  
The other avenues of labour for the border people include working as labourers in 
brick-kilns and rice-mills, and as porters at the Border Land Ports. Engaging more 
people, especially young men looking for livelihood opportunities, as labourers in 
these places might help reduce their engagement in cross-border smuggling 
activities, feels Hirak Kanti Munshi.62 
iii. Brick-kilns 
In the southern part of West Bengal, especially in the border district of the North 24 
Parganas, more than 400 brick-kilns63 have mushroomed over the years due to the 
presence of rivers in the district. West Bengal shares a substantial area of riverine 
borders with Bangladesh, making the border area suitable for the growth of brick- 
kilns. The sand deposition left by the rivers on their banks acts as raw materials for 
the brick-kiln industries64 and, hence, these kilns develop along the banks of rivers. 
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 Interview with Bina Pramanik, resident of Ramjivanpur village (South Dinajpur district of 
West Bengal, 24 January 2012).  
60
 The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) is an 
Indian job guarantee scheme, enacted by legislation on August 25, 2005. The scheme 
provides a legal guarantee for one hundred days of employment in every financial year to 
adult members of any rural household willing to do public work-related unskilled manual 
work at the statutory minimum wage of 120 (US$2.18) per day in 2009 prices. If they fail to 
do so, the govt. has to pay the salary to their homes. The law was initially called the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) but was renamed on 2 October 2009.  
61
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Interview with Animesh, resident and farmer at Bindol (North Dinajpur district of West 
Bengal, 26 January 2012).  
62
 Interview with Hirak Kanti Munshi, resident of Balurghat (South Dinajpur district of West 
Bengal, 24 January 2012).  
63
 Cheruvari, S. (2006) Changing lives in the brick kilns of West Bengal. Report for UNICEF 
India. Available from: http://www.unicef.org/india/child_protection_1736.htm. [Accessed: 
27 July 2013].  
64
 Molla, H.R. (2011) Embankment of Lower Ajoy River and its impact on Brick-Kiln 
Indsutry in Central Bengal, India. International Journal of Research in Social Sciences and 
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The landless labourers, including a large number of migrant labourers not just from 
within India but also from Bangladesh (who cross the border to work in these kilns) 
depend largely on the seasonal occupation that these kilns provide.65 The labourers 
from Bangladesh are mostly illegal migrants, who cross the border without passports 
and start working in these kilns on a seasonal basis. The demand for cheap labour 
pushes the owners of these kilns to adopt ‘unofficial’ means of employing labourers. 
The illegal migrant labourers from Bangladesh do not find any official recognition. 
What they do find is a means of livelihood on a seasonal basis.  Most of them go 
back to Bangladesh once the brick-making season is over. But many of them stay 
back and eventually mix with the local Bengali population of West Bengal to look 
for other avenues of livelihood.  
Plate 6. Brick-kilns along the riverine border, 2012.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Humanities. 2(II). [Online] Available from: 
http://www.ijrssh.com/webmaster/upload/Oct_2012_Hasibur%20Rahaman%20Molla.pdf. 
[Accessed: 27 July 2013].  
65
 Cheruvari, 2006.  
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‘The brick kilns have increased a lot in the last few years. We are extremely 
dependent on the kilns. The womenfolk also work there,’ says Md. Tafikul Islam.66 
In the absence of big-scale industries in the border areas, brick-kilns provide 
employment opportunities, even if seasonally, to a large number of people living 
along the borders. ‘There is nothing like an industry here. We just have the brick- 
kilns in this area. Otherwise, livelihood here means agriculture’, says Riazul 
Mondol.67  
Amidst the lack of employment opportunities and the increasing involvement of 
border people with illegal means of earning, the brick-kilns have almost become life-
savers, as responses from the border civilians indicate. The stretch between Lalgola 
(Murshidabad) and Basirhat (North 24 Parganas) along the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border is especially lined by such brick-kilns, many of them illegal and without 
official license, given the vast area of riverine borders in this stretch.68  
Yet the narrative of the brick-kilns has its share of irony as well. While the brick-
kilns have provided better livelihood opportunities in the border areas, they have also 
driven many of their labourers into smuggling practices. The labourers use their 
income from these brick-kilns in smuggling, informs Kalipada Ghosh, a human-
rights activist working with the labourers of the brick-kilns.69 Border regulations 
affect the brick-kiln labourers in other ways as well, including the need to present 
voter cards to the BSF when required, and restrictions on working after 6PM. This 
implies that the labourers are unable to earn the wage that labourers in non-border 
brick-kilns make by loading bricks on to trucks in the evening.70 
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 Interview with Md. Tafikul Islam, resident of Panitor border (North 24 Parganas district of 
West Bengal, 17 January 2012).  
67
 Interview with Riazul Mondol, resident of Balurghat (South Dinajpur district of West 
Bengal, 24 January 2012).  
68
 Biswas, G. and Sujauddin (16 January 2013) Abhijoger shasti chhilo boro tikto. Ananda 
Bazar Patrika. [Online] Available from: http://www.anandabazar.com/16mur1.html. [Last 
accessed: 17 September 2013]; Biswas, G. and Mukhopadhyay, S. (17 January 2013) Policer 
najar kintu koda. Ananda Bazar Patrika. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.anandabazar.com/17mur2.html. [Last accessed: 17 September 2013].  
69
 Interview with Kalipada Ghosh, resident and human rights activist at Basirhat (North 24 
Parganas district of West Bengal, 17 January 2012).  
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Rice-mills had once constituted an important source of livelihood for the areas which 
now constitute the border districts of South Dinajpur (West Bengal) and Dinajpur 
(Bangladesh). While raw paddy came from the farmlands of Dinajpur, the rice-mills 
were mostly located in the western part of the district (which, after partition, became 
a part of West Bengal). The few remaining rice-mills in South Dinajpur (West 
Bengal) stand testimony to the immense impact that the partition of Bengal in 1947 
had on the flourishing economy of the region.  The now-decadent rice-mills were 
once flourishing industries and catalysts in the process of the growth of the districts, 
which are now the border districts.71 Gourab Sarkar, a businessman in Hili explains it 
in the following way: ‘After the partition, the hinterland for these mills was cut off 
from the mills, having been located on the other side of the border. Many of the rice 
mills here shifted to the places which produced the raw materials, leaving Hili (the 
headquarters of South Dinajpur) barren. Increase in the carrying cost of raw Paddy 
resulted in this shift. The mills, therefore, moved nearer to the hinterland.’72  
These districts had their heyday during the flourishing of these mills and, eventually, 
went into decadence after the partition— followed by the closure of the rice-mills.  
Just as brick-kilns make themselves visible in every narrative of the people of the 
southern part of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, so do rice-mills in those of the 
northern part of the border—the difference being in the tone of loss and frustration in 
the latter, due to the degenerate state of the rice-mills. Both the rice-mill industry and 
the brick-kiln industry have been affected by the creation of the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border in a negative and positive way, respectively. While the brick-kilns 
are a positive product of the riverine borders, the rice-mills reveal the negative 
impact that the creation of the border had on some traditional industries. ‘Earlier the 
mills engaged a lot of people. Now, there are just two of these mills left, which do 
not suffice for the demand for livelihood of the people of this area. After the 
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 Interview with Gourab Sarkar, resident of Hili (South Dinajpur district of West Bengal, 25 
January 2012). 
72
 Ibid.; The ‘other factors’ were part of the demand for territories during partition, the 
Muslim League had demanded the inclusion of Calcutta urban agglomeration in East Bengal, 
including the areas where the ‘jute mills, military installations, ordnance factories, railway 
workshops and lines were located’. The demands were made on the grounds of East Bengal’s 
‘economy, internal communication and defence’.  Chatterji, J. (February 1999) The 
Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal’s Border Landscape, 1947-52. 
Modern Asian Studies. 33(1). pp.198-199.  
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partition, the process of giving out licenses for trading in raw materials have become 
more stringent, and has almost stopped, in order to avoid misuse of the licenses 
through illegal trading. This has led to the closure of a number of rice mills. As a 
result, many people are going away to other places for work,’ rues Hirak Kanti 
Munshi.73  
The stringency of the border resulted in the downfall of Hili as a commercial hub by 
increasing the communication hazards between it and Kolkata (the headquarters of 
West Bengal). ‘The railways could pass through the eastern parts of Bengal which 
later became Bangladesh, to cut short the travel time between Kolkata and Hili. 
Partition has increased the travel time between the two, forcing the trains to take a 
longer route. Most of the major railway services halted at Hili because it was an 
important destination. Hili was then the most flourishing business centre after 
Kolkata, since neither Siliguri nor Balurghat had emerged as business towns back 
then. In Hili alone, there were 15 rice-mills, making Hili not just the most important 
commercial hub in north Bengal but also the gateway to the north-east—a role that 
Siliguri now plays,’74 laments Gourab. There have been renewed efforts in recent 
times to re-establish railway links via Bangladesh between commercial hubs of the 
northern part of West Bengal and its major railway stations.75 These efforts complete 
the circle of the journey of border narratives, beginning from the disruption and 
illegalisation of links to their being re-established.  
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Interview with Hirak Kanti Munshi, resident of Balurghat (South Dinajpur district of West 
Bengal, 24 January 2012).    
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 Interview with Gourab Sarkar, resident of Hili (South Dinajpur district of West Bengal, 25 
January 2012); The humiliation of being searched by Pakistani guards has been cited as 
reason for the disappointment of those travelling between North and West Bengal via 
Pakistani territory after partition, besides the hazards of taking circuitous routes, and 
numerous changes and long waits. Chatterji, 1999, p.230.   
75
 Staff Reporter (12 February 2010) Via Bangladesh, Haldibari-Sealdah train chalu r dabi. 
Ananda Bazar Patrika. [Online] Available from: 





Plate 7. An unused railway line, disrupted by the creation of the border, 2011.  
 
IV. Land Ports 
 
i. Coolies in Land Ports 
The land ports along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border provide a range of 
livelihood opportunities to the border population, in both legitimate and illegitimate 
forms. Hili (West Bengal)-Bangla Hili (Bangladesh) and Petrapole (West Bengal)-
Benapole (Bangladesh) form the two most important Land Ports along the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border, though other check posts also function as ports or are 
being developed as Land Ports in order to reduce the load on these two existing ones. 
One of the important means of involvement for the border people that these ports 
offer is in the form of labourers. A substantial number of them are required for 
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loading and unloading the trucks. It is mostly the local population living near the 
border that works as full-time or part-time coolies (labourers) in these ports.76   
While the Land Ports provide a good livelihood opportunity to the border population, 
they also have their flip side like all the other livelihood practices along the border. 
Those along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border are also important sites of 
smuggling, contrary to the idea that Land Ports ought to be under strict surveillance 
and, hence, are unfavourable for illegal activities. It is, in fact, under the surveillance 
mechanisms of the border forces at these ports that illegal practices thrives the 
most.77   
The coolies are not just the ones most prone to getting involved in activities like 
working as carriers for smuggling contraband items across the borders, but also the 
worst victims of the same by getting addicted to the drugs they smuggle. A number 
of families are affected by this whereby male members of the families fall prey to 
drug networks and, eventually, addiction, while working as coolies in one of these 
border ports.78 
ii. Traders at the Land Ports 
Bangladesh shares about 40 border points with India, including the Land Ports (LP) 
and Land Customs Stations (LCS), of which less than 15 are active.79 In terms of 
legal trading, a wide range of produce—natural and otherwise, moves between the 
two states of India and Bangladesh through border ports, constituting about 60% of 
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 Interview with Gourab Sarkar, resident of Hili (South Dinajpur district of West Bengal, 25 
January 2012).  
77
 Interview with Jumaira, resident of Hili border (Dinajpur district of Bangladesh, 9 October 
2011).  
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husband was a coolie at Hili port. During that time he became addicted to heroin. He stopped 
contributing money to the family. It’s been two years that he has been working as a dhoor 
here. My children Shuruj [12] and Furuj [10] are also involved in smuggling.) Interview with 
Rumela Begum, resident of Hili border area (Dinajpur district of Bangladesh, 8 October 
2011).  
79
 Mirza, T. and Bacani, E. (2013) Addressing Hard and Soft Infrastructure Barriers to Trade 
in South Asia. Asian Development Bank South Asia Working Paper Series. No.16. [Online] 
Available from: 
http://sasec.asia/web/images/sasec/pdf/Addressing_Infra_Barriers_to_Trade_in_SA.pdf. 
[Accessed: 29 July 2013].  
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the total trade between the two states.80 The largest trading point between India and 
Bangladesh is the Land Port (LP) of Benapole-Petrapole between the Jessore district 
of Bangladesh and the North 24 Parganas district of West Bengal, respectively. Other 
important Land Ports, especially between Bangladesh and West Bengal, are 
Sonamasjid-Mehdipur, Hili-Bangla Hili, Birol-Radhikapur, Banglabandha-Phulbari, 
Burimari-Chengrabandha and Bhomra-Ghojadanga.81 The enormity of trade through 
these Land Ports ensures the involvement of a substantial number of people, 
including labourers and traders from local areas and other cities/towns,82 customs 
officials and a whole array of people in official and non-official capacities.  
Both in terms of the variety of traded products as well as infrastructure, Benapole-
Petrapole port scores over Hili.83 This explains the widespread occurrence of illegal 
cross-border activities in Hili, including bribes paid to border guards.84  
 
Plate 8. Truck terminal at Petrapole Border Land Port, 2011. 
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 Staff Reporter (23 March 2013) Govt. to set up 4 new land-ports to facilitate cross-border 
trade. The Financial Express. [Online] Available from: http://www.thefinancialexpress-
bd.com/index.php?ref=MjBfMDNfMjNfMTNfMV8yXzE2NDE0MA. [Last accessed: 29 
July 2013].  
81
 Mirza and Bacani, 2013.   
82
 Interview with Jumaira, resident of Hili border (Dinajpur district of Bangladesh, 9 October 
2011).  
83
 Mirza and Bacani, 2013.   
84
 Interview with Gourab Sarkar, resident of Hili (South Dinajpur district of West Bengal, 25 
January 2012).  
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V. Currency-exchange counters, restaurants and shops at the Land 
Ports 
 
i. Currency-exchange counters 
The Land Ports provide other livelihood opportunities as well. The currency-
exchange counters, which exchange Bangladeshi Taka for Indian Rupees and vice 
versa, constitute an important livelihood opportunity in the Land Port areas along the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border. The counters double-up as tourist agents in 
arranging for accommodation and travel for tourists who travel to India and 
Bangladesh through these ports. Mornings are the busiest times for the counters due 
to restrictions in border areas on any kind of official work late in the evenings.85  
Subodh Majumdar, who has been working in a currency-exchange counter at the 
Petrapole border for over a decade now, explains the flip side of the system: ‘There 
are hardly any checks on the number of people travelling across the border. If 
someone intends to stay back for some illegal intentions, he/she simply has to 
destroy his/her passport and that will destroy all proofs of his/her existence. When 
they enter, they provide an Indian address of the place where they will be staying. 
But no one checks the validity of the address. Most of them (Bangladeshis) have 
relatives on this side. They come, put up in their relatives’ place, gradually buy land 
and property here and settle here for good. They just send back their passports to 
Bangladesh via someone. The border forces or police do not keep an eye on the 
people, until they are specifically suspicious about someone, in which case, the 
matter goes to the court. Otherwise, they (Bangladeshis) eventually obtain voter 
cards and settle here once and for all’.86  
ii. Restaurants 
Restaurants87 form yet another important source of livelihood in and around the 
border Land Ports along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. The sheer number of 
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 Interview with Subodh Majumdar, resident and employee at counter at Petrapole border 
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 More like makeshift eating joints (like Dhabas in India) serving basic meals of rice, dal, 
vegetable, fish/meat. The service is personal/casual in nature and lacks any of the formality 
or even the poshness of the restaurants that one comes across in big cities.  
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such eating joints in and around the ports indicates the prospect of having restaurants 
in such busy areas. ‘There are less residential houses here and more restaurants and 
counters. Thousands of people come here every day, where will they have their food? 
It is these restaurants and counters which make the border so buzzing,’ says Apurba 
Kumar Biswas, a resident of the Petrapole border area.88 These restaurants, apart 
from serving the tourists, traders, labourers and all those who live and work at the 
border, act as a source of livelihood for hundreds of people as well.  
Though these counters or restaurants might seem minor livelihood opportunities 
compared to the enormity of the large-scale trading that takes place at these ports, 
they are no less important. In fact, as far as engaging the local population at the 
border is concerned, they largely score over the big trading businesses. Unlike the 
traders, the people employed in these counters and restaurants are essentially local 
people whose lives, over the years, have come to depend on the border.  
iii. Border shops 
The ownership of small shops in these port areas also constitutes another border-
dependent livelihood option along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. These 
depend mostly on ‘side-trading’—a co-lateral occurrence from the large assignments 
of trade that the ports witness everyday. A small part of the trade assignments are 
channelised into the local shops, which sell these items at lower prices than their 
actual market prices. The items enter the country legally as part of a larger 
consignment and then find their way into the small shops dotting the border Land 
Ports, while the rest of the consignment travels to other parts of the country. The 
items sold in these shops mostly include cigarettes, spices, small electronic goods, 
chocolates, juices and snacks.  The border guards, as well as the police and customs 
officials, are aware of their functioning.89  
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Plate 9. Petrapole border buzzing with currency-counters, restaurants and shops, 
2011.  
 
VI. Office of the border guards 
The office of the border guards, apart from providing livelihood to the border guards 
themselves, provides livelihood opportunities to the local civilians as well. Some of 
the local border population, though miniscule in number, are either engaged as 
assistants in the auctioning of smuggled items or as  purohits (priest) in the shrines 
inside the camps (this is specific to the BSF on the West Bengal border since a 
majority of them have shrines devoted to Hindu gods/goddesses). People engaged in 
one or the other activity inside the camps often end up playing mediators between the 
local civilians and the border guards.90 But their role as mediators depends on the 
discretion of the border guards, whose general feeling of distrust towards the local 
population prevents them from mingling with the border civilians.  
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 Interview with Rashid Hossein, resident of Lagola (Murshidabad district of West Bengal, 
8 November 2011).  
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In recent times, BSF has started recruiting local youths from border areas into BSF 
services, providing yet another livelihood option for the border civilians.91 
 
Plate 10. Land Customs Station Office, Patgram, Lalmonirhat, Bangladesh, 2011. 
 
VII. Fishing 
West Bengal and Bangladesh share 200 kilometres of a riverine border,92 of which 
Ichamati, Padma and Tista are the most important border rivers. While these rivers as 
borders, ironically, attains significance more as catalysts for smuggling, they are also 
important for promoting fishing as a livelihood option for the people on both their 
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sides.93 However, border regulations affect riverine borders as much as they do land 
borders, influencing the livelihood options of the people along them.94  
Moreover, the sense of insecurity associated with border life in general also looms 
large in the responses of the civilians. ‘There is always the fear of being shot by the 
BSF. If someone moves a bit to the other side of the river during fishing, BSF gets 
hold of them and beats them up’,95 says Jahangir, a fisherman in Kalindi river. The 
borderline, running along the river, is an imaginary line—seen at an equidistant point 
from either bank. It is, in fact, difficult not to violate the borderline when one is in 
the river since gauging the distance to the bank from the river is far more difficult 
than it is from the bank. The irony of imagining riverine border has also been 
expressed by the border guards themselves, besides the fishermen and civilians 
affected by it.  
 
Lines Drawn on Water96 
We have here 
Somewhat strange type of border – line, 
Going through the middle of the river 
 
Can anyone draw lines on water? 
Can a heart split up into two? 
 
The fish, as ever 
Keep going and coming 
Hither & thither 
Even the tortoises can not recognize 
The mid stream border-line 
 
I could never make out 
The names of the countries. 
                                                          
93
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Bangladesh, 14 February 2012).  
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From the fish that were caught 
 
I only know the names 
Of those fishing 
And helplessly watch 
The fish flopping about in anguish. 
 
 
Plate 11. Riverine border, with West Bengal on the far side, 2012.  
 
VIII. Livelihoods not directly related to the border 
Some of the other livelihood practices seen in the border areas, such as tailoring, 
beedi-making, owning a band-party and so on, though not directly related to the 
border, are nevertheless affected by it. If nothing else, the general sense of insecurity 
haunts the people engaged in these livelihoods as much as those in other border-
related occupations. 
i. Beedi-making 
 Beedi manufacturing is a 20 billion revenue-yielding industry in India that involves 
more than 10 million organised people and another 30 million people in the 
unorganised sector. The unorganised workforce in the beedi industry includes about 
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20 million marginal labourers, 6 million farmers, 4 million registered beedi rollers 
and another 1 million involved in plucking tendu leaves (the leaves used for making 
beedi). Women constitute 75% of the total workforce, which is almost essentially a 
rural one.97  
The areas along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, being essentially rural in 
character, also see involvement of a substantial number of their people in the beedi-
making industry.  The involvement is especially in the form of an unorganised 
workforce, including pluckers and rollers.Women constitute the major portion of the 
workforce, more so because of restrictions and insecurities involved in their 
movement in border areas.98 In the northern parts of the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border, the closure of the rice-mills has triggered the large-scale involvement of local 
civilians in beedi-making99. The creation of the border catalysed the closure of the 
rice-mills which, in turn, encouraged the emergence of beedi-making as an important 
alternative livelihood practice.  
ii. Tailoring  
Proximity to a city or an affluent town encourages the emergence of certain 
livelihood practices. Understandably, certain professions have emerged in those parts 
of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border which are in close proximity to Kolkata. The 
district of North 24 Parganas, being the closest border area to Kolkata,100 has 
witnessed the emergence of certain livelihood practices, such as tailoring, which 
depends for its market upon Kolkata. Basirhat is one such border town in this district 
which has seen the large-scale emergence of the tailoring business in the last couple 
of decades.101 This explains the concentration of a huge number of tailoring 
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shops/factories in and around the border areas of Basirhat.  Though these occupations 
are not directly related to the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, they are integral to 
narratives of border livelihoods along it.  
iii. Other options 
 The fluctuating prices of agricultural produce, coupled with restrictions in using the 
fenced-out lands, compel the border dwellers to look for alternative livelihood 
options. While some of these alternatives are related to or dependent on the border, 
others are not. Moreover, the seasonal nature of agriculture also renders the 
cultivators jobless at certain times, when they look for other options.  Running band-
parties102 or even working as domestic helps103 constitute such alternative means of 
livelihoods. But the essentially unaffluent nature of the border areas implies that such 
alternative means of livelihoods often fail to provide sufficient earnings.104  
 
IX. Illegal livelihood practices 
The creation of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border in 1947 followed by the 
deployment of border guards and, finally, the beginning of the construction of the 
fence in 1986 has affected traditional livelihood practices in these parts.  The border 
has also resulted in the evolution of some livelihood practices never seen before in 
the areas which now constitute the border. Both kinds of influences of the border on 
livelihood practices are seen in the legal and illegal practices prevelant, at present, 
along it. While some of the traditional practices have been illegalised by the creation 
of the border, some illegal practices have been a result of the creation of the border 
itself. The emergence of cross-border smuggling practices along it also has its roots 
in the ‘confused policy’ of India and East Pakistan following the partition, regarding 
the commodities which could be allowed to move across the border legally. This 
                                                                                                                                                                    
here. It is a very useful profession here. Kolkata serves as both our source for raw materials 
as well as markets for our products.) Interview with Bilal, resident of Basirhat (North 24 
Parganas district of West Bengal, 17 January 2012).  
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 Interview with Nikhil, resident of Mathurapur village (South Dinajpur district of West 
Bengal, 24 January 2012). 
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 Interview with Julekha, resident of Raibhat village, Bowladar (Dinajpur district of 
Bangladesh, 9 October 2011). 
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 Interview with Nikhil, resident of Mathurapur village (South Dinajpur district of West 
Bengal, 24 January 2012).  
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confusion ‘created a space for the emergence of smuggling as a thriving enterprise in 
the border areas, usually with the connivance of the border police’.105  
The geographical expanse of smuggling practices along the border in terms of the 
area covered and the range of contraband items crossing it indicate that cross-border 
smuggling practices are integral to the understanding of not just livelihood practices 
but the characteristic features of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border in general.  
From drugs (like heroin, marijuana, cough syrups, syringes, hormone-stimulating 
drugs and alcohols) to domestic and household necessities (crops, spices, utensils, 
cattle and fish), from turtles (even Monitor Lizards)106 and skeletons107 to cooking 
oil, petrol, diesel, metals, from electronic goods (phone sets, calculators) to luxury 
items (cloths, perfumes, junk jewellery), from fake currency notes and mobile phone 
SIM cards to newspapers—every conceivable item is being smuggled across the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border, despite the patrolling border guards and the 
surveillance mechanisms at work.108 This also indicates the awareness and, in some 
cases, co-operation of the border guards in such practices.  
Some points along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border have attained specific 
strategic importance for cross-border smuggling practices, like Hili (between the 
South Dinajpur district of West Bengal and Dinajpur district of Bangladesh), 
Petrapole-Benapole (between North 24 Parganas district of West Bengal and Jessore 
district of Bangladesh),109 and areas like Phulbari-Banglabandhu, Changrabandha-
Burimari, South Gitaldaha-Mogolhat, Raiganj-Ranipukur, Bagdha-Ansolia, 
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Krishnanagar-Jadabpur and Bashirhat-Bhomra.110 Such illegal livelihood practices 
have, over years of their functioning, not just become characteristic of the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border but also an integral part of the economy that runs along it.  
i. Drugs  
Cough Syrup: The smuggling of drugs, especially the cough syrup called 
Phensidyl,111 is the most commonly known practice in this border, besides that of 
heroin (like Jamtala, Khalidpur in Bongaon)112 and marijuana.113 Phensidyl is 
manufactured by a well-known pharmaceutical company in India from where it is 
distributed mostly to the northeastern parts of India and West Bengal.114 ‘In addition, 
empty Phensidyl bottles are refilled with higher narcotic content, repackaged as 
“Phensidyl Plus” and smuggled back into Bangladesh,’115 where they are acquired by 
addicts at a cheap price (the price for a 100ml bottle of smuggled Phensidyl in 
Bangladesh amounts to Tk.500116 and is acquired in India for Rs. 150,117 though the 
official market price for a 100ml Phensidyl bottle in India is Rs.75 and Rs.40.78 for a 
50ml bottle).118 Large consignments of Phensidyl bottles have been reportedly seized 
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along the India-Bangladesh border and still continue to be seized on a regular basis 
by the border guards.119  
Heroin/Hashish: Heroin has been mostly reported as sourced from the ‘Golden 
Crescent’,120 through India into Bangladesh.121Along the stretch of the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border, the Benapole-Petrapole, Hili-Bangla Hili and Gede-Darshana 
borders are the most prone to drug-trafficking.122 Other informal and small-scale 
drug-trafficking routes along this stretch include Phulbari-Banglabandhu, 
Changrabandha-Burimari, South Gitaldaha-Mogolhat, Raiganj-Ranipukur, Bagdha-
Ansolia, Krishnanagar-Jadabpur, and Bashirhat-Bhomra.123 The smuggling of heroin 
as well as other drugs is executed through conceivable and inconceivable ways, 
within tool boxes of bullock carts, the folds of women’s sarees, underground canals 
(built to drain excess rain water) and boats,124 besides trucks carrying agricultural 
products, fabrics and, as a journalist in a local newspaper in Dinajpur informed me, 
even hidden inside the death-beds of corpses taken for cremation or burial.125 
Smuggling through underground canals is difficult to trace since it is easy to mistake 
the act of smuggling for routine agricultural practices such as draining water from the 
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fields by farmers. It is only below the culverts that such acts of smuggling can be 
traced visibly.126  
 
The problem with tackling heroin production has been that the main component of 
heroin—Acetic Anhydride127 —is used for making medicinal drugs (eg. Aspirin), 
besides leather, fabrics and paper, because of which the production of this chemical 
cannot be banned.128 Incidences of hashish129  smuggling inside plastic capsules have 
been recently reported. Hashish is packed inside capsules that look like ordinary 
medicine and is smuggled across the border from India (mostly from the border 
districts of Siliguri and Jalpaiguri in West Bengal) to Bangladesh.130 Heroin, hashish 
and marijuana (ganja) are also regularly seized by the border guards though the 
actual amount which is successfully smuggled is much more the amount seized.131  
 
‘Both the sides are affected by drug smuggling. But it still persists due to the profit it 
brings and because the BSF officials are also involved in it,’132 laments Narendranath 
Ghosh, a resident of Karimpur. The closure of the border region to the general 
civilians after 5pm every day helps the smugglers in getting their way. It helps the 
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latter as well as the border guards to operate unhindered, without the fear of being 
exposed,133 says another border resident.  
 
The BSF, the BGB or the police can rarely lay their hands on the contractors of these 
trades. It is the carrier, known as dhoor in local parlance, who mostly gets caught by 
the border guards.134 Carriers are usually local border civilians.135 Any person 
capable of carrying any amount of weight, irrespective of gender or age, can earn as 
a dhoor. I was witness to scenes of smuggling on the Bangladesh side of the Hili 
border (Dinajpur) during one of my field visits, where children ranging from 7/8 
years of age to boys in their mid-twenties were running on the roofs of a moving 
train carrying sacks of Phensidyl bottles and jumping from them onto the other side 
of the border, the railway line being located within a few yards from it.136  
The dhoors are assigned the ‘job’ by the manager of the smuggling network, locally 
known as the ‘lineman’, who is responsible for maintaining the liaison between the 
carriers and the border guards.137 The linemen are often locally-known faces, but are 
hardly reported to the border guards or the police. Fear of life threats from them is a 
reason cited by the local civilians, who witness such practices and know the lineman 
as well.138 But the more important reason cited by the locals themselves is that of 
attracting the unwanted attention of the border guards. Since a substantial number of 
local civilians are directly or indirectly involved in illegal cross-border practices, 
they are also dependent on the lineman for the smooth operation of these.139   
Moreover, the border guards are often the direct profiteers of such practices. They 
depend on the skills of the linemen for the smooth execution of cross-border 
smuggling. These reasons make the linemen indispensable to both the border 
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civilians and border guards.140 This explains the power that they wield in the border 
areas. ‘Here, the power and influence of the linemen is more than than any political 
leader or Panchayat head. This can happen only in a border area,’ says Gourab 
Sarkar, a trader at the Hili Land Port.141 Support from the political parties in power is 
also a reason for the growing influence and affluence of the linemen, says Kuddus 
Rahman, chairman of the local committee of the political party in power in West 
Bengal, hinting towards the misdeeds of the previous government.142 
The prospect of instant money drives the essentially poor and often unemployed 
border civilians into such smuggling networks and this trend is the same on both 
sides of the border.143 Moreover, the carriers often fall prey to addiction themselves 
and are unable to avoid drug smuggling jobs out of desperation.144 The addiction of 
the carrier ruins him/her in the long run, leaves them incapable of earning a 
livelihood, eventually ruining the whole family. Subodh Burman was arrested by the 
BGB during the early hours of dawn near the Mohorapara area in Hili while 
smuggling 278 bottles of Phensidyl across the border. The bottles were being carried 
by him to the contractor’s house for which he would have been paid Tk. 350 for each 
bottle. He was a farmer by occupation and his family consisted of his wife and little 
daughter.145 Carriers are often deceived by linemen into being victimised by the 
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ii. Illegal human crossings 
Illegal human border crossings constitute yet another form of cross-border practice 
along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, where the dhoors help people cross the 
border illegally, without a passport.147 Its riverine borders,148 especially those 
between Satkhira (Bangladesh) and North 24 Parganas (West Bengal), are prone to 
illegal human crossings,149 besides being strategic locations for the smuggling of 
contraband items as well.150 The Dinajpur border between West Bengal and 
Bangladesh is another such point.151   With increasing surveillance mechanisms 
along the riverine and unfenced borders, a greater number of such crossings are 
being operated along the fenced areas, according to the statistics given by the BSF.152 
Hari, an agent helping Bangladeshi people to cross over into West Bengal, informs 
me that such illegal crossings generally take place at night. ‘Here, BSF does not 
fire,’153 he assures. 
In fact, some policies of the concerned states, especially the ones related to travel tax, 
encourage these illegal border crossings. The unaffordable rates of travel tax 
imposed by both India and Bangladesh,154 coupled with the hazards and expenditure 
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of obtaining passports, drive the poor local civilians into illegal ways of crossing the 
border by paying a much smaller amount to the brokers or dhoors.  
‘Some people also cross the river along with the smuggled cattle,155 informs a 
witness. The co-operation of the local population with the illegal border crossers156 
as well as the common language (Bangla) of the illegal crossers and the legal 
residents, are often the reasons for the failure of the border guards or the local police 
in tracking down this illegal movement.157  
Illegal or unauthorised border crossing also involves the state personnel, where such 
officials cross the border illegally to either take stock of situations or probe into an 
incident or occurrence.158 ‘We knew that sneaking into Bangladesh will be a risky 
decision. But we were determined to know what is going on there. People who were 
coming here told us their tales of plight. That’s why we took the risk,’159 said an 
official of the Border Intelligence Corps (BIC), following reports of attacks on Hindu 
minorities under the Khaleda Zia government across the Bangladesh border  in the 
Satkhira, Kaligunj and Khulna areas of Bangladesh in 2001. These acts of 
unauthorised border-crossing makes the border guards as much a part of the narrative 
of contesting the sovereign delimitations of a state as the border civilians, rendering 
them an integral part of the border culture. 
iii. Cattle 
Cattle smuggling (or ‘trade’, as it is called in Bangladesh) across the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border is necessarily a one-way occurrence where cattle is procured from 
provinces like Rajasthan, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Uttarakhand, Madhya 
Pradesh, Utter Pradesh and Bihar in India and smuggled into Bangladesh, mostly 
through Murshidabad and the North 24 Parganas and South 24 Parganas districts of 
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West Bengal.160  The cattle are stocked in herds at strategic locations near the border 
from where they are made to cross the border with the help of a lineman.  
The transportation of cattle within India is in violation of Article 55 of the Transport 
of Animals Rules, 1978, which prohibits carrying more than 10 adult cattle or 15 
calves on broad gauge and more than 4 adult cattle or 6 calves on narrow gauge.161 
The traders carry as many as 300 cattle in each wagon while transporting them from 
one province to another in India.162  
The export ban on cattle trade imposed by India is a major factor for the flourishing 
of its illegal version.  While the demand for beef in Bangladesh is not met by its 
limited supply, India has a cattle surplus due to its low demand for beef.163 The Rs. 
2,000 crore meat industry in Bangladesh keeps the demand for cattle high.164   The 
‘official’ number of seized cattle indicates the expanse of the trade since it does not 
point out the actual number of cattle successfully smuggled across the border.165 The 
demand-supply imbalance in West Bengal and Bangladesh also explains the increase 
in cattle smuggling during such festivals as Eid. The demand for cattle in Bangladesh 
increases during Eid, especially during Eid-e-Qurban or Eid al-Bakr166 when cattle-
smugglers in West Bengal make quick money by smuggling cattle into Bangladesh. 
The volume of trade, in such cases, increases all the more if Eid happens to be 
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celebrated around festivals like Durga Puja167 in West Bengal (as was the case in 
2011 and 2012168).169  
The demand-supply equation ensures that cattle worth between Rs. 500 and Rs.3,000 
fetches anything between Rs. 20,000 and Rs. 40,000 in Bangladesh.170 The cattle 
trade from India (West Bengal, Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya) to Bangladesh is 
worth $500 million annually171—an indication of its enormity.  Anything between 
5,000 and 15,000 cows cross everyday,172 while other estimates put the range 
between 20,000 and 25,000, which is worth $81,000.173  The profits for cattle 
smuggling are substantial. The price of a cow worth Rs. 500 in Haryana (India) 
becomes five times on entering West Bengal. At the West Bengal border, it could 
become as high as Rs. 5,000,174 which is then shared by the contractor, carrier, 
lineman (often they are the same person in the case of cattle smuggling) and the 
border guards on both sides.175 The nature of increase in the price of a cow, not just 
between the two provinces within India but within a single province (from a non-
border to a border area), indicates the effect that the border has on such illegal 
livelihood practices.  
The Indian perspective: The flourishing of the cattle trade across the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border has its roots in the ban on cattle slaughter and cattle export 
imposed by India. Article 48 of the Indian Constitution bans the slaughter of cattle on 
terms of agricultural needs and animal husbandry. Yet with the mechanisation of 
agriculture following India’s independence in 1947, the need for cattle in agriculture 
decreased. Ban on slaughter and exports resulted in surplus cattle in India.  With the 
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creation of Bangladesh in 1971, possibilities of cattle trade opened up between the 
two states. Cattle export being a sensitive issue in India (due to the religious 
connotation of cows in Hinduism), none of its successive governments opened 
official avenues for legal cattle trade, leading to the establishment of an unofficial 
network across the borders.176 
The Bangladesh perspective: The legalisation of cattle trade in Bangladesh in 1993 
turned a cattle ‘smuggler’ into a cattle ‘trader’ on its border. The payment of Tk. 500 
(Rs. 383) as Customs charges to the BGB on the Bangladesh border makes the trade 
official.177  Bangladesh also profits from the bone and leather collected from the 
slaughtered cattle in its leather and ceramic industries, besides its major export of 
beef.178  It is, therefore, natural that it does not take any step towards curbing such 
cross-border practices since cattle trade is directly linked to Bangladesh’s economy 
and food security.179 The Bangladesh government as well as the BGB are aware of 
the profits that Bangladesh reaps from the cross-border cattle trade.180  
Years of operation have established contractual links between cattle smugglers on 
both sides.181  While the creation of the border disrupted or adversely affected 
traditional ties and livelihood practices in the border areas between West Bengal and 
Bangladesh, it also created new links. The ‘cross-border’ aspect is common to both 
the broken (and illegalised) traditional links and the new (illegal) links.   
‘Earlier, the Bangladeshis would have to move into the Indian side of the border to 
bring the cattle. But now, with the help of the BSF, the Indians themselves bring the 
cattle to a certain point across the border. The BSF officials do not otherwise say 
anything, except for rare cases of their seizing a couple of cows, to show that they 
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are doing their job honestly,’182 says Ismail, indicating the role that border guards 
play in this border trade.  
 
Plate 12. Cattle haat, 2012.  
The border markets or haats (local term for markets) are located on the 
corresponding side of the Bangladesh border where the cattle are stocked 
immediately after crossing it. Traders come from all over Bangladesh, from as far as 
Sylhet, Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf to as near as Satkhira, Khulna and Jessore, to deal in 
cattle.183 They come with trucks, load them with their purchases (generally 15-25 
cows per truck)184 and head off to markets where they sell the cattle to other local 
buyers within Bangladesh. ‘The cows are marked according to their assigned serial 
numbers (depending on the consignment number of the contractor). The locals are 
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appointed as labourers for loading the cows on to the trucks,’185 says Alamgir, a 
cattle trader. The cattle trade, thus, creates co-lateral livelihood opportunities for the 
border civilians, besides their obvious involvement as traders.   
 
Plate 13. Cattle being transported from haats in trucks, 2012.   
The cattle haats act as wholesale markets, supplying the demands of innumerable 
local shops/markets across Bangladesh, like the haats in Matila and Lebutola186 or 
Putkhali187 in Jessore. Each of these wholesale markets witnesses dealings worth 
thousands of Indian Rupees and Bangladesh Taka each day, adding up to huge 
transactions for both the states of India and Bangladesh. The auctioning of seized 
cattle by the BSF contributes towards the cattle trade, since the bidders are mostly 
smugglers who re-smuggle the cattle at high prices.188  
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The relation between the cattle traders and the border guards on both sides is 
generally dictated by the unstated rules of the trade and is, hence, harmonious, 
especially on the Bangladesh border. ‘Those who smuggle cattle generally do not 
indulge in smuggling other things, because they share a good rapport with the BGB 
and, understandably, do not want to ruin that rapport by smuggling other things. 
Cattle smuggling is not a crime to them (the BGB), while smuggling Phensidyl is, 
any day, a far more harmful act. That is immoral. Cattle smuggling is as much a part 
of legal business as is any other legally traded item’, says a cattle trader at Kaikhali 
border, Satkhira (Bangladesh), in explaining the cattle trade network across the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border.189 The presence of BSF and BGB camps in front of the 
cattle haats along the border is ample proof of the unstated understanding.190  
This does not suggest that other contraband items are not smuggled together with 
cattle or in return for it. Drugs, spices, fake currency notes or even firearms 
constitute items which are often smuggled along or in return for cattle.191  
The wholesale cattle haats are a thriving economy in themselves, complete with 
shops catering to every need of the traders. The items sold at the shops range 
between food, tea,192 toiletries, clothes, tyres, petrol and any thing that a trader, 
having travelled from afar for an overnight journey might need. Initially, the local 
civilians would rent out rooms to these traders, who would reach the market in the 
evening, stay overnight near the market at one of these guest accommodations, 
complete their transactions early the next morning, and start on their way back. 
Recently, some private guest accommodations have been built by the locals and the 
committee of traders who are in charge of the overall trade operations for 
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accommodating the traders.193 These haats are run by the locals, who look after the 
various departments of the transactions—complete with an organised committee of 
members, presidents and secretaries.194 From lungis195 to toothbrushes, from petrol to 
tyres, from rice and beef curry to tea and biscuits—cattle markets are a self-sustained 
economy, thriving along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.   
‘Everyday the revenue from cattle businesses amounts to about Tk. 50,000,’196 
informs one of the members of the syndicate in-charge of the cattle haat at Putkhali. 
He also reveals that the reason behind the flourishing of cattle trade at particular 
points along the border is the ‘security’ that those points offer—indicating hassle-
free trade. ‘The other borders cannot provide this security,’197 is how he phrases his 
concern, unaware of how he redefined the concept of security and illegality by 
talking about unofficial security for an officially-illegal business. The cattle trade, 
thus, provides livelihood opportunities to a substantial number of border people, 
including the civilians and the guards, without a legal recognition, especially from 
India. The irony is well-expressed in a response from one of the local traders: 
‘Tendencies towards other kinds of crimes have diminished significantly because the 
cattle businesses have improved the over-all economy of the area’198—indicating 
how the spatial specificity of the border creates its own socio-economic narrative, 
which is often beyond the comprehension or even control of the state.  
Instances of violence towards the smugglers by the border guards, especially the BSF 
on the West Bengal border, are not rare.199 Cattle trade-related violence is often the 
result of such situations where the credibility of the BSF is under question or where 
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its general efficiency at the borders is questioned.200 They also result from disputes 
over payment between the trader and border guards.  
However, such risks do not deter smugglers from trading in cattle. ‘The smugglers 
are daring and have a don’t-care attitude. Border life has made them daring,’ says a 
BGB official at Hakimpur in Dinajpur district (Bangladesh).201 Moreover, 
restrictions on using lethal weapons by the BSF202 have catalysed cross-border cattle 
smuggling like never before.203 The number of attacks on BSF constables in 
instances of clashes between them and the cattle smugglers204 indicate that borders 
are, indeed, the toughest hurdles for states when it comes to establishing control over 
its territories.   
Frequent skirmishes between the smugglers and border guards followed by violent 
abuse and the deaths of both have led to considerations of legalisation of the cattle 
trade.205 The border guards, especially the higher officials of the BSF, are keen to see 
the cattle trade legalised through the lifting of the export ban by India in order to 
curb both smuggling and violence.206 While the Indian government chooses to ignore 
the issue of cattle smuggling for fear of hampering bilateral relations with 
Bangladesh, the BSF, inspite of being the representatives of the state at the borders, 
cannot help being concerned. The BSF is part of the border culture, which includes 
cross-border practices as well. This is where the BSF are more ‘border people’ and 
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less the state representatives, indicating the fact that the reality of the border and the 
patterns of border narratives engulf everyone who negotiate the border everyday.   
iv. Firearms 
The smuggling of firearms is not uncommon along the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border, with the border guards themselves confessing such occurences.207 ‘Firearms 
are mostly smuggled in along with the cattle, especially in the Putkhali border 
area,’208 confesses a BGB official at Benapole. The North Dinajpur district is also an 
important transit for firearm-smuggling networks between West Bengal and 
Bangladesh, as reports of the seizure of firearms are not rare in the area.209 In fact, 
reports hint at an increasing number of firearm smugglers operating in various 
pockets of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, including the districts of Kushtia, 
Jhenaidah, Chuadanga, Meherpur, Satkhira and Jessore on the Bangladesh side, and 
the adjoining districts of Murshidabad, Nadia, North 24 Parganas and South 24 
Parganas on the West Bengal side.210  
Factories in the border district of Murshidabad in West Bengal have been reported to 
be manufacturing these arms in villages which are at a distance of about 3 kilometres 
from the Bangladesh border. The cheap price of firearms (pipe-gun, one-shooter gun, 
musket rifle and revolver) made in West Bengal (as well as in other parts of India) 
and their easy availability increases their demand in neighbouring Bangladesh.211  
Reports confirm the confession of the border guards that firearms are often smuggled 
in consignments of fruits, eggs, rice, vegetables and other items of daily need, which 
mostly go unchecked by them. ‘Good relations’ between the border guards and the 
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smugglers is often the reason cited for such exemptions. About 50% of these illegal 
firearms serve the leaders and cadres of political parties,212 while the names of the 
leaders of these parties are also often found on the list of people directly related to 
firearm smuggling.213  Reports of increasing deaths by firearms in Bangladesh can be 
traced back to the availability of smuggled firearms, mostly procured from India, 
through the West Bengal border.214  
Buyers also include the terrorist organisations that use these arms to train their 
members.215 Some of the arrested cadres confessed to being involved in cross-border 
cattle trade, while being actively involved in smuggling guns and ammunitions for 
terrorist groups.216 Small-arms, locally named as Belgharia, Moyur and Chhakka, are 
being smuggled into Bangladesh through the southwestern frontier, which shares the 
border with Murshidabad, Nadia, and the North 24 Parganas and South 24 Parganas 
districts of West Bengal, suggest reports.217 The firearms cost anything ‘between 
Tk.25, 000 to over Tk.0.1 million. Unsuspecting low income people are often used as 
carriers of the smuggled firearms,’218 the report says.   
v. Fake currency notes 
The smuggling of Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN) has increasingly become 
rampant across the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, especially with the flourishing 
of cattle trade. Cattle traders are often paid in fake currencies (cattle worth Rs. 4,000 
is paid for by Rs. 10,000 worth fake currencies by the Bangladeshi smuggler), which 
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is then circulated in India.219   Fake currency notes worth thousands are often 
reported to be seized from smugglers, while thousands of them are successfully 
distributed across the states in innumerable markets and shops.220 Farmers crossing 
the fence for cultivating their farmlands outside it are often seen to be involved in 
smuggling fake currencies.221 Fake currency notes worth Rs.43, 81,000 in 2011 and 
Rs. 15, 82,000 till August 2012 has reportedly been seized in India.222 The nexus 
between FICN, firearms and terrorist organisations is, increasingly, becoming a 
matter of concern for both India and Bangladesh.223  
vi. Currency coins 
Currency coins (known as Rejki in smuggling lingo), adding up to thousands have 
recently been reported as being smuggled across the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border. The process involves procuring currency coins from across West Bengal and 
smuggling them across the border into Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, these coins are 
made into metal blades. Local foundaries or ferro-alloy factories along the West 
Bengal border also melt coins into metal sheets before smuggling them to 
Bangladesh. Re. 1, Rs. 2 and Rs. 5 coins are mostly used for the purpose. While 
melting a Re. 1 coin makes about 4 blades, melting Rs. 5 produces anything between 
5 and 7 blades— indicating the profits made by the coin smugglers. This explains 
why drivers of public vehicles, small-scale traders and even women homemakers in 
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and around Kolkata have been reported to be involved in smuggling coins.224 Metal 
smuggling in the form of coins has been the recent addition to the already vast range 
of cross-border smuggling practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. It has 
a direct effect on the circulation and unavailability of currency coins in other non-
border areas of West Bengal.225 
vii. Items of daily necessity 
Besides the riskier and more expansive trading in drugs, cattle, firearms or fake 
currencies, the people living along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border survive on 
smuggling items of daily necessity, from a few litres of petrol/diesel to a few 
kilograms of spices, vegetables and eggs226 to a few utensils, electronic items, 
clothing, tools, audio-visual disks and so on. The Bhomra border in the Satkhira 
district of Jessore (Bangladesh) is an intriguing study in informal smuggling 
transactions over the stretch of the unfenced border. Bhomra is a Land Port between 
Satkhira (Bangladesh) and North 24 Parganas (West Bengal), which is used for 
trading in vegetables, cement, zip shutters, fish etc. between India and Bangladesh.227 
But that does not stop the local civilian population from indulging in the small-scale 
smuggling of household items like spices, onion and garlic, apart from Phensidyl.228 
There is a narrow canal flowing along the Bhomra border which acts as a meeting 
point for women from both sides of the border.229 These women smuggle in/out 
items like spices or even cooking ware, in return for a small amount of money. Some 
of them sell the smuggled spices or vegetables to other households in the village.230  
The seasonal nature of agriculture, coupled with the fluctuating prices of crops, 
ensures a steady demand for such items.  
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Newspapers are smuggled across the border despite the availability of both locally-
published as well as national newspapers along the whole length of the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border. Some of the major Indian newspapers are smuggled into 
Bangladesh for Tk. 20-25 and vice-versa. ‘Money transaction for the newspapers is 
done through recharge of mobile phones. The smuggler on one side tops up the SIM 
card of his counterpart on the other side with the amount payable for the smuggled 
newspapers. This “talktime” in his phone is used by the smuggler to contact his 
counterpart for further deals involving more newspapers, cattle etc. ensuring that 
newspaper smuggling is executed with no direct transaction of money,’231 says Alok 
Sengupta, resident of Dinhata.  
The nature of the smuggled items indicates that cross-border smuggling is not always 
necessarily linked to global smuggling networks, as some studies on such practices 
indicate. They show instead that such cross-border practices become rudimentary 
ways of living and earning for the people living along the border. The border people 
learn to put the reality of the border to the best of their interest, irrespective of its 
legal/illegal nature. Over the years, smuggling practices come to be seen as an 
integral part of livelihood practice along the border.232  
Parbati Mohanto gives a vivid description of not just the process of cross-border 
smuggling practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border but also the nature of 
relations between the smugglers and border guards. ‘This is our job and is like any 
other job that people do. We don’t think there is anything wrong with it’ begins 
Parbati, herself a regular smuggler in the Hili border area.233 ‘We work as dholai234  
for contractors and have to pay the BSF Rs. 150 for every trip that we make across 
the border.  Some of the BSF constables are kind enough not to take any money from 
us. But some are greedy and do not spare us a rupee….We get Rs.15 for smuggling a 
single goat.  A few days back garlic was in much demand, for which we got Rs.3 per 
kilogram.We had to pay the BSF Rs.2, which left us with a profit of Re.1. Generally, 
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our Bangladeshi counterpart throws the sacks of items to this side of the border. We 
carry the sacks in turn to another place. The BSF officials know all about it. They 
allow us to carry 1-2 quintals at a time and dump them at a safe place, from where 
these sacks are then distributed to other local markets, like Maburghat, Trimohini, 
etc. The Mahajans (contractors) take half of the total transaction amount.  All the 
people in this village are engaged in this job. This is our profession….If we need to 
use cycles for carrying the items to and from the border, the Mahajan pays Rs. 60 to 
the border guards and Rs.10 extra to the person who carries them. The border guards 
allow the cycles to pass at an opportune moment. The higher officials of the BSF 
might not know about these practices. It is the guards patrolling the border who 
mostly engage in it. Even they need money. We understand their situation. 
Sometimes we cook some good food for them because the food in the camp is not 
good. They buy the meat and we cook it with spices ….When a new battalion comes, 
they try to be strict about these things. Instances of heated arguments are not rare in 
those phases. But gradually we develop a rapport with them….In fact we feel sad 
when the battalions are transferred. They help us do our work by making us aware if 
the situation at the border is tense or by suggesting safe smuggling routes….The BSF 
constables keep their share of the money either inside their sticks or their boots, or 
even in a hole that they dig into the ground from where they collect the money later. 
Even they have fear of being caught by their seniors. And once a case is filed against 
them, they have to pay a heavy fine from their salary.’235 If poverty of the civilians is 
an important reason for their involvement in such practices, the fee structures of the 
border guards (both BSF and BGB),236 in a way, explains their involvement in the 
practices as well, given the meagre salary that the constables of BSF and BGB get. 
The constables are also often the only earning members of their families. Earning an 
extra amount of cash helps them financially as much as it helps the border civilians 
to support their meagre income from agriculture or other livelihood options (if at all). 
This makes the border guards an integral part of the everyday survival narratives of 
the border and no less part of the border culture than the civilians.  
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Whenever the situation at the border becomes tense, smuggling is checked for a 
while which makes life for these people extremely hard, due to their complete 
dependence on these practices. ‘In those times, we have to resort to whatever we had 
earlier earned and so have to be careful about our expenditures,’237 says Parbati.  The 
predominance of the linemen in this particular area is weak compared to other border 
areas because of the absence of the fence. Linemen, explains Parbati, attain 
importance in the fenced areas because the need to co-ordinate cross-border 
movements is higher in them. In unfenced areas such as this village, the transaction 
takes place directly between the contractors, carriers and the border guards.238 The 
vulnerability of the unfenced areas and the villages close to the IB (International 
Border) on either side in terms of smuggling are also highlighted in the records of the 
BSF.239  
A stretch of the border near the Ghunapara-Dhumron village where this interview 
took place has yet not been fenced. On being asked how this stretch remained 
unfenced, Parbati explained how the local MLA of the Left Front agreed to arrange 
for the prevention of fencing in that area after the local people pleaded with him: ‘He 
came and asked us what to do. We said that this is a poor area. If you fence the 
border, how will we earn a living? So he looked into the matter and prevented 
fencing. That has been a great help to us.’240  When she was asked what alternatives 
the local people had in case the area was fenced someday, she said with a grin: ‘If the 
border is fenced someday, we will find other ways to carry on our work. Do the 
fenced areas lack smuggling practices? Just as an animal finds its food under any 
circumstances, even we will do the same. God has given us brain, so I am sure we 
will find a way. In fact, then the guards at the gates will help us find other ways.’241 
This conversation provides a fair idea about the modus operandi of small-scale cross-
border smuggling practices involving the civilians and border guards, as well as the 
nature of involvement of the latter in such practices, especially in the unfenced 
stretches of the border.   
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The construction of the fence has, in fact, played an important role in the labelling of 
certain practices as ‘illegal’ in official terms. Even after the creation of the border in 
1947, the unhindered movement of people and items between West Bengal and 
Bangladesh existed without being officially illegalised. The construction of the fence 
has made such movements visible and, thus, officially illegal.242  
While the construction of the fence, as a decision of the Indian state, has illegalised 
these cross-border practices, the border guards are the ones who actually negotiate 
the fence and the cross-border movements everyday. Their ways of negotiation with 
these practices gives us an idea that the border guards, inspite of being the 
representatives of the state, interpret the border and the fence in ways which are 
acceptable, and often profitable, for them. The essentially poor local civilians along 
the border are often seen to survive on smuggling things as basic as dry leaves, 
which earn them a mere Rs. 20-30 a day. The border guards consciously overlook 
such practices on humanitarian grounds.243 ‘We spare the poor people,’244 says a 
BGB official at Benapole, while talking about how small-scale smuggling forms the 
only resort for the poor local people along the border.  
viii. Chars and ghoj as strategic locations for smuggling 
The chars and ghoj245 areas along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border have become 
havens for the transit of contraband items because of their strategic locations. ‘These 
territories are havens for the smugglers who get the Indian women to bring certain 
items from the Indian side, collect all the smuggled items in these territories and then 
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smuggle the items into the other areas of Bangladesh,’246 says Pradip, a resident of an 
Indian ghoj. Ghoj and chars are affected by the changing courses of the rivers. 
Therefore, the livelihoods of the people living on them have also become river-
dependant.  ‘Earlier we would depend on fishing in the Ichhamati river which used to 
flow along the ghoj. Ever since this part of the Ichhamati has dried up (followed by a 
change in its course), we have become completely dependant on the Bangladeshis for 
our food, daily necessities and even education. We have no other resource left than 
smuggling,’247 says a resident of an Indian ghoj surrounded by Bangladeshi territory 
on its three sides.  
 
Plate 14. Hand-drawn map showing course of border river, chars and BSF outposts, 
BSF camp, Shikarpur, 2011.  
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Plate 15. Thin strip of land leading to an Indian ghoj, with Bangladeshi territories on 
either side, 2012.  
 
Plate 16. India’s border fence through which the land indicated above passes, 2012. 
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ix. Obstacles in curbing smuggling 
Responses from the border guards, especially the senior commanders in the camps, 
do not, however, point to the involvement of the constables as the main reason for 
their failure to curb cross-border smuggling. Rather, the lack of manpower and the 
failure of surveillance mechanisms are cited as reasons. According to a BSF official, 
the distance between the border checkposts needs to be reduced and searchlights 
need to be immediately fitted along the fence: ‘Government does not implement it, 
nor do the smugglers let the implementation take place.’248 Such responses indicate, 
yet again, that inspite of being representations of the state at the borders, the border 
guards become enmeshed in the border culture that eventually affects their 
perceptions, actions and negotiations with the border civilians and their ways of life. 
The responses clearly indicate the vulnerable position that the double-role of the 
border guards thrust them into—one, as the representative of the state and the other, 
as an integral part of the border culture. Such spontaneous responses bring out their 
lived experience.  
Natural environmental conditions, like foggy days or dark nights, make surveillance 
more difficult for the patrolling constables.249  Winters pose a huge threat to the 
border guards because the available equipment like binocular, SST (searchlights) or 
night-vision cameras fail to fight the dense fog.250 The thick cover of clothing which 
the people don in winter makes it easier for smugglers to hide smuggled goods. The 
folds of sarees251 worn by women and the jackets worn by men are used for this 
purpose. Specialised jackets with numerous pockets have lately been seen to be used 
by smugglers to smuggle Phensidyl and have come to be known as ‘Dyl Jackets’ in 
                                                          
248
 ‘DEE-EE  ! A A Q. +9  
7 7.  
 . ]
 &   
 
। ’ (The checkposts are at a distance of 100—200 metres from each other. There are no 
search lights.  Government does not implement it, nor do the smugglers let the 
implementation take place.) Interview with a BSF official at Shikarpur BSF camp (Nadia 
district of West Bengal, 21 October 2011).  
249
 Interview with a BSF official at Asharidoho BSF camp (Murshidabad district of West 
Bengal, 9 November 2011).  
250
 This also explains the increase in seizures of smuggled goods in the winter months of 
December, January and February along this border. Uttar Vang Prahari Samachar Patrika 
(March 2012). 4(11).  
251
 Saree is a strip of unstitched cloth worn by women, ranging from four to nine yards in 
length that is draped over the body in various styles, which is native to the Indian 
subcontinent. It is popular in India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Burma, 
Malaysia, and Singapore. The most common style is for the saree to be wrapped around the 
waist, with one end then draped over the shoulder, baring the midriff.  
94 
 
local jargon.252  Winters also mean that the water levels of the rivers reduce 
considerably, making it easier for the smugglers to cross them.253 
x. Nature and flow of contraband products 
The nature and flow of contraband items across the West Bengal-Bangladesh border 
indicate that the border economy has its own logic and pattern of functioning, and 
has no necessary connection with the larger economic scenario of either India or 
Bangladesh. Other than cattle, drugs and fake currencies, most of the smuggled items 
circulate locally in the border areas.  Eggs, spices, dairy products, toiletries, 
cigarettes, newspapers and SIM cards for mobile phones constitute such items.254  
Most of the items of regular use are manufactured on both sides of the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border. Thus, the flow of items depends on the demand for a particular 
variety or quality of an item on a particular side of the border.255  
The Public Distribution System (PDS) on the West Bengal side of the border also 
plays an important role in the smuggling of items of daily use. The PDS system in 
India ensures the distribution of items like sugar, wheat, rice, etc. to villagers at 
subsidised rates. The PDS shops are generally not located inside the villages, which 
mean that local salesmen carry the items from the PDS shops or godowns to villages 
along the border.  The salesmen are required to show a chit to the BSF mentioning 
the quantities of the items carried. While the quantities are required to be specified, 
there are no specifications on the number of trips that a salesman can make to the 
border villages. Invariably, the salesmen make a number of trips in a day, selling 
quantities of items far exceeding the required amount for the population of that 
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village. The excess amount thus collected is smuggled across the border to 
Bangladesh at opportune moments, mostly at nights.256  
Everyday narratives of such cross-border flows give a more comprehensive idea 
about the state of things than the biased state-centric discourses. The state-centric 
discourses on cross-border flows tend to ignore what leaves the state, focusing only 
on what enters it; ignore the role of consumer demands that decide the nature and 
direction of the flows of contraband items; ignore the perceptions of the local people 
regarding the legality-illegality of transacting in certain goods or even the illegal 
nature of certain practices; and ignore the role of the state itself in facilitating such 
flows and the benefits that these bring to the state.257 Thus, the everyday survival 
narratives of the border people are lost in the larger discourses of security and border 
control of the state in the context of these cross-border smuggling practices.  
xi. Gendered aspect of the nature of involvement in smuggling  
A careful observation of the nature of smuggling suggests that there are clear 
categorisations regarding the forms and items of smuggling between men, women 
and even children. Women are mostly involved in smuggling light-weight items, 
including Phensidyl, spices, food items or even household items of everyday use.258 
The clothing of the women (mostly Sarees) helps them carry these small and light 
items within their drapes.259 The lack of women border guards makes it even easier 
for them to operate.260 Moreover, instances of sexual favours offered by women or 
demanded of women by the border guards261 in a number of instances also indicate 
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the gendered aspect of livelihood practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border.262   
Men mostly perform smuggling practices which involve carrying or moving heavy 
items or acts which involve physical strain, such as running, climbing or crossing 
high barriers.263 This does not, however, mean that men are not involved in 
smuggling light items such as drugs or items of daily use. But practices which 
demand physical strength almost exclusively involve them. This explains the large-
scale involvement of men in cattle smuggling, especially along the riverine 
borders.264  
Often, the male members of families are seen to be in charge of ‘managing’ the 
execution of the smuggling, while the women and children execute the operation. 
The reasons cited for such modus operandi is the sympathy that border guards often 
show towards women and children.265 Children are involved in cross-border 
smuggling practices from a very young age along the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border. While the items smuggled by them are mostly light weight items such as 
drugs, fruits and spices, they often assist their mothers or other female members of 
their families in executing the strenuous part of the operation, like running across the 
border or getting aboard trains. The Hili border is an example where children aged 
anything between 7/8 years to their mid-twenties are seen running on the roofs of 
moving trains, carrying sacks of Phensidyl bottles and jumping from these trains on 
to the other side of the border.266 Dropouts from schools are common in the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border areas due to the involvement of children in illegal 
activities from a young age. The prospect of instant earnings drives the children into 
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such activities. Their guardians, constituted mostly of poor farmers or labourers, are 
rarely seen to prohibit their children from getting involved in smuggling.267  
The involvement of the hijras268 in cross-border smuggling in certain parts of the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border269 cannot be overlooked if one has to understand 
livelihood practices along it. The fact that a substantial number of hijras are involved 
in smuggling270 clearly suggests that they utilise their unique gendered status to earn 
a living. They mostly work as dhoors in smuggling drugs, while themselves falling 
prey to addictions most of the time.271 One round-trip across the border fetches them 
around Tk. 200, while the sacks may contain drugs worth Tk.50,000 to 60,000.272 
The hijra status helps them escape the abuse faced by other male or female 
smugglers.273 The fact that they are ‘neither male, nor female’ keeps the border 
guards at bay as they feel that ‘handling hijras’ questions their dignity.274 
Humanitarian grounds are, however, cited as the real reasons by the border guards 
for allowing the hijras to continue smuggling.275 The prospect for a hijra involved in 
cross-border smuggling in these parts of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border has 
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become highly profitable, which explains men undergoing emasculation operations 
or even disguising themselves as hijras to earn a living.276 
The involvement of physically disabled people, including children, is also not rare in 
cross-border smuggling practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. ‘They 
make use of their disability to carry on the smuggling. They carry light things like 
marijuana, heroin, etc. But the guards leave them because of their disability,’277 says 
a BGB official at Hili, indicating the similarity in attitudes of the border guards 
towards both the disabled and the hijra smugglers. The involvement of around 25 
physically disabled people, including men and women, in and around the Hili port 
area indicates that physical disability, like the hijra status, is utilised by the border 
civilians to earn and survive on the border.  
 
X. Prospects for formalisation of border markets 
The formalisation and legalisation of the already existing border markets along the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border have been suggested both by civilians as well as 
border guards as a measure to curb illegal cross-border practices. This is also an 
indication of how the creation of the border has affected traditional links, local 
village markets being one of them,278 and has created new, mostly illegal ties (cattle 
smuggling networks, for example). ‘If cattle trading is legalised and these haats are 
officialised, the propensity for smuggling will automatically be checked,’ says 
Ranjit, the local Panchayat head of Jamalpur.279 Many senior officials among the 
border guards admit the prospect and necessity for the legalisation of haats, 
especially the cattle haats. ‘We all have to think about it seriously. It is not a problem 
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that can be solved by policing,’ says a BSF official.280 In fact, the BSF has been 
sending proposals for such ‘open haats’ along the border to the government of India, 
confirmed the BSF IG of the Malda frontier.281 The use of the word ‘open’, 
interestingly, stands in contradiction to the idea of the border as a closed ‘container’ 
as envisioned by the state. It also highlights the failure of state policing and 
regulations in gauging or negotiating the uniqueness of the border, as admitted by the 
border guards themselves.  
 
Plate 17. Informal border market beside border outposts. Indian shopkeeper selling 
products to Bangladeshi customers, 2011.  
Certain areas in the North and South Dinajpur border with Bangladesh’s Dinajpur 
district, and the Malda border with Bangladesh’s Joypurhat and Naogaon disricts, 
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have been identified as viable places for border haats since these are some of the 
areas which still remain unfenced. Allowing the people from both sides of the border 
to trade in these haats with valid passports for a specified time is what the BSF 
suggests. Not only will these haats cater to the daily needs of the locals, they will 
also reduce the life risks of both the smugglers and border guards, besides 
‘contributing towards the revenue of both the governments’.282 Amidst debates on 
the need and viability of these border haats, the government of West Bengal has 
approved four locations along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border as freetrade 
zones, where traders from both states can sell their products.283 The markets will be 
located ‘on’ the international border, said B.D. Sharma, Additional DG, BSF. ‘Half 
of the area will be on the Indian side and the remaining in Bangladeshi territory. It 
will be an enclosed space with gates on either side.All infrastructures such as banks 
will be set up’, he informed.284 Bangladesh has also been planning to build Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) along its borders with India in order to encourage cross-
border trade within the legal framework of the state.285 Such suggestions indicate the 
state’s desperate attempt to negotiate its borders within the structures of state 
machinery (transaction in the haats with passports). They also indicate the role that 
borders play in questioning the state’s role as the container of socio-political 
relations.  
The existing border haats are currently havens for the smugglers to negotiate their 
deals, which can only be prevented if they are regularised and trading in certain items 
is legalised. ‘A haat is organised near the border every Sunday where these 
smugglers come for making deals. You can easily identify them from their suspicious 
body-language. Even the BSF knows them,’286 says a civilian in Balurghat, implying 
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that these haats could be put to better use for the civilians if only they were 
officialised by the state.  
I have been witness to such illegal but flourishing border haats providing both cattle 
and other products such as juices, snacks, chocolates and biscuits on my field visits 
to border areas between North 24 Parganas-Jessore and Burimari-Changrabandha, 
respectively.287 In some of the regular border haats, the fear of persecution by border 
guards looms large among the local civilians, simply because of the ‘illegal’ aspect 
of the whole operation.288  
The propect of meeting relatives and friends from across the border is also evident in 
the responses of the civilians,289 besides that of being able to trade without fear. The 
way the existing border haats flourish during festivities, such as Durga Puja and Eid, 
stands proof of their prospects once properly organised. Many of these haats were in 
existence much before the creation of the border but have lost much of their glory 
and significance after the partition.290 The ones which still function are plagued by 
illegal transactions. Thus, haats are a natural culmination of not just the exchange of 
various products across the border but also of cross-border cultural ties that the 
border people on both sides share, besides having great potential for contributing 
towards the economies of both India and Bangladesh. Traditional haats, which have 
been de-legitimised by the state-building agendas of India and Bangladesh, need to 
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The partition of Bengal in 1947 did not merely create territorial boundaries but also 
disrupted traditional ties. The border ‘breached the notions of the moral economy’291 
of the people by restricting their movements and rupturing traditional socio-
economic links. Clearly, defining and establishing complete control of the borders 
became political compulsions for both India and East Pakistan, and, later, 
Bangladesh, in order to establish unquestionable sovereignty over their respective 
territories.  The process of the creation of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border has to 
be understood from two perspectives. On the one hand, borders were 
cartographically marked by the states (despite territorial disputes over certain parts), 
border guards and surveillance mechanisms deployed, and, eventually, border fences 
constructed (by India) to check the porousness of the borders. On the other hand, the 
partitioned people negotiated the creation of the border in two ways. Tradional links 
broken by the border were re-established, albeit with an ‘illegal’ tag from the 
respective states. And new links were established as outcomes of the border itself, 
most of which were again, illegalised by the states concerned.  
The effect of the creation of the border on livelihood practices, as discussed above, 
might be understood through Van Schendel’s concept of three levels of scales, which 
he describes in the following ways: scales-we-almost-lost, indicating a pre-border 
web of relations that has weakened but not vanished; state-scale, indicating the web 
of relations that the state created through the creation of the border; and border-
induced scales, indicating the web of relations created by the border itself.292 The 
study of various aspects of livelihood practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border gives us a fair idea about the various patterns of livelihood practices which 
have been affected and created by it. Disruption of traditional livelihoods, the 
officially-recognised livelihoods created by the border and the co-lateral (mostly 
illegal) livelihoods created by it becomes clear in the light of Van Schendel’s 
framework of scales.  
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i. Effects of the border on the role of the states, border guards and civilians 
In the context of livelihood practices, a study of the roles of the concerned states, the 
border guards as representations of the states, and the border civilians reveals a 
complex pattern of operation. Apart from establishing border Land Ports and a few 
small-scale (brick-kilns, rice-mills) and cottage industries (beedi) along the border, 
the role of India and Bangladesh in the context of the livelihood practices of their 
border people has been mostly negative. Regulations and restrictions related to 
movement along and across the border have affected the lives of civilians in adverse 
ways. The construction of the fence has been a double jeopardy.  
The border guards as representatives of the states were deployed for guarding and 
protecting the border. Lethal and non-lethal weapons, surveillance mechanisms and 
border outposts are the more visible forms of enactment of the role of the state’s 
representative by the border guards. The abuse of people violating the regulations of 
the border by the border guards also forms a visible form of enactment of their 
duties.  
The civilians, affected by the border and often victimised by the border guards, learnt 
to negotiate their spatial identity, i.e. the identity of the people of the borderland. 
They modified existing livelihood practices and produced new ones where the border 
could be put to their best interests. Negotiating regulations related to the crossing of 
the fence for cultivation or fishing in the riverine borders and resorting to cottage 
industries are examples of the effect of the border on traditional livelihood practices. 
The civilians also resorted to new livelihood practices created by the border, 
including engagement as traders, labourers, counter owners or shopkeepers at border 
Land Ports, and assisting or serving border guards in camps. But the most significant 
change brought about by the border in the livelihood practices of the people of these 
parts was the creation of exchange patterns across the border, considered illegal by 
the state but of potential to the economic interests of the border civilians. Engaging 
in illegal cultivation, engaging as illegal workforce (brick-kilns) and engaging in 
cross-border illegal trade constitute such practices and exchange patterns.   
All these livelihood practices have become integral to border life in the last six 
decades of their operation along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. Interestingly, 
the role of the border guards in the livelihood narratives of this border is seen to have 
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two aspects. While the more visible aspect is that of the protection of the territorial 
sanctity of the border by restricting the movement of people and commodities, and 
increasing surveillance mechanisms,293 the subtler aspect is the involvement of the 
border guards themselves in such movements. Their involvement in these practices 
indicates how state agents are ‘drawn into cross-border politics of scale’.294 This 
explains the large-scale involvement of border guards in illegal cross-border 
livelihood practices in heavily guarded parts of the border like Hili or Petrapole-
Benapole. Their uniforms and other visible trappings of territorial discipline do not 
necessarily match the spatiality of their everyday relations or how they place 
themselves in the border milieu, as Van Schendel rightly observes.295 The ‘lure of the 
border’ makes the border guards susceptible to practices which weaken state 
territoriality296 and makes them as much a part of the border milieu as the civilians.  
ii. Uniqueness of livelihood practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border 
The study of livelihood practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border has, so 
far, highlighted the effect of border regulations on peasants and migrants, the effect 
of fencing on movement, and the establishment of global illegal trade networks using 
the topographical qualities and strategic location of the border in question.297 Studies 
have also been done on the clash between statist definitions of ‘legal’ and local 
perceptions of ‘licit’, resulting in the illegalisation of licit ties.298 Most of these 
studies have had the model of the state as the perpetrator and the border civilians as 
the victims as the index for understanding livelihood practices along the border. This 
chapter shows that there are many more complex strands of narratives beneath such 
linear narratives of perpetrator-victim discourses. It also shows that livelihood 
narratives of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border are not limited to the disruption of 
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traditional links followed by the destitution of border civilians, but are also study in 
the production of new links and the modification of old ones.  A one-way linear 
study shows how pre-existing practices have been illegalised by the state. But the 
fact that the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, in the last six decades, has also seen 
the production of illegal practices and networks cannot be overlooked in the study of 
livelihood practices along it. The fact that such networks have not just been 
established by global traders but also by the local inhabitants of the border areas 
makes the study all the more significant.  
The use of international borders by global smuggling networks has been a usual 
occurrence, globally. Nor is it a unique feature of the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border. Understanding the definitions of legality/illegality by the concerned states 
and illegal traders, or understanding the modus operandi of the international 
networks has been a much-explored area. This explains the abundance of studies 
related to drug-trading networks across the various borders of India, including those 
with Bangladesh.  
This chapter highlights the local aspect of the creation of the border rather than the 
global implications. The effect of the border on the cultivation patterns of farmers, 
the co-lateral livelihood opportunities created by it like assisting or serving the 
border guards, the local economies created by Land Ports and cattle trades and the 
cross-border exchange of items of daily necessity constitute patterns of the localised 
effect of the border on the people who live along it.  
iii. Border as thirdspace 
Livelihood practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border are examples of the 
disruption of hegemonic discourses, as well as indications of gaining alternative 
access to resources not seen in the other non-border parts of India or Bangladesh. 
They are also examples of the reproduction of different perspectives of contexts vis-
à-vis predominant perspectives. These features are what constitutes any subaltern 
narrative299 and, therefore, make livelihood practices along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border subaltern narratives as well. The chapter establishes the above 
claim by showing how border civilians evolve ways of gaining access to resources 
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and livelihoods by negotiating and utilising the border—ways which are different 
from the available or existing ways in the non-border areas. The perspectives of the 
civilians and border guards regarding their livelihood practices and that of the others 
question the predominant ideas of legality, licitness, inclusion and exclusion in India 
and Bangladesh.  
An interesting observation about the livelihood practices along the West Bengal 
border is that the subversive or subaltern nature of the narratives is not a result of an 
organised or pre-planned effort. They are rather what James Scott phrases as 
‘everyday forms of resistance’.300 The border civilians are well-aware of the various 
nuances of the economy and the related livelihood possibilities in the border areas. 
They are also aware of the nature of state presence and governance in the border, 
what the border regulations are constituted of and most importantly, what practices 
are deemed to be considered legal or illegal by the states. The various practices that 
they engage themselves in despite knowledge of the above clearly indicate that 
border civilians are not always necessarily victims of statehood but beneficiaries of 
the same as well. Their practices are their efforts ‘to work the system to their 
maximum advantage or minimum disadvantage, ever testing the limits of the 
possible’.301 The practices are not organised and, thus, might not find a significant 
place in the studies related to this border. But they are, nevertheless, ‘opportunistic 
and self-indulgent,’302 indicating that the civilians use the border to their own 
interest. The lack of a formal organisation in such practices does not, however, imply 
that there is a lack of co-ordination as well. The various patterns and networks of 
livelihood practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border clearly point towards 
a well co-ordinated narrative of survival, which alerts us to the fact that the practices 
are ‘by no means merely random individual action’.303  
Yet another significant observation is that the intentions of the practices indicate ‘an 
accommodation with the structure of domination’.304 This explains why the 
livelihood practices are not, in any visible way organised efforts to deny the presence 
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of the state at the borders but simple rudimentary ways of putting the reality of the 
border to use. Instead of a denial or refusal of the state machinery, the livelihood 
practices of the civilians operate well within the structure of the same. What, 
nevertheless, makes the practices unique are the ways in which the civilians re-
interpret and redefine the space of the borderland to suit their survival needs and how 
the border guards, inspite of being representatives of the states, involve themselves in 
this process of redefining the border. Involvement with the various livelihood 
practices along the border makes the practices of the border guards more a part of its 
everyday life than any organised, pre-planned effort to either establish or refuse the 
presence of the state at the borders.  
The border, as a space of separation from the neighbour, as container of its own 
civilians and as a space for the exercise of unquestionable sovereign power of the 
state is re-interpreted and, in the process, reproduced by the border people, including 
the civilians and the border guards. The border, thus, becomes the platform on which 
the clash of perceptions between the border people and the state is performed, 
turning the border into the thirdspace305, i.e. the everyday lived reality of the border 
people. The border is perceived by the state as a non-fluid space of containment and 
sovereign power. The border guards, despite being embodied representatives of the 
state, conceive the border as a space for both establishing control, as well as for 
personal gains. The border civilians survive the reality of the border through 
practices and actions that suit their needs. Conflicting perceptions of the border, thus, 
converge in the borderland making the border the platform for the production of 
unique narratives.  
iv. Border consciousness 
Years of performance of such border narratives crystallise into a pattern of 
consciousness among everybody who negotiates the border in their daily lives. This 
consciousness is spatial in character, i.e. tied to the specificity of the borderland, and 
has been termed here as a border consciousness. This chapter provides a building 
block, by analysing livelihood practices, towards the establishment of the thesis that 
various strands of socio-economic and ethno-religious narratives converge in the 
border to be crystallised into a larger spatial narrative—the narrative of the 
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borderland, and that years of performance of certain actions and perceptions turn into 
a pattern of consciousness—the border consciousness. The omnipresence of the 
border in all the actions and perceptions of the border people constitutes an integral 
feature of the border consciousness—right from the role of the border fence in issues 
of cultivation, the role of border regulations in fishing, the role that the border Land 
Ports play in providing livelihood opportunities, the role of small-scale industries in 
attracting labourers across the borders to the role that the border plays in creating 
illegal avenues of livelihood. The words ‘Bangladeshi’ and ‘Indian’ become almost 
interchangeable when it comes to responses regarding such border narratives, 
especially livelihood narratives, so that after a point, only the performance of the 
activity matters and no more the nationality. This highlights the overpowering role 
that the border plays in the lives of its people—in binding the people on both sides of 
the borderline with the commonality of their border(ed) status. While the ways of 
negotiation of the people with their bordered-status differs, the consciousness that 
they are indeed a ‘border people’,306—different from the non-border people on both 
sides—remains constant. This was, in fact, reflected in the response of an Indian 
intelligence officer, who was surprised to find ‘no disorder and very little bad feeling 
among the people of the two dominions’ during his survey of the border villages of 
24 Parganas in 1950. He assessed that the self-interest of both the people of India and 
Pakistan had nipped any possibilities of bad feeling in the bud right in the beginning. 
‘They were too busy with their own smuggling of chillies, mustard oil, cloth, black 
pepper etc…’ he observed.307   
The study of livelihood practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border serves as 
a reminder that subalternity is not merely an inert position characterised by a lack of 
agency within the framework of the state machinery, but a potential consciousness 
that creates its own subversive narrative despite the omnipresence of the dominant 
state narratives.  Interestingly, ‘no subaltern claims subalternity’.308 On the contrary, 
the subaltern makes an attempt to negotiate the vulnerable situation that he finds 
himself in.309  The dynamic livelihood narratives along the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
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border evolving into a unique border consciousness stands proof of that negotiation. 
‘Common sense’310  as a characteristic feature of the subaltern consciousness is best 
understood in such ‘everyday forms’ of negotiations; as is the absorption of new 
ideas and techniques to adapt to new conditions of life.311  Thus, studying livelihood 
practices along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border contributes towards our 
understanding of how such everyday forms of common sense are adapted to suit the 
survival needs of the people negotiating the bordered conditions of their lives. This 
chapter, thus, provides one of the building blocks towards the thesis of the evolution 
of border consciousness by analysing how various patterns of livelihood practices 
converge and get intertwined at the West Bengal-Bangladesh border in producing a 
larger spatial consciousness.  
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Narratives of the India-Bangladesh Enclaves  
 
I. Introduction 
The chapter aims to look at the geographical enclaves along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border in the context of their relation to it. The enclaves are unique 
geographical territories located on both sides of the border between West Bengal and 
Bangladesh, and concentrated in two border districts each of West Bengal and 
Bangladesh. The creation of the enclaves has its origin in the partition of Bengal into 
East Pakistan and West Bengal in 1947. This chapter aims at a brief background of 
the creation of the enclaves, followed by their present socio-political status in the 
context of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. 
The word ‘enclave’ as a geopolitical entity first appeared in the diplomatic document 
of the Treaty of Madrid (1526).1 An enclave has been defined as an outlying portion 
of a country entirely or mostly surrounded by the territory of another country.2 The 
evolved geopolitical meaning of the word has currently come to mean a portion of a 
country separated from the mainland and surrounded by a politically alien territory.3 
The term exclave has also come to exist besides the term enclave, with a slight 
variation in definition. From the point of view of the state in which the pocket of land 
is located, it is an enclave. From the point of view of the state to which the territory 
belongs, it is an exclave. A political exclave is defined by G.W.S. Robinson as a part 
of the territory of one country entirely surrounded by the territory of another 
country.4 Given the similarity in their definitions, the terms enclave and exclave are 
often used interchangeably. Besides standard enclaves, the two other types of 
enclaves located so far are counter-enclaves and counter-counter-enclaves. A 
counter-enclave is an enclave within an enclave, i.e. domestic territory lying within 
the enclave territory of another state. A counter-counter-enclave is an enclave lying 
                                                          
1
 Sills, D. L. (ed.). (1968) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Vol.5. p.61.  
2
 Hanks, P. (ed.). (1971) Encyclopedic World Dictionary. p.58. 
3
 Rabbani, Md. G. (2005-2006) Stateless in South Asia: Living in Bangladesh-India 
Enclaves. Theoretical Perspectives: A Journal of Social Sciences and Arts. 12 & 13. p.1.  
4
 Robinson, G.W.S. (1959) Exclaves. Annals of the Association of American Geographers. 
49. pp. 283-295.  
111 
 
within a counter-enclave, i.e. a detached part of the principal enclave lying in the 
counter-enclave of that enclave.5   
In general understanding, enclaves may be accessible from the mainland through an 
alien or foreign territory, by land or sea. However, with increasing political 
complications and the enhanced stringency of legalities associated with travelling 
across foreign territories, accessing enclaves by the parent states, however much 
cordiality the two states might have shared, ceased to be a viable option. With the 
growth of centralised state systems, territorial contiguity began dominating state 
sovereignty and national identity. Likewise, enclaves around the world began to be 
eliminated, through their consolidation into the mainland, throughout the 19th 
century.6  As of now, the enclaves along the India-Bangladesh border are the most 
unique of their kind in the world, both in terms of their geospatiality as well as their 
political significance.   
 
Figure 2. Diagrammatic sketch map of Cooch Behar enclaves (chhits). Source: 
District Map of Cooch Behar, Govt. of India.  
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II. India-Bangladesh enclaves: historical background  
The Bengali term for the word enclave is Chhitmahal—formed of two words Chhit 
(piece, portion or fragment) and Mahal (territory or landmass). The birth of the 
enclaves found in the Indian subcontinent can be traced to the Mughal era (16th-18th 
centuries), when a lot of such fragments of land belonging to a local chief or landlord 
would be located at a distance (i.e. not attached to the main piece of his jurisdiction), 
surrounded by the territories of others. Most of the local rulers or zamindars, in order 
to expand their territorial control, penetrated into neighbouring areas, creating 
landlocked estates of various sizes under their own control. Even these estates did 
not necessarily have a territorial continuity and were themselves scattered among 
neighbouring territories. These pieces of land came to be known as Chhitmahals and 
were mostly located on the eastern fringes of what was then the territorial 
configuration of the Mughal Empire. Neither the Mughals nor the British rulers could 
completely consolidate these estates (forming part of the Princely states under their 
control) scattered throughout the Indian subcontinent.  
The origin of the India-Bangladesh enclaves can be traced back to the scattered 
princely estates held by the Maharaja of Cooch Behar and the zamindars of 
Jalpaiguri, Rangpur and Dinajpur. Myths have it that these Maharajas and zamindars 
often exchanged estates between themselves as part of poker games or even as gifts 
of honour. Conflicts between the local Mughal rulers and the Cooch Behar royal 
family also led to the creation of some enclaves. While the Maharaja of Cooch Behar 
held sovereignty over some of the far away enclaves inside the Mughal jurisdiction, 
the Mughals did the same within Cooch Behar’s jurisdiction. Later British 
annexations brought the Cooch Behar jurisdiction under its control but did not bring 
about any fundamental change to the territorial characteristic of the enclaves.  
The partitioning of Bengal resulted in renewed confusion regarding the distribution 
of the enclaves between West Bengal and the newly-formed state of East Pakistan. 
The Boundary Commission, responsible for deciding the new boundary between the 
states, based its decisions on ambiguous indices such as ‘contiguity’ and ‘other 
factors’. The term ‘other factors’, though vaguely spelt out, became the deciding 
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factor for the Boundary Commission.7 Both the Muslim League and the National 
Congress based their suggestions on the ‘other factors’ and decided on the boundary 
line. It was this ‘other factor’ reference that was used to include and/or exclude 
enclaves which otherwise would not have been justified by the territorial ‘contiguity’ 
factor. The boundary line itself was decided and executed in haste. Moreover, the 
Boundary Commission based its decision on district maps rather than field surveys,8 
which resulted in the enclaves remaining a part of a district but being located in 
another state.  
The princely states were not immediately partitioned or set free in 1947 following the 
partition. They were given time to weigh their options between joining India or 
Pakistan. Accordingly, in 1949, Maharaja Jagadependra Narayan of Cooch Behar 
merged with India following the ‘Cooch Bihar Merger Agreement’ on 28 August 
1949.9  According to the Agreement, all the territories belonging to the Maharaja of 
Cooch Behar fell under the sovereignty of India, implying that the enclaves held by 
Cooch Behar in the zamindari of Rangpur and Dinajpur formed part of India, despite 
being separated from the main jurisdictional area of Cooch Behar.10 Similarly, the 
enclaves under Rangpur and Dinajpur fell under the sovereignty of Pakistan despite 
being surrounded on all sides by the territories of Cooch Behar (West Bengal).  The 
geographical characteristics of the enclaves were rendered all the more complex due 
to the zigzag demarcation of the India-Bangladesh border in the areas which hosted 
them.11   
Interestingly, there was never any confusion about the area and demarcation of the 
enclaves themselves in India and Bangladesh, despite disagreements about the 
citizenship status of their inhabitants. The borders between British India and Cooch 
Behar had been clearly demarcated in 1934 through concrete pillars. Many of these 
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pillars are still in place today, though they look different from the ones marking the 
India-Bangladesh border that was constructed in 1947.12     
The districts of Cooch Behar (the areas of Haldibari, Mekhligunj, Mathabhanga, 
Sitalkuchi, Dinhata and Tufangunj) and Jalpaiguri in the state of West Bengal (India) 
host the Bangladeshi enclaves, while the Bangladeshi districts of Panchagarh 
(Panchagarh, Debigunj, Boda), Nilphamari (Dimla), Lalmonirhat (Lalmonirhat, 
Hatibandha, Patgram) and Kurigram (Kurigram, Bhurungamari, Fulbari) host the 
Indian enclaves.  
At present, there are a total of 162 enclaves in India and Bangladesh, including 111 
Indian enclaves in Bangladesh (covering an area of 17,158 acres) and 51 Bangladeshi 
enclaves in India (covering an area of 7,110 acres).13 The population of the 111 
Indian enclaves in Bangladesh amounts to 37,550 according to a Census of the 
enclaves (the first ever) in July 2011, while that in the 51 Bangladeshi enclaves in 
India amounts to 14,310.14 These figures give a fair idea of the enormity of the crisis, 
given that more than 51,000 people have been walking the tightrope between 
citizenship and statelessness for over six decades now.   
In 1951, the first attempt at enumerating the population of the enclaves was taken up 
by the government of Pakistan as part of its Census. But the enumerators were 
harassed and arrested by the Indian border police when they tried to enter the 
enclaves and, hence, began the exclusion of the enclave dwellers from all the 
censuses of both the countries for the next 66 years.15 The bigger irony, perhaps, is 
the fact that in the 1961 Census of Pakistan, 82 villages mentioned as ‘uninhabited’ 
actually constituted the enclaves.16 The enlisting of the enclaves as uninhabited 
territories together with the uninhabited status of the deserted villages around 
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(deserted due to river erosion) makes the unrecognised status of the enclaves amply 
clear.   
The partition of Bengal saw the exchange of lands between Hindus and Muslims 
migrating between India and East Pakistan. Though cases of planned exchange of 
lands were few compared to the large scale frenzied exodus, official documents 
testify to such exchanges in a substantial number. Hindus from East Pakistan 
migrating to West Bengal exchanged their lands with the Muslims of West Bengal 
who migrated to East Pakistan.17 Yet the enclave residents hardly had the choice of 
exchanging their lands with non-enclave lands since that would involve exchange 
with foreign lands. In order to keep to the jurisdictions of their own states, the 
enclave inhabitants could exchange lands only with enclave inhabitants from the 
other side of the border. ‘If there is an exchange between Chhits and lands of the 
other state, then the matter will fall under the Foreigner’s Act,’18 informs Phulmoni, 
an enclave resident.   
The trajectory of the enclave inhabitants has been somewhat similar to that of the 
Namasudra and other agricultural castes who were the last to leave their lands and 
so, the last to arrive in the new states after partition.19 Essentially peasants by 
occupation, enclave residents were among the last migrants to leave their original 
enclaves and migrate to those on the other side of the border.  Such migrations 
continued in phases well into the 1990s. ‘Changing our jurisdictional areas, i.e. 
police stations, was the most that we could do. But, in any case, we had to stick to 
enclaves in order to be within the larger jurisdiction of our country. Many of our 
Muslim neighbours here in the enclaves are those who have been inhabitants of these 
lands for generations, and who did not migrate to East Pakistan even after partition. 
They are technically Indian citizens by birth (by virtue of being inhabitants of the 
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Indian side of the land for generations), but have been turned into Bangladeshi 
citizens due to this enclave status,’ complains Phulmoni.20 Much of the enclave 
population consists of such original inhabitants, who were living in these territories 
for ages—long before the partition took place. That has not ensured access to the 
basic facilities of their states for these people. Their politico-territorial status 
prevents them from accessing the minimum needs of life and livelihood. 
Partition and migration, thus, affected the enclave residents in ways different from 
the non-enclave residents and immigrants. Change of sides did not mean change of 
nationality for those enclave-residents who migrated, while the nationality of those 
who did not migrate from their original enclaves changed. This makes the enclave 
narratives unique not just as a socio-spatial phenomenon but also in partition and 
citizenship discourses.  
The construction of the fence put a complete halt to the interaction between the 
enclave population and their parent states. The fence made cross-border movement 
visible like never before and cut off the enclaves from their states. Even till the early 
1980s, people could travel to their own states for casting their votes or accessing 
some basic facilities. With the increased cross-border restrictions on mobility being 
put into operation between India and Bangladesh, such movements have ceased.21  
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Plate 18. Bangladeshi enclave in India, 2012.  
 
III. Bilateral Agreements concerning the India-Bangladesh Enclaves 
 
i. Nehru-Noon Accord (1958) 
The territorial complexity of the enclaves coupled with the possibility of religious 
tension (between some of the Muslim-majority enclaves and their Hindu-majority 
neighbouring areas and vice-versa) troubled the prime ministers of both India and 
Pakistan—Jawaharlal Nehru and Firoz Khan Noon, respectively. Discussions 
regarding a decision about the enclaves began between the ministries of both 
countries, complemented by survey initiatives and demarcation talks. The idea of the 
exchange of enclaves began to appear in the public discourses of both India and 
Pakistan. Eventually, on September 10, 1958 an agreement was signed between 
Nehru and Noon for the exchange of enclaves.  
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The Berubari question22 formed the main issue of the agreement together with the 
question of the exchange of enclaves.  In fact, there had been talks regarding the 
separation of the two issues, and of the enclave question to be dealt separately under 
the Acquired Territories (Merger) Bill, 1960. Despite objections by the West Bengal 
State Assembly to the separation of the Berubari question and the enclave issue, the 
Acquired Territories (Merger) Act23 was finalised in 1960. The Act provided for the 
‘Exchange of old Cooch Behar enclaves in Pakistan and Pakistan enclaves in India 
without claim to compensation for extra area going to Pakistan.’  
However, amidst opposition from political parties over both the Berubari issue as 
well as the enclaves, the Act could not be implemented. In 1971, the Indian Supreme 
Court’s attempt for a final implementation of the Act was overshadowed by a war 
crisis (leading to the formation of Bangladesh), stalling the exchange for the time 
being.  
ii. Indira-Mujib Agreement (1974) 
The struggle for the independence of East Pakistan followed by the creation of 
Bangladesh in 1971 renewed optimism among the people of both West Bengal and 
Bangladesh regarding the enclave issue. India’s co-operation with Bangladesh in its 
liberation war was largely responsible for this optimism. Accordingly, on May 16, 
1974, the Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh—Indira Gandhi and Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, signed yet another agreement provisioning for the full exchange of 
the enclaves. Bangladesh dropped its claim over South Berubari in return for the 
possession of its largest enclave in West Bengal—Dahagram-Angarpota.  
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The agreement provided for the lease of land by India for use by Bangladesh 
(measuring 175x85 metres), as a passage between the Bangladesh mainland and the 
Dahagram-Angarpota enclave. This passage came to be called the Tinbigha 
Corridor.24 The agreement was followed by protests by the people of Mekhligunj (the 
area of Jalpaiguri which ought to host the corridor), which delayed the final 
implementation of the creation of the corridor. Finally, in 1982, the matter was taken 
up by H.M. Ershad25 in Bangladesh and an agreement was signed between Indira 
Gandhi and Ershad leasing the Tinbigha Corridor to Bangladesh. But it was not 
before 1990 that all the hurdles in the path of the implementation of the agreement 
could be resolved and a corridor could be built across Indian territory, connecting the 
Bangladeshi enclave of Dahagram-Angarpota to the mainland of Bangladesh.26   
iii. Manmohan-Hasina Agreement (2011)  
While the Tinbigha Agreement signified a breakthrough in India-Bangladesh bi-
lateral relations, it also meant that the larger enclave issue involving more than 160 
other enclaves was pushed to the backseat. The Tinbigha Corridor overshadowed the 
situation of the rest of the enclaves, who were, since 1947, in a wretched state.   
In 2011, the Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh— Manmohan Singh and 
Sheikh Hasina, signed yet another accord providing for the exchange of the enclaves, 
by which their inhabitants could continue to reside at their present location and be 
recognised as the citizen of the host country or else they could move to the country 
of their choice. The agreement is yet to be ratified and implemented.  
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Bilateral affairs between India and Bangladesh over the enclave question have, in a 
way, pushed the reality of the existence of enclave dwellers to the backseat, since the 
reality of the situation never made it to the state-level agreements. Security and 
economic concerns of the states have been prioritised over the destitution of the 
people who are the victims of state-building.  
In 1948, an agreement had been signed between the East Bengal government and 
Cooch Behar agreeing to allow the armed forces of both sides across the other’s 
territory in order to enter and leave the enclaves. The district officials, under the 
agreement, were required to have photograph identity cards. Their visits were also to 
be preceded by an announcement no less than fifteen days in advance. Police 
officials were required to be in their uniforms and unarmed. The agreement had also 
provided for supplying certain goods to the enclaves once a month and the collection 
of revenue once every six months. The agreement had not provided for the transit of 
people in and out of the enclaves. While state officials could transfer goods into the 
enclaves, the produce from the enclaves could not be transferred out, barring the 
enclave people from participating in the regional economy,27 forcing them into a 
virtual economic blockade and criminalising their survival practices. ‘If they were to 
survive, they had to ignore the agreement and face the peril of being defined as 
smugglers.’28  
The nature and provisions of the agreements regarding the enclaves from their 
inception to date stand proof of the fact that the bilateral relations between states 
have been prioritised over the survival concerns of the people for whom these 
agreements were meant. The introduction of the passport and visa control systems in 
1952 added to the woes. The passport system drove the enclave people into acting 
more against the law. In the absence of passport offices within the enclaves, the 
enclave people wanting to obtain a passport had to cross foreign territory illegally to 
reach their parent state. The parent state would have to allow them to enter without a 
passport. In case they somehow got through this process and obtained a passport, 
they had to approach the consulate of the neighbouring state for a visa to return to 
their enclaves. Once the visa expired, they had to go through the whole process again 
illegally. The passport and visa system struck the final blow to the citizenship status 
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of the enclave people, driving them into infringement of the laws of both India and 
Bangladesh through every little move they made.29 With the introduction of the 
passport system, the collection of revenue from the enclaves by state officials also 
ceased since the latter now required visas to enter the enclaves.30  
Given their unique territorial nature and absence of state apparatuses within the 
enclaves, it is not difficult to imagine what the lives of these enclave-dwellers entail. 
Law and order is conspicuous by its absence. With no access to the police, border 
guards or administrative institutions, the enclave people have to deal with any kind 
of issue—environmental, social, legal, economic or political—by themselves.  
The earlier literature on enclaves had mostly looked at them from the perspective of 
geographical uniqueness, sovereignty, international law and issues of 
administration.31 Some recent studies have attempted to look at the various strands of 
identity formation within the enclaves as well as negotiation between the enclave 
people and their neighbours,32 but have not studied them as constitutive parts of 
border narratives per se. This chapter aims to look at the narratives of the India-
Bangladesh enclaves as integral parts of border narratives and as an important strand 
in the evolution of border consciousness along the border. 
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Plate 19. Path to an Indian enclave in Bangladesh, with stark resemblance to its non-
enclave surroundings, 2011.  
 
IV. Deprivation from access to basic facilities 
 
i. Land documents, identity proofs and other basic amenities 
 The enclave population neither have a formal citizenship status nor any specific 
document showing their status as enclave inhabitants. ‘Neither do we have birth 
certificates, nor do we have Polio cards. We are only known as “people” (implying 
the deprivation from a formal citizenship).’33 The only document related to land that 
some of these people might have is an age-old one that shows that the land had been 
owned or rented out to one of their ancestors for cultivation by the local landowners. 
These land documents still act as the only continuing connection with their parent 
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state.34 Other than this, the enclaves do not officially belong to any police station or 
district.  
While the district that they officially belong to does not recognise them, the district 
within which they are located cannot recognise them since they are a foreign 
territory. ‘The way we can claim to belong to a district, a police station, these people 
cannot claim any of these. They lack an identity and are foreigners in their own 
lands. They cannot even access the facilities of their own states due to the border 
fencing. They are practically left without laws or a Constitution unlike us. BSF 
insists that even if they have to pass over a few yards of the neighbouring state’s land 
while travelling from their enclaves to their states, they require a passport.  We 
cannot help them in any way even if we want to,’35 says Nirendranath Burman, 
resident of a village adjoining a Bangladeshi enclave in India, while responding to 
questions about the condition of their enclave neighbours.  
This also means that the people belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes in the 
enclaves are also without a certificate documenting their caste status.36 Their unique 
territorial status has resulted in the absence of even basic facilities which the official 
citizens of a state enjoy like schools, hospitals, police stations, etc. ‘The only thing 
we can call our own is this air we breathe,’37 laments Md. Iqbal Ali.  
Taking help from neighbours in terms of fake identities to get admission to a school 
or hospital in the host state is routine for the enclave dwellers. And this service 
includes a certain amount of expenditure as well. ‘We have to pay about Tk. 500 
each to the Bangladeshi Union member of the neighbouring village for fake birth 
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certificates for our children, where the father’s name and the name of the village of 
the child’s birth are forged,’38 says Hafizul.  
Though electric poles run through them, the enclaves themselves are deprived of 
electricity. The electric poles provide electricity to the neighbours on all sides, 
depriving the enclaves in which they are installed. ‘If we try to hook current from the 
lines, we are threatened. Even if we want to buy electricity from them, they do not 
co-operate.’39 This also means that irrigation water needs to be pumped in using 
diesel-engine machines in the absence of electricity. The lack of electricity implies 
that the enclave inhabitants have to depend on their neighbours for daily activities 
such as charging their mobile phones. ‘We charge our phones from the houses of our 
neighbours, since we cannot use the electricity that runs through our Chhits,’40 says 
Kamal, resident of a Bangladeshi enclave.  This has forced many of the enclave 
people to extend their houses into the neighbouring territories in order to acquire 
electricity and postal addresses in the host state.41 
Some of the enclaves have arranged for their own drinking water facility with no 
help from either state. The kerosene oil, which their neighbours get at a subsidised 
rate at the ration shops, needs to be procured at a substantial rate for use as lighting 
purposes in their huts. With no citizenship documents, the enclave dwellers cannot 
access subsidised rations like their neighbours. ‘The moon, sun, rain and air are the 
only things we get free here. If the Indians could, they probably would have cut off 
our access to these as well,’42 complains Md. Iqbal, resident of a Bangladeshi 
enclave in India.  
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The enclave dwellers have built roads themselves in the absence of any state 
initiatives to improve the communication system inside them. Temporary bridges 
have been built in some, using bamboo as their main resource. Almost all the 
inhabitants of that particular enclave contribute in the construction of the roads or 
bridges, either by providing bamboo or by providing labour. Senior enclave residents 
supervise the construction.43   
ii. Land issues 
A lot of people from the surrounding areas have managed to grab land inside the 
enclaves in the absence of their original owners (who might have migrated 
elsewhere) or any state administration. They continue to live in their own state, in the 
vicinity of the enclave but enjoy the possession of the land inside the enclaves—
lands for which they do not require to pay revenue. Moreover, in the period 
following partition, the uncertainty over the future of the enclaves had reduced their 
land prices.44 This was another reason behind some of the neighbouring people 
buying land inside the enclaves in the hope that they would eventually be merged 
with the host state.45  
Some of these landowners bring landless people from other areas (mostly victims of 
displacement due to natural calamities like river erosion) and settle them on their 
lands in the enclaves as adhiars, who then form their own little colonies and start 
cultivating the land as sharecroppers. The adhiar families are provided with a piece 
of agricultural land and a piece of land for residence by the owner of the land. The 
yield from these lands is divided equally between the adhiar and the landowner. 
These sharecroppers are often treated as subjects of the landowner, and called proja 
(subject).46 A new version of socio-economic subjectivity, thus, awaits these adhiars 
once they are settled inside the enclaves by the land owners—though such identities 
are not recognised by either of the states concerned.  
Besides enjoying the yield from an unregistered and untaxed land, people having 
lands inside the enclaves can also use their own shallow pumps to irrigate their part 
of the lands, which the enclave inhabitant cannot do. The owners of these enclave 
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lands are registered under the BPL (Below Poverty Line)47 list in their own states 
since they do not officially own any land in the states of which they are citizens. 
They cultivate their lands inside the enclaves and reap the benefits to the full, not 
having to pay any revenue for the produce. ‘We cannot complain for fear of threats, 
nor does the Indian government do anything about this,’48 says an enclave resident. 
This does not imply that the enclave dwellers themselves are happy about their non-
revenue status. One of the respondents makes it clear when he says, ‘revenue-paying 
has been a tradition of this country. Our forefathers paid tax throughout their lives. 
Why shouldn’t we pay?’49  
Some of the neighbouring cultivators have come to own hundreds of acres of lands 
inside the enclaves over the years. ‘The Chatterjees of Dinhata own 600-700 bighas50 
of agricultural land here. They bring their own agricultural labourers from outside the 
enclaves to work on their land. Even when they sell the land, they do it to Indians, 
but never to us. We are perpetually deprived of every opportunity,’51 says a visibly 
infuriated Kamal Debnath, inhabitant of a Bangladeshi enclave in India.  
Even if the enclave dwellers try buying land from their neighbours, they often end up 
being defrauded by the sellers in the absence of documents and also because most of 
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them are unable to attend the land registry process as it takes place in the nearest 
local administrative unit of the district under which the enclave lies, across the 
border. Moreover, the enclave lands have never been included in the land settlement 
surveys of either state since 1947, which puts these lands and their owners (both fake 
and real) into complete uncertainty as to the future of their possessions.52 ‘We cannot 
register our land holdings either in India or Bangladesh. So we write it down 
informally. It has no real validity and is susceptible to manipulation in future,’53 says 
Bimal, resident of a Bangladeshi enclave.  Nor is there any uniformity in the land 
registration systems of the various enclaves. The land registration documents are 
without any legal standing and have no validity outside the enclave.  
iii. Commercial transactions 
Being completely surrounded by the territories of the host state, the enclave people 
have to depend on their neighbours for commercial transactions, as well as for 
schools, hospitals, etc. They use the haats of their neighbouring locality of the host 
state for commercial purposes; use the currency of the host state; maintain family and 
friendship links with the surrounding areas, including marriage ties (which are 
officially cross-border marriage ties), and often participate in the religious festivals 
of the neighbours (Hindu enclave residents in Hindu festivals and Muslim residents 
in mosque congregations).54  
iv. Adverse position of some neighbouring territories 
Due to the enclaves, some areas of the host state are deprived of communication 
systems and electricity as the enclaves pose a barrier. These areas, bounded by the 
enclaves, have turned into adverse territories themselves. The kind of infrastructure 
required to deal with such situations (for example, building a bridge around the 
enclave) might not always be economically viable. This leaves the people of such 
areas with little choice but to traverse the enclaves for communicating with other 
neighbouring villages of their own state—being forced into being ‘trespassers’.55  
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v. Schools, hospitals 
It is with the fake identity of their neighbours that the children from the enclaves are 
admitted into neighbouring schools.56 The issue of having to ‘pose a stranger as my 
husband in order to get my children admitted to school’ keeps coming up in 
numerous responses of the women inhabitants of the enclaves.57 Admission to 
hospitals operates on a similar use of fake identities.  
School education, even after such a hazardous beginning, can only continue till the 
primary level, after which it is not possible to continue education in a high school 
since issues of identity are more formalised in them. Official documents, like a voter 
card, ration card or birth certificates, to which the enclave inhabitants do not have 
access, are essential for admission into government-run high schools.58 ‘In the higher 
classes, they are asked about their whereabouts,’ says Fatima Bibi in context of 
sending children to neighbouring schools with fake identities.59  
Some of the enclaves have informal schools, run either by one of their own residents 
or sometimes volunteered by a person from the neighbouring areas.60  These schools 
cannot provide any food or books to its students, unlike primary schools in the 
neighbouring areas where the students are entitled to free meals and textbooks at the 
primary level. ‘We cannot even pay any remuneration to the teachers who volunteer 
to teach in these schools,’61 laments an enclave inhabitant. The uncertainty of 
educational degrees, if acquired somehow, leaves the enclave people disinterested in 
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pursuing education. With no access to the parent state and no legal access to the 
employment opportunities of the host state, the enclave people are left with little 
choice. Using fake documents to acquire government jobs poses the risk of being 
apprehended on verification (a process that every government job entails).62   
vi. Marriage, women, sexual violence 
Despite efforts and examples of cross-border marriages between the enclave people 
and their neighbours in the host states, the prospect of marriage is often critical and 
forever hazardous for them. Finding a bride from the neighbouring areas is often 
difficult for the male residents of enclaves since that entail a loss of citizenship for 
the bride. The wife as well as the children are rendered document-less because the 
husband/father does not possess one.63 ‘Once one marries into the enclaves, she loses 
her ration cards and becomes document-less like the rest of the enclave population. 
All her previously existing documents become invalid on entering the enclave after 
marriage.’64  
Women from the enclaves have another version of the crisis of marrying outside the 
enclaves. Fatima Bibi narrates how her daughter is being harassed by her in-laws for 
not being able to provide documents. ‘My daughter is unable to obtain Indian 
citizenship because of lack of documents. Her in-laws are demanding Rs.5000 so that 
they can arrange for fake documents with that money. We are poor people. Where do 
we get so much money?’65 Bhabani Burman and Bimal Burman second Fatima on 
the plight of the women inhabitants of the enclaves who are married into 
neighbouring villages.66 To ensure the acceptance of their daughters into non-enclave 
families, the enclave residents encourage the marriage ceremony to be held in the 
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presence of a marriage registrar (or a priest/kaji) of the choice of the groom’s house, 
arranged from the neighbouring area.67  
Incidents of sexual harassment, including rape and molestation by both the 
neighbouring miscreants as well as the border guards, are not uncommon in the 
enclaves.68  Lack of medical facilities within the enclaves result in complications 
related to childbirth, including miscarriages.69  
Fatima narrates the irony that though her paternal house is in a village which is 
currently in the Rangpur district of Bangladesh, her parents could never visit her in 
her present address in the Bangladeshi enclave of Mashaldanga. The piece of Indian 
land between the Bangladesh mainland and the enclave prevents them from visiting 
their daughter. ‘Even we cannot attend funerals of our parents for the same reason,’70 
rues Fatima. Movement across the enclaves and the neighbouring areas is all the 
more restricted for the women of the former, given the belief of the men ‘in their 
(women’s) inability to flee from pursuers.’71 The tragic trajectory of the enclave 
people rings loud in such responses. This crisis, however, fails to put a complete halt 
to cross-border marriages between enclave and non-enclave residents. Incidents of 
women from distant places in the host state marrying into the enclaves do occur, 
although rarely.72 
vii. Religious aspect 
A religious innuendo in the context of fake documents and identities has also been 
noticed in some of the responses. Md. Iqbal explains that most of the Hindu 
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inhabitants of the enclaves have their Hindu relatives as neighbours, living in the 
Indian territories around them, and they provide fake documents and identities to 
Hindus in the enclaves, whereas the Muslim enclave dwellers need to obtain these 
documents through the payment of a substantial amount of cash.73 Similar responses 
are heard from the Hindu residents of Indian enclaves in the Muslim-majority 
Bangladeshi areas.   
Fatema Bibi supports Iqbal’s claim that religion often plays a role in the kind of 
behaviour that the enclave population can expect from their neighbours: ‘They 
behave all the more badly because we are Muslims. All the surrounding villages are 
Hindu, and all of us inside the Chhit are Muslims. If they unleash their cattle on our 
Chhits to graze, we cannot complain, or else they become violent.’74 Irrespective of 
religion, the relation between the enclave population and their neighbours, in most 
cases, is not favourable. ‘We have to interact with our neighbours. But if they behave 
badly, we cannot answer them back. We are always being apologetic, often 
unnecessarily, simply to ensure that they keep co-operating with us,’75 says Fatema. 
These responses are manifestations of what Willem van Schendel phrases as the 
clash between citizenship, proxy citizenship and an enclave identity. In the post-
partition phase, the states of India and Pakistan ‘saw themselves as being in charge of 
the population living in their own territory, but also of a category of people living in 
the territory of the other state.’76 These groups have been termed by Van Schendel as 
citizens and proxy citizens, respectively. India’s proxy citizens were the Hindus 
living in Pakistan, while Pakistan’s proxy citizens were the Muslims living in India.77 
This transterritorial78 aspect of nationality was often related to questions of the 
loyalty of proxy citizens towards their territorial nation.  
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The condition of the enclave people was perhaps the most complicated against the 
backdrop of such citizenship issues because of the location of their identity at the 
crossroads of being citizens, proxy citizens and enclave people.79 Communal 
outbreaks in the post-partition phases elsewhere in India or Bangladesh affected the 
enclave people in ways whereby the proxy citizens of the enclaves were unharmed, 
while the citizens of the other state were made victims of the communal violence. 
The dilemma in identifying themselves with either the parent state or the host state 
pushed the enclave people to the brink of vulnerability. Their identification as 
citizens distanced them from their neighbours and relatives outside the enclaves on 
whom they were economically dependent. The more the enclave people identified 
themselves as proxy citizens, the more they distanced themselves from their co-
residents in the enclaves.80 This drove them to create a third identity for 
themselves—that of being ‘enclave people’.81 The undercurrent of citizenship and 
identity issues can still be felt in the responses of the enclave people like the ones 
above. Religious issues related to citizenship questions still occupy an important role 
in the narratives of the enclave people.  
The complex pattern of citizenship and proxy citizenship in the enclaves can also be 
understood from the recent survey of the enclave people regarding their choice of 
state once the exchange of enclaves was executed. 743 out of the 14,000 Indian 
enclave residents (constituting 149 families) in Bangladesh expressed their desire to 
be rehabilitated in India, while none among the 37,000 Bangladeshi enclave residents 
in India expressed their desire to be rehabilitated in Bangladesh after the exchange. 
Interestingly, the Bangladeshi enclave residents in India have themselves started 
preparing for the rehabilitation of those who choose to rehabilitate from the Indian 
enclaves in Bangladesh instead of waiting for the Indian state or even the West 
Bengal government to take an action. The Bangladeshi enclave residents in India 
have also decided to help the Indian enclave residents from Bangladesh with the 
necessary financial support to start their lives afresh in the Bangladeshi enclaves in 
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India. This also indicates the desperation of the enclave residents for the execution of 
the exchange.82  
viii. Relation between the enclave residents and the Panchayat/Union 
Earlier, the Panchayat/Union heads of the Panchayats/Unions to whom the enclaves 
officially belonged could come to the enclave for the mediation of disputes or the 
issuing of certificates. However, with the introduction of the passport/visa system 
and the enclave issue gaining political momentum in India-Bangladesh bilateral 
affairs, the border guards stopped allowing the same, depriving the enclave 
population of their last resort of communication with their parent states.  
Interestingly, the Panchayat/Union heads of the neighbouring villages of the host 
state still engage in such co-operation, as and when possible, despite its illegal 
nature. ‘We do try to help the enclave people in some ways, even though it will be 
considered officially illegal. We cannot do anything legally, especially for those who 
do not have a single document. Those having a basic document can still be helped, 
albeit illegally. In fact, I have arranged for many of their school admissions, 
livelihood opportunities as labourers outside the enclaves or even arranged for voter 
cards for many of them—all illegally,’83 says the Deputy-Head of the village 
Panchayat of an Indian village adjacent to a Bangladeshi enclave, but he also adds 
that, ‘not all Indian Panchayats help the enclave people in the way we are trying 
to’84— indicating the inherent troubled relations between the enclave population and 
its neighbours.   
Some of the Indian neighbours of the Bangladeshi enclaves and vice versa confirm 
these responses regarding the troubled relationships between the enclave inhabitants 
and their neighbours. ‘It is true that they do not share a cordial relation with their 
neighbours. The Indians do abuse the enclave dwellers, though there are exceptions 
of course. Many of us try to co-operate with them, which is also reflected in the 
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relation between many of these enclave dwellers and their neighbouring villages,’ 
says Md. Ziauddin Miah.85 Some of the responses, in fact, point towards an ambience 
of cordiality between the two, especially during times of festivities.86  
ix. Trespassing and ‘push-backs’ 
The threat of conviction for trespassing is omnipresent among the enclave people 
since it is difficult for them to prove their enclave-status if wrongly convicted of 
illegal infiltration.  In case of apprehension, they are either ‘pushed back’ forcefully 
into their parent state or imprisoned. Being pushed back forcefully into their own 
state creates yet another hazard for these enclave dwellers since they have set up 
their own life and livelihood in the enclaves over the years. ‘Once we are forcefully 
pushed back to Bangladesh, it is almost impossible to come back to the enclave, and 
especially in the current situation of the fences,’87 says a Bangladeshi enclave 
resident in India.   
While, on the one hand, the restriction of movement between the enclaves and the 
parent state is a problem, being forcefully pushed back into their states is no solution 
either. The idea of ‘being forcefully pushed back’ into their own states forms an 
interesting but complex narrative in the context of the enclaves. It is, in fact, quite 
easy for the neighbours to create an issue out of any kind of movement by the 
enclave population. ‘All they have to do is report to the BSF that we are illegal 
Bangladeshi infiltrators, and we will immediately be sent to the jail. Earlier it was a 
3-month term for such convictions. Currently it has been extended to 2 years and 2 
months. There are plans for further extension, for up to 3 years.’88 The hassles that 
the ‘push-back’ policy of the border guards create for the enclave people indicates 
that the more important issue for the latter is their integration into the host states as 
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officially recognised citizens rather than access to their parent state.89 Such issues 
form a platform for the citizenship demands of the enclave people.  Push-backs are 
not unique to enclave residents but are a common occurrence along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border, where civilians are forcefully ‘pushed back’, either into their 
own state or into the neighbouring state by the border guards, where the victims of 
push-backs are stranded between legalities pertaining to citizenship of India and 
Bangladesh.90  
x. Lack of voting rights 
The lack of voting rights of the enclave people prevents them from voicing their 
problems in either the local Panchayats/Unions or to the political parties ‘Our plight 
never comes up as an agenda with the leaders even during elections. The leaders 
invest their energy only towards their voters, in the Indian villages around. We are 
not entitled to vote, so no one cares to talk about us,’91 laments Bimal, resident of a 
Bangladeshi enclave in India.  
 
V. Livelihood 
Livelihood opportunities for the enclave dwellers are few, other than agricultural 
practices.  The partition played havoc with them by separating them from their 
agricultural fields. Plots of land were scattered not just on either side of the border 
but also on the same side between the enclaves and their surroundings. The lives of 
these people deteriorated, as Rabbani puts it aptly, ‘from peasant to sharecropper, 
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tenant to landless and sharecropper to non-cropper.’92 With the population of the 
enclaves soaring rapidly in the absence of any government administered Family 
Planning Programmes,93 earning a living with the limited availability of resources 
has been the main crisis of the enclave inhabitants. The economic blockade that the 
enclaves have been forced into left their people with little option but illegal 
transactions with their neighbours.  
Working as labourers elsewhere in the state or even abroad, which has become a 
usual occurrence all along the border, is a risky proposition for the enclave 
population because of the lack of documents. This makes them doubly vulnerable to 
false allegations of infiltration.94  ‘We do not have any industries in the enclaves, not 
even such cottage-industries as beedi-making. We are unable to work as labourers in 
India, since we do not have a union card, unlike the Indian labourers. While they 
(Indian labourers) can come into the Chhit to work as labourers, we cannot do the 
same outside the Chhit,’ complains Iqbal, resident of a Bangladeshi enclave in 
India.95 Experiences of travelling outside the enclaves as labourers have not always 
been good. The threat of persecution has kept most of the enclave people away from 
such livelihood opportunities.96  
The BRAC97 credit programme offers loans to some of the residents of the Indian 
enclaves in Bangladesh for supporting their personal economic initiatives or to help 
meet their harvest shortcomings. Yet the absence of official documents remains a 
constant impediment with only those residents who obtained membership to BRAC 
before 1993 being eligible for such credit assistances. With the introduction of the 
Voter Identity Card in India in 1993, the ambiguous identity of the enclave residents 
became all the more prominent, making their stateless position visible and rendering 
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them ineligible for assistance from Bangladeshi organisations. A large number of the 
enclave people are, thus, deprived of the BRAC credit assistance programmes due to 
the lack of an official identity (Voter Identity Card).98  
Scarcity of food is an inevitable outcome of the lack of livelihood opportunities and 
the restriction on movements for the enclave-dwellers.  A growing population adds to 
the crisis. The productivity of the available agricultural lands remains low due to the 
lack of access to advanced technology by the farmers within the enclaves, including 
restrictions on using shallow pumps and buying livestock. The restricted amount of 
economic transactions adds to the crisis.  
 
VI. Attitude of the border guards towards the enclave people 
The attitude of the border guards towards the enclave residents is, not surprisingly, 
unfavourable. ‘Madhya Mashaldanga is about 2.3 kilometres from the border, while 
Dakshin Mashaldanga (in Bangladesh) is about 1 kilometre from the border. In 
between these two territories, there is Indian territory where BSF is posted.  If only 
we did not have that stretch of the territory in between, we could easily travel to 
Bangladesh. But BSF does not allow us to traverse that path at any cost,’99 says a 
resident of a Bangladeshi enclave in India.   
The border guards take advantage of the undocumented status of the enclave- 
dwellers. Even if instances of murder or abuse by miscreants from neighbouring 
areas occur within the enclaves, the border guards or the police do not take them up 
because of the ‘foreign territory’ status of the enclaves. ‘We ourselves solve such 
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cases, since police would not take up these cases,’100 complains Hafizul, a resident of 
an Indian enclave in Bangladesh.  
This encourages both physical and verbal assaults on the enclave-dwellers by 
neighbouring villagers. Complaints such as ‘we cannot speak with as much vigour as 
the neighbouring Bangladeshis’101 speaks amply of the sense of crisis that these 
enclave-dwellers go through.  
The border guards’ attitude towards the enclave-dwellers is either one of ignorance 
or of unnecessary threats and abuse.  Akbar Alam narrates how the border guards 
used to take the enclave-dwellers away for no reason at all or for minor reasons and 
beat them up brutally or imprison them for months. ‘These days, the situation is a bit 
better, though things have not changed too radically,’102 he says.  
That things have not changed radically is proved by what Md. Iqbal Ali Sheikh says. 
As enclave-dwellers, there are restrictions on their movement as well as on the 
amount of agricultural goods or food items that they can carry. ‘If the amount 
exceeds a bit,  the border guards make us do menial work such as cleaning garbage 
or even human excrement or else simply put us behind bars for months together,’103 
says Iqbal Ali.  
The male-enclave dwellers are also made to work as corvee labourers by the border 
guards for constructing and/or maintaining the border fences. ‘If we do not agree to 
do it, they threaten us. Undocumented as we are, we always have the fear of being 
apprehended by the border guards and so, are bound to comply with these kind of 
demands,’ says Iqbal Ali.104  The border guards often have roads built through the 
enclaves for their own convenience, which the enclave people are prohibited from 
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using.105 Interestingly, this is another example of illegal border crossings by official 
actors.106 Traversing the enclaves makes a border guard as illegal a trespasser as an 
enclave resident moving out of his/her enclave.  
 
VII. Platform for miscreants 
The theft of cattle, crops and poultry is a regular occurrence inside the enclaves. 
‘Theft occurs in the light of the day. We try our best to dissuade them from stealing 
our stuff, but to no avail. If we persist, then they threaten us, just because we are 
enclave people,’107 says an enclave resident.   
‘People from the neighbouring areas behave very badly with us. If we talk back, they 
become violent, use swear words, might even put our homes on fire or might 
forcefully take away our cattle,’108 is how Md. Anisur sums up the basic crisis of the 
enclave population.  
The enclave inhabitants are often jeopardised by the police, border guards and 
neighbours for events in which they have no involvement whatsoever.109 Incidents of 
rape, molestation, theft and murder mostly perpetrated by miscreants from the 
surrounding areas110 go unrecorded and, hence, unpunished. A resident of an Indian 
enclave in Bangladesh narrates an incident pertaining to 2010: ‘Some Bangladeshi 
miscreants attempted burglary inside the Indian enclave, when some of them were 
held by the enclave dwellers and beaten up. As revenge, the rest of their gang 
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 Interview with Md. Riazul Islam, resident of an Indian enclave in Bangladesh 
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members put fire to 160 of our huts in the enclaves the next day. It has been a year 
now and there has been no substantial aid coming from either India or Bangladesh 
other than a few tarpaulins and clothes. We have not been able to rebuild our houses 
and still live under make-shift enclosures made from burnt tin sheets.’111  
 
VIII. Haven for smugglers 
Cattle smugglers often use the enclaves as transits for smuggled cattle. However, the 
enclave inhabitants rarely engage in such practices themselves for fear of being 
doubly jeopardised. ‘They take their cattle through the Chhits, but we are not 
involved in these practices because, as it is, we are perpetually threatened by the fear 
of persecution,’112 says Bimal Burman, an enclave resident.   
Their existential crisis prevents them from inviting any further chances of being 
harassed. ‘We do have smuggling activities inside the Chhits, but we do not have 
anyone to report these. If we try approaching the Pradhan, he says it is our fault. The 
Chhit inhabitants are rarely involved in these activities themselves because we know 
we do not have any resort if we land up in trouble. We have no other option but to let 
others carry on such activities using the Chhit as a transit because there is no one 
who will come to our rescue if we are attacked by the smugglers. The BSF never 
comes to the Chhits to enquire about our needs,’ complains Md. Anisur.113 The 
smugglers store their smuggled items in the enclaves, using them as transit points 
before arranging for the final smuggling across the border. ‘Again it is we who are 
victimised in such instances, and never the actual smugglers involved,’114 says 
Ziauddin, resident of a Bangladeshi enclave. 
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The enclaves are havens for illegal or banned cultivation like that of ganja (hemp). 
As part of a larger drug network, cultivators are provided with seeds and fertilisers 
by the smugglers’ syndicates for cultivating ganja,115 though they are often not aware 
of the network they are part of or of the ban on such cultivation. The border officials 
or the police cannot prevent this from happening due to restrictions on entering the 
enclaves.116  
While the sense of being disowned is clear in responses such as, ‘we live in perpetual 
fear. We do not have an identity— neither a Pradhan nor a state,’117 a sense of 
confinement is also evident in responses such as, ‘we feel as if we are living in a 
jail.’118 The complex territorial status of the enclaves has clearly resulted in a 
complex perception of belonging and/or exclusion amongst its inhabitants. This 
complex narrative of belonging is corroborated by the fact that in the case of those 
enclave dwellers who are convicted for a crime, the final discharge from the jail is 
often delayed even after the completion of their terms. ‘Where will they release us? 
To which country? Bangladesh does not accept us as its citizens,’119 says Bimal, 
resident of a Bangladeshi enclave. It is after much deliberation that they are returned 
back to their enclaves.  
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Plate 20. Hut within an enclave, 2011.  
 
IX. Counter-enclaves 
The condition of the enclave-dwellers becomes all the more blatant when compared 
to the condition of the people living in a counter-enclave. In the midst of the 
Bangladeshi enclave of Madhya Mashaldanga within Indian territory, there is an 
Indian counter-enclave—Nazirhat II Gram Panchayat, which, by the incidence of its 
location, is surrounded by Bangladeshi enclaves on all sides despite being on the 
Indian side of the border. Its inhabitants need to travel through the Bangladeshi 
enclaves in order to get to the Indian territories for schools, hospitals, their 
livelihood, shops, etc. In spite of its unique territorial position, its inhabitants insist 
that access to basic facilities has not been a problem, as all the people in this enclave 
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have Indian documents proving their citizenship status like ration cards, voter cards, 
etc.120  
Despite sharing a spatial uniqueness with the other enclaves, including illegal 
crossings over foreign territory,121 the standard of life in terms of access to 
fundamental privileges, distinguishes the people of this particular Indian enclave 
from those of its neighbouring Bangladeshi enclaves. The children go to schools, 
they have access to hospitals and the women have been married into villages on 
Indian territories without any hazard. ‘My daughters often come for a visit. My sons 
are engaged in agriculture when they are here. Otherwise, they go to Delhi122 as 
labourers for 2 to 5 months,’123 says Saraswati, resident of the Indian counter-
enclave.  
Relations with their neighbours from the surrounding Bangladeshi enclaves are just 
about cordial. ‘Though we do not attend their Eid festivals, they often come here 
during our Durga Puja festivals,’124 says Saraswati. Simply by virtue of being 
located on the ‘right side’ of the border, the inhabitants of this particular counter-
enclave enjoy a better life than those inhabiting the enclaves on the ‘wrong side’, 
despite the similarity in their spatial uniqueness. The role of the border becomes 
undeniably visible in such narratives.  
 
X. Local administration 
Many of the enclaves have formed their own administrative councils within their 
space, calling these bodies Chhitmahal Nagarik Samiti (Enclave Citizens’ 
Committee).125 Intra-enclave disputes of any kind are, most often, mediated by such 
councils, in the absence of any legal or administrative machinery of the state within 
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the enclaves. ‘The Chhits have their own councils. We select one of our senior 
members as the head of the council. There is no formal election as such. The entire 
process is performed verbally,’ informs Bimal Burman.126  
Usually the councils have one chairman and nine members. The area of the enclave 
council is divided into wards (usually three but dependant on the size of the enclave), 
each being represented by three members. The larger enclaves might hold an 
informal election for forming their councils, where local leaders from neighbouring 
areas might be invited by the enclave-dwellers to supervise the election process. 
Only the male enclave inhabitants are allowed to vote, keeping the gendered nature 
of the system intact amidst such deprivation and destitution. The smaller enclaves 
stick to simpler selection methods.127  
These councils do not simply have their own heads and members, but also 
chowkidars (village police)128 and kerani (clerks). The enclave residents collect a 
fund from amongst themselves, which is paid as an honorarium to these people for 
their service.’129 ‘We ourselves try to discipline those enclave inhabitants who create 
nuisance within the enclaves, though the number of such offenders is very few. In the 
absence of any legal system, who would want to create a problem anyway?’130 adds 
Md. Kamal Hussein, an enclave resident.  
The literal translation of the term used by the enclave residents to describe the nature 
of the local governance (shamajik bichar)131 is ‘social justice’—a form, as explained 
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by the people themselves, characterised by the absence of a state-recognised judicial 
institution and existence of a social institution. It is formed and obeyed by the 
enclave residents.  The term shamajik bichar might be interpreted as social 
administration or social arbitration, but the literal translation—social justice—in fact, 
stresses the abysmal state of justice—social, political and economic, in the enclaves. 
This explains the negative undertone of the enclave residents when using this term, 
and is made clear in responses such as: ‘In the absence of a proper legal institution, 
the miscreants can operate without fear. They know that possibilities of a severe 
punishment are rare here. Social justice (shamajik bichar) is the most that we can 
expect.’132   
 
Plate 21. Enclave council members, 2011.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Khagrabari Chhit of Cooch Behar district of West Bengal in Panchagarh district of 
Bangladesh, 5 October 2011).   
132
 Interview with Iqbal Hussein, resident of an Indian enclave in Bangladesh (Dahala-
Khagrabari Chhit of Cooch Behar district of West Bengal in Panchagarh district of 
Bangladesh, 5 October 2011). (The use of italics is my own and is meant to hint at the limits 
of such social arbitration as expressed in the tone of speech of the narrator.) 
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The nature of economic transaction (including land transactions) between the enclave 
people or between them and their neighbours is also called shamajik kenabecha133 or 
social transaction by them, given the unofficial nature of the process.134  
There is a religious connotation to their perception of the local governance as well, 
reflected in responses such as, ‘Neither do we have citizenship, nor a legal 
institution. We have social justice, the procedures of which take place at the local 
mosque.’135  This does not, however, imply that religion has an overwhelming 
presence in the narratives of the enclaves but indicates the overpowering nature of 
the spatial uniqueness of the enclaves themselves that binds their residents together. 
Arbitrations involving both Hindu and Muslim offenders take place under the 
auspices of the mosque or a temple inside the enclaves. Hafizul adds that the demand 
for citizenship for both the Hindus and Muslim residents of the enclaves is equally 
strong, irrespective of the host state.136 This aspect points towards the complex 
pattern of identification with regard to religion that the enclave people are part of.  
It is the state of statelessness that binds them together more than religion, just as a 
‘bordered status’ binds the border inhabitants together more than their social, 
political or economic identities.  A sense of being wronged by fate, as echoed by 
many of the border inhabitants (‘it is a sin to be born at the border’)137 rings large in 
the responses of the enclave residents as well: ‘We feel ashamed to say that we are 
born as enclave people,’138 says Hafizul, an enclave resident.  
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XI. A ‘State of Exception’ 
The politics that the complex territoriality of the enclaves give rise to is, in a way, 
expressed by the response of a BSF officer to one of the enclave residents in a 
Bangladeshi enclave inside India. Md. Iqbal Ali Sheikh narrates how on being 
requested by the enclave people to allow them to visit their relatives on the 
Bangladesh side of the border, the BSF officer retorted, ‘why don’t you fly over to 
that side?,’139 indicating the complexities associated with moving out of the enclaves 
and across the border by land. Such responses not just highlight the territorial 
implication of the enclaves but also the perceptions of the people regarding the same.   
The vulnerable existence of the enclave residents in the context of the absence of 
state machineries within the enclaves evokes the idea of the ‘bare life’ of the homo 
sacer
140
— a man who may be killed and yet not sacrificed. The pretexts posed by the 
states, especially India, with regard to the imminent loss of territory and people that 
the enclave exchange would entail, make the evocation stronger. The states are not 
ready to sacrifice those people who lack minimum recognition in the first place, even 
if that means pushing them to the limits of destitution.141 The inclusion of the 
enclaves in the juridical framework of the states is, ironically, in the form of their 
exclusion, and this is what thrusts them into a ‘state of exception’142—a state of 
‘being outside, and yet belonging’.143  
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‘The rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it’144 is 
what aptly describes the legal state of the enclaves. It is this state of exception that 
has become the rule145 in the enclaves.  
The creation of a ‘fairly formal legal system of their own’146, in the form of enclave 
councils and land registration procedures, testifies to the role that necessity plays in 
the creation of the state of exception. That ‘necessity has no law’ is indeed testified 
by the situation of the enclaves. The adage can be interpreted in two ways. One is 
that necessity does not recognise any law. The second is that necessity creates its 
own law.147 The enclaves are a study in both. On the one hand, the necessities of the 
principles of sovereignty and the citizenship issues of India and Bangladesh fail to 
recognise any law within the enclaves. On the other, the enclave people create their 
own socio-legal councils meting out basic juridical services out of sheer necessity.  
An understanding of the citizenship questions of the enclave people highlights the 
dilemma between inclusion and membership—incapacity of inclusion into the whole 
of which it is a member148 (being detached from the parent state) and failure to 
become a member of the whole in which it is already included149 (exclusion from the 
host state). As sovereign powers, the states decide the (non)value of the people and 
territory of the enclaves, pushing them into a ‘bare life’—not in the sense of a simple 
natural life but one exposed to death.150  
The impression of a ‘bare life’ deprived of the basic rights of citizenship and 
vulnerable to threats rings clear in the response of Karim Baksh, an enclave resident, 
when he says: ‘We lead a life like animals here. Even the animals are tracked and 
recorded by the government, but not us.’151 In fact, agitation among the enclave 
inhabitants often reflects an extremist approach, and understandably so. An 
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inhabitant of a Bangladeshi enclave in India retorts that if persistent demands for 
citizenship are not met by the government, then it will not be a surprise if these 
enclave-dwellers turn to extremist methods for obtaining the same. ‘We are trying to 
co-operate with the government by wanting to be part of the state,’152 says Suren 
Burman, adding that the delay in the decision-making process of the governments of 
India and Bangladesh simply reflects the ignorance of the leaders concerned, who 
perceive the enclave crisis merely as a bilateral affair, instead of trying to understand 
the reality of survival of the enclave people.153  
The irony is that both India and Bangladesh are party to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)154 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)155 under the auspices of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.156  The condition of the enclave people 
makes a complete farce of such declarations and covenants by depriving them of all 
those rights which these declarations intend to ensure.  In fact, their condition poses a 
serious challenge to the progress of various development goals, including the 
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MDGs,157 such as access to safe drinking water, sanitation, health service, etc.,158 
besides depriving them of the NREGA159 work opportunities, primary education, 
Anganwadi160 and such other facilities provided by the host state. Though this applies 
to the entire stretch of the border between India and Bangladesh, and several other 
backward areas in India, the geographical specificity of the enclaves makes the 
situation worse by not just preventing the existing initiatives from reaching the 
people, but also by preventing the situation of the enclaves from being officially 
documented.   
 
XII. Demand for citizenship 
Given the complex nature of citizenship issues in the enclaves, the demand for 
recognition as citizens by the respective host states has been a natural culmination of 
the trajectory. Such demands make perfect sense when seen in the light of the history 
of most of these inhabitants, as well as, their dependence on their neighbours. ‘We 
have always been living here, right through generation. Naturally we want to be 
Indian citizens,’161 says Md. Iqbal, a resident of a Bangladeshi enclave in India. 
Concern for the next generation is the prime factor when it comes to the demand for 
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citizenship status. ‘We are approaching old age. At least our children can have a 
proper future,’162 says Fatema Bibi, an enclave resident.  
 
Plate 22. Residents of an enclave, 2012.  
Apart from the ruins of the pillars marking the border between the host states’ 
territories and the enclaves (the pillars are absent in most of the places), no other 
distinguishable mark of difference can be pointed out between the two. The 
similarity in profile of the people of the neighbouring villages and the enclaves 
renders it impossible for an outsider to distinguish an enclave from non-enclave 
territory, unless pointed out. It is solely the citizenship issue which keeps the enclave 
people from leading an unhindered life like their neighbours.  
Life at the border has its own share of complexities, including restrictions on 
movement. The status of the enclave people is doubly jeopardised, being a part of the 
border population and of the specific territorial status. Official recognition as citizens 
of the state will, at least, reduce some of the vulnerabilities associated with living 
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along the border.  ‘We want to be Indian citizens, and nobody here has a different 
view on this,’163 is how Md. Iqbal, resident of a Bangladeshi enclave in India, voices 
the unanimity of the demand. Hafizul Islam, a resident of an Indian enclave in 
Bangladesh, echoes Iqbal’s concern in his demand for an end to statelessness.164  
An official citizenship status would also mean that the enclave residents could avail 
of passports, with which they could legally visit their relatives on the other side of 
the border, without fear of being persecuted. ‘Ever since the fencing, we have not 
been able to visit our relatives on the other side. We do not even have the required 
documents for passport,’165 complains Md. Kamal Hussein. The prospect of the 
exchange of enclaves has, in fact, already increased the prices of the enclave lands,166 
in contrast to their falling prices a few years ago.  
An interesting observation during the interviews was that the responses of some of 
the interviewees, mostly constituting women who had married into the enclaves, 
reflected a confused perception of citizenship—an outcome, perhaps, of a cognitive 
dissonance.167 Respondents belonging to the post-partition generations (those who 
were born into the enclaves) as well as women married into these enclaves often 
lacked a clear perception of the history of the formation of the enclaves, or a clear 
mental map of their unique geographical position. Their initiation into the movement 
for citizenship has been externally imposed by their families/husbands. Their 
responses regarding the demand reflect this imposition. Rebecca Khatun, a resident 
of an Indian enclave in Bangladesh, spontaneously replied that she wanted to ‘go to 
India’, on being asked about her choice of citizenship. After a condemnatory look 
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from her husband, she quickly rectified her reply:  ‘No, sorry, I mean I want to 
remain a part of Bangladesh,’168 she finally said.  
11-year old Sabina Akhtar, daughter of the chairman of an Indian enclave in 
Bangladesh, on being asked about her idea of the citizenship issue, highlighted the 
hazards faced by the enclave people due to the lack of an officially recognised status. 
Her reply (which sounded more like a prepared speech than an impromptu response) 
covered everything from the lack of educational facilities in the enclaves and the 
deprivation of children vis-à-vis the Bangladeshi children in their neighbouring 
villages, to how, in spite of having equal potential, the enclave children were not 
being able to fulfil their dreams of pursuing a career. She clearly pointed out how her 
dream of becoming a doctor might be shattered if they were not given Bangladeshi 
citizenship.169 That this performance of enlightening me on the enclave crisis was 
rehearsed was clearly visible, with no time wasted in constructing sentences in 
sequence. It is not hard to realise that such responses from the current generation of 
the youth and the women married into the enclaves are externally imposed and 
hence, either lack confidence or spontaneity.  They are also indicative of the complex 
and often confused pattern of perception about issues like citizenship, belonging, 
inclusion and exclusion over generations of people undergoing the perils of the 
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Figure 3. Location of Tinbigha, Cooch Behar. Source: Cooch Behar District Map, 
Govt. of India.  
 
XIII. The Tinbigha narrative 
The citizenship issue takes a starkly different dimension in two specific Bangladeshi 
enclaves in India. Dahagram and Angarpota are two Bangladeshi enclaves under the 
Lalmonirhat district of Bangladesh, which are located inside the Cooch Behar district 
of West Bengal. After years of deliberations and government-level talks between 
India and Bangladesh,170 a Tinbigha (3 bighas) Corridor was built over the 1-acre 
Indian territory, connecting Dahagram with the Bangladesh mainland. Following its 
inauguration in June 1992, the corridor was initially opened for the residents of 
Dahagram at every alternate hour in the day, between 6 AM and 6 PM. From 2001 
onwards, the corridor began operation continuously between 6AM and 6PM each 
day. Agitation by the enclave residents was followed by an agreement between the 
Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh—Manmohan Singh and Sheikh Hasina, on 
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19 October 2011,171 which provided for the operation of the corridor for 24-hours 
every day. It is manned by the BSF172 since it is an Indian territory.   
 
Figure 4. Location map of Tinbigha. Source: Cooch Behar District Map, Govt. of 
India.  
A 24-hour connection with the mainland has been a boon for Dahagram, not just in 
terms of access to administrative and legal institutions, basic facilities and markets, 
but of having obtained Bangladeshi citizenship as well. ‘The situation here is much 
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better now, after the corridor has been opened for the whole day. We can bring 
bricks, cement, sand, etc. for constructing our homes here. My husband works as a 
van driver plying passengers between Bangladesh and here. We are doing fine as 
Bangladeshi citizens,’173 says Jarina Begum of the Angarpota enclave. Old-age 
stipends, provided by the Dahagram Union Parishad, have improved the lives of the 
aged people of Dahagram as well.174  
In the pre-corridor period, the situation of these enclave residents was no different 
from that of their fellow enclave residents in the other enclaves. This explains why 
many of the enclave residents had their education in and initial business transactions 
with their neighbouring Indian villages.175 All this has changed for the current 
generation, who now has access to hospitals, schools and markets right inside their 
enclaves, funded and constructed by the Bangladesh government. ‘We now get a 
good price for our crops, cattle and land,’176 informs a visibly satisfied Akbar, 
resident of Angarpota. Relief from the wrongdoings of miscreants and the border 
guards,177 as well as the official documentation of land transactions, have been some 
of the major reasons for the residents of Dahagram to rejoice. Plans for constructing 
bridges over the Tinbigha for the enclave residents are also on the agenda of India 
and Bangladesh.178  
As ‘recognised’ Bangladeshi citizens, these people emphasise their affluence and 
hence, their wish to ‘remain’ a part of Bangladesh. In fact, they term their movement 
to ‘remain a part of Bangladesh’ as an attempt to ‘free Dahagram from India’.179 A 
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resident of Dahagram explains the movement in the following way: ‘We want to 
remain a part of Bangladesh. We want Dahagram to be free from them. But they 
(Indians who have been affected by the Tinbigha Corridor) want to seize Dahagram 
as their own territory. They have also been complaining about the privileges which 
we have been provided following the opening of the Corridor. They try their best to 
hamper the facilities like electricity or free movement. Our forefathers have fought 
for a free Bangladesh. Why would we want to be a part of India now?’180 These 
responses come as a stark contrast to the sort of responses regarding citizenship of 
the inhabitants of the other enclaves.  
 
Plate 23. Hospital in Dahagram, 2011.  
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Plate 24. Higher Secondary School in Dahagram, 2011.  
Dahagram being territorially closer to the Bangladesh mainland has had a different 
trajectory from the other enclaves right from the beginning of the enclave question in 
1947.  It has been ‘more important as an idea of territory “saved” from the clutches 
of a “spatially greedy” Indian state, than as a material geographic reality,’181 as Jason 
Cons rightly puts it. In fact, this status of Dahagram was recognised by the state of 
Bangladesh when the Zia government182 issued 16 ‘Civil Guns’ to Dahagram in 1977 
to be used for defence—signalling an effort to secure Dahagram-Angarpota as part of 
its national territory.183 The fact that ‘the guns are spoken of almost reverentially’184 
by the residents as ‘symbols of belonging’185 indicates the difference between the 
narratives of Dahagram and the rest of the enclaves.   
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Enumerating the residents of Dahagram through a Census conducted by Bangladesh 
in 1981 was yet another attempt to claim control over Dahagram by Bangladesh.186 
These narratives portray the residents of Dahagram as ‘rights-bearing’ citizens187 of 
Bangladesh, in stark contrast to the stateless condition of the residents of the rest of 
the enclaves.  
Claims over territories in the context of the Tinbigha Corridor still persist, with the 
West Bengal government deciding to construct a community centre and rest house in 
the Tinbigha corridor, despite objections from the BGB and in violation of the 
international border law on the construction of permanent establishments on the 150-
yard stretch from the zero point.188 The BGB has made its objections clear on this 
decision of West Bengal and has decided to prevent the construction if West Bengal 
goes ahead with its plans.189  
Territoriality becomes decisive in the production of these different versions of 
narratives. While territorial detachment decides the responses of the inhabitants of 
the rest of the enclaves, territorial attachment shapes the ideas of belonging among 
the residents of Dahagram. Narratives of belonging coincide with that of the idea of 
the nation in such spontaneous responses, redefining notions of spatiality, citizenship 
and liberty in the process.190 In fact, narratives from Dahagram add another 
dimension to the concepts of proxy citizenship. While the movement for ‘freeing’ 
Dahagram from the clutches of India positioned its Muslim residents ‘as stoic 
sufferers holding their land in the name of a Muslim Bengali state,’191 the Hindus of 
Dahagram actively campaigned ‘to demonstrate that Dahagram’s residents “desired” 
to be part of India.’192   
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Plate 25. Tinbigha Corridor leading to mainland Bangladesh, 2011. 
 
XIV. Organised initiatives 
Initiatives of organising the people of the enclaves have been a difficult task, given 
the scattered nature of the geographical location of the enclaves, as well as 
restrictions on their activities and movements. However, a Chhitmahal Nagorik 
Committee (Committee of Enclave People) was formed by some individuals of the 
Indian enclaves in Bangladesh in a public meeting on 26 January 1972, following the 
birth of Bangladesh in 1971. The main purpose of the committee was to lodge 
complaints with government institutions regarding the question of rights and 
privileges as provided for in the bulletin of the meeting.193 Other committees were 
also formed by the migrants, however small in number, from the Indian enclaves to 
the Indian mainland, who took initiatives to mediate between the enclave residents 
and the government of India. Yet such initiatives failed to garner any support from 
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either the government officials or the political parties.194 The worsening of the 
condition of the enclave people stands proof of this neglect.   
The Bharat-Bangladesh Enclaves Exchange Coordination Committee (BBEECC) 
was formed in 1994 by Dipak Sengupta (Dinhata, Cooch Behar district of West 
Bengal), who’s son, Diptiman Sengupta, took over the committee from October 
2009. The committee consisted of enclave residents from both Indian and 
Bangladeshi enclaves. Ever since its inception, the BBEECC has been vehemently 
pursuing the enclave issue, submitting several memorandums and survey reports to 
various governmental departments, besides organising regular meetings and 
demonstrations in favour of the implementation of the Indira-Mujib Treaty.  In 2000, 
the committee met with the Indian Home Minister, Lalkrishna Advani, discussing 
possible solutions to the problem. So far, the committee has handed over 6 letters to 
the current Chief Minister of West Bengal (and the Leader of the Opposition in West 
Bengal State Assembly before 2011), Mamata Banerjee, requesting the rapid 
execution of the exchange programme,195 as well as attending to the citizenship 
issues of some of the enclave residents, especially the children.196 Inactivity on the 
part of leaders and government officials forced the members of the committee to 
organise a hunger strike in March 2012 at Dinhata led by the senior enclave 
residents. The focus of the demonstration was to draw the attention of the 
administrative officials and the media towards the enclave question. Unfortunately, 
the demonstration, in spite of disquieting governmental officials for a while, failed to 
produce any concrete action towards the fulfilment of the enclave exchange 
agreement.197 In fact, as a way of making their case for incorporation stronger, the 
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enclave residents have started observing and celebrating the national events of the 
host state like Republic Day, over the last few years.198  
 
Plate 26. BBEECC rally demanding exchange of enclaves, 18 March 2012.  
Against the backdrop of such a strong movement in favour of the issue of the 
exchange of enclaves, the situation in them has started improving. The movement, 
having brought the enclave question to the forefront, has attracted the attention of the 
media as well as the civil society towards the destitution of its residents. ‘In the last 
couple of years, incidents of false conviction have reduced due to the on-going 
movement,’199 says Md. Iqbal Ali from a Bangladeshi enclave in India.  
The ‘Indian’ initiative in the movement (Dipak and Diptiman Sengupta being Indian 
citizens) has had a positive effect on relations between the inhabitants of the 
Bangladeshi enclaves within West Bengal. ‘Ever since this movement has gained 
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momentum, operation of the Indian miscreants within the enclaves has significantly 
reduced,’200 says Bimal, resident of a Bangladeshi enclave.  The enclave issue has 
also gained momentum in public debates, due to the initiatives of the committee.201   
The border guards and local political leaders, as well as administrative authorities, 
have also been cautious in their interaction with the enclave inhabitants ever since 
the movement has become stronger. Surveys of the enclaves were done in 2012, 
enumerating the population and specifying their other geographical details.202 
Bilateral initiatives for the implementation of the exchange have been renewed from 
2011, although debates regarding them had never completely ceased in the 
intervening years. Considerations over the loss of land by India, as is being debated 
by political parties,203 as well as issues of citizenship and migration, have been 
delaying the process.  
The irony is that the states are repenting the loss of the territory which they had 
failed to recognise in the first place. Despite being of no use to them, other than a 
cartographic claim over the land, the states, especially India (in terms of area, the 
amount of land to be given up by India to Bangladesh is more), are seen to bring up 
issues of the loss of land and population.204  
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The most recent and positive outcome of the on-going discussions was the meeting 
between Salman Khurshid, India’s Minister of External Affairs and Bangladesh’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dipu Moni, in Dhaka (Bangladesh’s capital) in February 
2013,205 where they agreed upon the urgency of taking a final call on the enclave 
question, besides other unresolved land issues along the border between India and 
Bangladesh. The signing of MOUs206 regarding the border agreement (including the 
exchange of enclaves) and the exchange of maps showing the demarcation of borders 
between India and Bangladesh has certainly been a positive step ahead.207 
Bangladesh’s Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina’s scheduled visit to Delhi in September 
2013 is being targeted as the deadline for the final call on the enclave exchange 
issue.208 Khurshid is also hopeful of West Bengal’s Chief Minister, Mamata 
Banerjee’s co-operation in these matters.209 It is West Bengal that hosts all the 
Bangladeshi enclaves, as well as the state that Bangladesh shares its maximum 
border with. Hence, West Bengal will be the deciding factor as far as questions of the 
loss/gain of territory and people are concerned. In the meantime, the Indian Cabinet 
has also passed a bill regarding the exchange of enclaves, to be presented and 
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debated in the next session of Parliament.210  Bangladesh has been keeping its 
pressure alive on India for the passing of the bill as soon as possible.211   
However, the Mamata government together with the BJP212 show no signs of 
concretising the treaty anytime soon.213 Against such a backdrop of negligence by the 
state, the enclave residents have filed a public litigation with the Kolkata High Court, 
demanding the exchange of enclaves, and the access to health, education and other 
fundamental rights.214 Security questions of the enclave residents have been 
consistently raised by them in the context of the execution of the exchange.215   
 
XV. Conclusion 
The India-Bangladesh enclaves have travelled a full circle. From being thrust into 
statelessness by the imperatives of state-building to leading a bare life, from hoping 
to be incorporated into the states to an organised movement for the realisation of 
their demand for citizenship, the narratives of the enclaves reveal the enclave 
peoples’ attempt to ‘give to the empirical form of a population the moral attributes of 
a community.’216 The journey has, in the process, not just seen the creation of a 
unique identity of the enclave people but has made them an integral part of the larger 
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community of border people as well. The perception of themselves as ‘enclave 
people’217 stands as an indication of this attribute.  
The complex patterns of interactions along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border 
amongst the border people, including the civilians, border guards and other 
administrative bodies, combine differing and often conflicting views on the questions 
of territorial imperatives, citizenship, nationality, religion, caste, gender and 
economy. The enclaves add yet another dimension to it. The fact that territorial 
imperatives and border issues have gained significance like never before despite 
debates in favour of a borderless world and the unhindered flow of commodities and 
cultural trends, is strongly emphasised by the India-Bangladesh enclave narratives.  
The India-Bangladesh border enclaves are geographically unique, ethno-culturally 
rooted in history and politically vulnerable. Narratives produced in them are not just 
absent elsewhere in the non-border non-enclave areas of India and Bangladesh, but 
are absent or seen in very different forms in the other enclaves of the world. This 
chapter looks at some of these aspects of the India-Bangladesh border enclaves in an 
effort to understand their uniqueness, the patterns of the complex web of interactions 
between the enclave people and their neighbours and to highlight the significance of 
studying these enclaves as an integral part of studying border narratives.  
i. Enclaves as thirdspace  
The India-Bangladesh enclaves are, perhaps, the best studies of the production of the 
thirdspace218. Caught at the crossroads of the state-building principles of India and 
Bangladesh, the establishment of complete control over the borders by these states, 
and the survival needs of their civilians, the enclaves have become platforms where 
conflicting perceptions of statehood and the border control of the state and its 
civilians are played out, creating the lived reality of the thirdspace. The livelihood 
practices of the enclave people, the ethno-religious interactions and activities of the 
enclave people between themselves and with their neighbours, and the creation of 
socio-legal bodies for arbitration are visible manifestations of the evolution of a third 
identity of the people as an ‘enclave people’219 and the evolution of the enclaves into 
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the thirdspace. The dispute between the West Bengal government, the enclave 
residents and the state government of India adds to the narrative of the enclaves’ 
transformation into a hotbed of lived reality.   
The fact that the enclave narratives are not just outcomes of state-building but also 
evolve within the hegemonic structure of statehood, much like the border narratives 
discussed in the preceding chapter, is highlighted by two significant aspects: the 
movements of the enclave people demanding citizenship, resulting in the recent 
debates between the enclave residents and the West Bengal government, and the 
creation of semi-formal legal bodies within the enclaves modelled on the 
Panchayats/Unions in the neighbouring villages of the host state.  
The enclave narratives are not limited to their efforts for accommodating themselves 
within the state structure but, in fact, have a direct effect on one of the more 
important pillars of statehood in a democratic state, i.e. the elections. The effect is 
not simply in terms of the conflicting views of political parties regarding the political 
question of enclave exchange,220 but also on the results of elections. In the recent 
Panchayat elections in West Bengal (July 2013), the areas surrounding the 
Bangladesh enclaves in the Cooch Behar district of West Bengal unanimously voted 
against the Mamata Banerjee-headed Trinomool Congress (TMC) for her failure to 
execute the exchange of the enclaves with Bangladesh.221 The enclave exchange 
issue, by virtue of being a national issue, has to be executed between the central 
governments of India and Bangladesh. But as the host of the Bangladeshi enclaves, 
West Bengal plays a very important role in the process of ratification of the treaties 
and the final execution of the process of exchange. The failure of the TMC to make 
any progress in the enclave issue affected the people’s decision in the Panchayat 
elections, where the Indian villages surrounding the Bangladeshi enclaves made their 
dissatisfaction known by voting out TMC, despite the latter’s victory in most of the 
other districts of West Bengal. The enclave question affects not just the enclave 
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people themselves but those in the surrounding areas, through various legal and 
illegal interactions (including fake identities, access to local markets and access to 
basic needs as well as miscreant activities). The results of the Panchayat elections 
are a reflection of this overwhelming effect that the enclaves have on the 
neighbouring people, as well as a re-emphasis of the fact that enclave narratives, too, 
express themselves within the framework of statehood.   
These narratives also, in a way, contest and redefine the idea of the enclaves as a 
space of exception. Even within the structure of power of the state (including the 
power to exclude), the enclave narratives create their own unique ways of negotiating 
their bare life. Interactions with neighbours and the effect on the electoral decisions 
of the very state that excludes them are ways of contesting and questioning the 
sovereign power of the state. In being a space of exception through the exclusionary 
practices of the state, the enclaves share a similar fate with the chars and ghoj areas 
along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.   
The enclaves also attain a subalternity through their questioning of the role of the 
state as the container, as do the other border narratives along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border. The extension of enclave houses into neighbouring areas, 
neighbouring areas being affected by accidents in the enclaves like fire, people from 
neighbouring areas  owning land inside the enclaves and the similar profile of the 
people (culture, language, customs) are some of the more visible examples of the 
subversive nature of the enclave narratives. In spite of such similarities in nature, the 
non-enclave border narratives of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border become more 
visible than the enclave narratives in state discourses and public debates because they 
directly question the sovereign power of the state at its international borders.  The 
enclaves, on the other hand, being ‘contained’ within the larger territorial jurisdiction 
of the states, fail to hit at the roots of the vulnerability of state hegemony. Despite 
questioning the role of the state as the container (through border crossings between 
enclaves and their non-enclave surroundings), they fail to threaten the states’ 
sovereignty in ways that the international border does, although they are a result of 





ii. Border consciousness 
It is the territorial specificity of the borderland that binds the enclave and non-
enclave border people together in creating a spatial consciousness. The construction 
of spatial consciousness in the enclaves follows a similar trajectory to the non-
enclave border areas, not just in the context of the overwhelming presence of the 
border but also by the fact that it is the spatial specificity of the enclaves that produce 
this consciousness, much like the specificity of the borderland producing the border 
consciousness. The creation of the border following the partition of Bengal lies at the 
genesis of this consciousness and is what acts as the foundation for the subaltern 
existence of both the enclave and non-enclave border people. This chapter 
contributes yet another block towards the construction of the thesis of the evolution 
of a spatial consciousness along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. It establishes 
the uniqueness of a distinct spatial narrative that has been created and affected by the 
creation of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. It also highlights the significance of 
understanding the India-Bangladesh enclave narratives as integral parts of the 
evolution of border consciousness along this border, besides contributing towards a 
general understanding of enclaves and borderlands around the world. India-
Bangladesh enclave narratives and, in fact, West Bengal-Bangladesh border 
narratives in general, provide unique examples of ‘miniature societies attempting to 
survive in the interstices of the modern world state system,’222 and, thus, call for a 
careful study.   
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Ethno-Religious Narratives along the West Bengal-Bangladesh Border, 
with Caste as a Specific Index 
 
I. Introduction  
This chapter aims to look at how spatial marginality affects the interaction between 
socially marginalised communities of people and the state at the borders. It takes up 
the issue of caste, especially lower castes, as an index of social marginality and aims 
to study the interaction between the state and these castes at the geographical borders 
of the state. 
Following the Partition of Bengal in 1947, there began a mass exodus of refugees 
between the newly-created state of East Pakistan and West Bengal.1 The initial wave 
of Hindu refugees who came from East Pakistan to West Bengal was essentially the 
urban population, a majority of who were professionals. Most of them settled in and 
around Calcutta and its suburbs with the help of their friends, relatives, caste 
members and other influential social networks.2 The exodus continued well into the 
1960s, after which there was a break till 1971,3  when a new wave of refugees 
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migrated into West Bengal from the newly-formed state of Bangladesh.4 Beginning 
from the 1950s and especially in the 1970s, the majority of the refugees constituted 
agricultural communities, unlike the initial phase of urban, mostly middle-class 
migrants. The agricultural communities were the last ones to leave their lands and 
migrate to West Bengal since peasant communities are tied to their lands.5  
Most of these migrants settled along the border between West Bengal and 
Bangladesh for two reasons. Firstly, the urban areas, including the suburbs, had 
already been populated by earlier migrants, who found work in the various academic, 
technical and professional institutions existing in the urban areas. 6  Scarcity of 
residential land was an obvious outcome. Secondly, the agricultural skills of the 
peasant migrants could hardly be put to use in the urban areas where there were no 
cultivable land. The border areas were, and still are, rural areas with cultivable lands. 
So settling away from urban areas, including border villages, was an obvious 
decision for these peasant migrants. Most of them happened to belong to the 
Namasudra7 caste, which is considered to be low in the caste structure of the Hindu 
Bengali society.   
The major concentration of the Namasudra settlement in the Bengal province in the 
pre-partition period was in and around the areas of Khulna, Jessore, Faridpur, Dacca 
                                            
4
 Islam, S.S. (1984) The State in Bangladesh under Zia (1975-81). Asian Survey. 24(5). pp. 
556-573.  
5
 Bose, P.K. (ed.). (2000) Refugees in West Bengal. Calcutta: Calcutta Research Group. 
6
 Bose, 1968.  
7
 The caste system in India had its roots in the varna system of the Hindu scriptures, where 
people were assigned their castes in accordance with their jobs or professions. Gradually, the 
caste system became a hereditary structure from a purely profession-based classification. 
Those people who were involved mostly in menial occupations were considered the most 
lowly-held in the caste hierarchy.  With the passage of time and the increasing orthodoxy of 
higher castes, the caste system became rigid and the lowest castes began to be considered as 
‘Untouchables’, whom the higher castes were careful not to come in contact with. The 
Untouchables constituted a number of lowly-held sub-castes, the Namasudras being one of 
them. The Namasudras were largely a hard-working agrarian community known for their 
agricultural and artisan skills. They were one of the biggest communities in Bengal, mostly 
concentrated in the eastern side of undivided Bengal (later Bangladesh) with a long tradition 
of fighting caste-Hindu domination and voicing their concern against various ignominies of 
the caste system. The migrant population from Bangladesh to West Bengal, post-partition, 
consisted of a large section of the Namasudra population. Their migration continued, 
actively, till the late twentieth century.   
 172
(now Dhaka), Mymensingh and Bakargunj in the eastern side of the province 
followed by 24 Parganas, Midnapore, Burdwan, Nadia, Pabna, Rajshahi and Rangpur 
in the middle parts of Bengal. Among these, the Namasudras from Jessore, Khulna, 
Pabna, Rajshahi and Rangpur (which witnessed the creation of the border) migrated 
to West Bengal on the Indian side of the border after the partition in 1947. They 
migrated in phases beginning in 1947 till about 1965 and even later, though the 
number reduced in the later phases. Most of these Namasudras crossed the border 
and settled in and around the border areas along the length of the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border.8 This explains the concentration of Namasudra population in the 
border districts of 24 Parganas, Nadia, Murshidabad and Dinajpur in West Bengal. 
The concentration of Namasudras and Hindu scheduled castes, in general, on the 
West Bengal side of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border is made clear from the fact 
that the families who were left outside the fence 9  on the West Bengal border 
consisted mostly of Hindu scheduled castes, apart from backward and poor Muslim 
families, who did not have the means to either migrate to Bangladesh or move 
inwards into Indian territory away from the border. This implies that the people who 
settled nearest to the border were mostly the Namasudras and Hindu scheduled 
castes who, due to fencing regulations, were caught in the 150-yards patch of land 
between the ‘zero line’ and the fence.10  
The West Bengal-Bangladesh border, as the geographical markers of the sovereignty 
of the states of India and Bangladesh, has been witness to intense patrolling, fencing 
and surveillance mechanisms. The profile of the border people, their lives and 
livelihood practices and their movement have been a cause of concern for the states. 
India has been particularly concerned with the issue of migrant people settling along 
the border, especially because migrants coming into West Bengal after 1964 are 
liable to be labelled as illegal ones, unlike those before the stipulated deadline who 
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were given an official refugee status.11 Thus, migrants settling along the border after 
1964 have perturbed the state ever since. In the interaction which followed between 
the illegal migrants and the state, caste has been seen to play a decisive part, whereby 
caste statuses of the migrants have decided the kind of treatment they would have 
from the states, including the border guards and government institutions. The 
political leaders, the bureaucrats and the legislative bodies have been seen to take the 
caste factor into consideration while deciding on their agendas with regard to illegal 
migrants.     
This chapter looks at two narratives where the ethno-religious and caste factor of 
immigrants, settled along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, have played vital 
roles in the nature of negotiation between them and the state. It also looks at certain 
aspects of interaction between the border guards and border civilians, and between 
the border civilians themselves, where ethno-religious and caste factors are latently, 
but nevertheless strongly, present.  
 
II. The Marichjhapi Massacre of 1979 
 
i. The event 
Following the formation of Bangladesh in 1971 and the military coup of 1975, West 
Bengal saw the renewed influx of refugees from Bangladesh, most of who were 
Namasudras. The Congress government of West Bengal 12  was unwilling to 
accommodate them within West Bengal. Apart from being small in number, these 
refugees lacked family and caste connections of the previous middle-class refugees, 
as a result of which they had to depend solely on the government for their survival. 
On claims of unavailability of vacant lands in West Bengal, the government adopted 
the policy of dispersing the Namasudra refugees to other provinces within India. 
Another vital reason for these policies was to weaken the strength of the Namasudra 
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movement, which had its roots in the eastern parts of Bengal during the late 
nineteenth century.13 The scattering of these refugees would not only dismember the 
Namasudra community but also ensure the prevention of the rise of the Namasudras 
in the tri-caste 14  hierarchy of West Bengal electoral politics. 15  Thus, these 
Namasudra refugees were forced to settle in semi-arid, rocky, inhospitable lands 
called Dandakaranya in the neighbouring regions of West Bengal, 16  with little 
support from it. Their agricultural skills were of little use in the forest-areas of 
Dandakaranya.  A hostile land coupled with quarrels with the local tribal population 
made life and livelihood difficult for the refugees.17 Besides, they were culturally, 
physically and emotionally removed from the environment that they had left behind 
in Bangladesh.  
When, after independence in 1947, the Congress party formed the government in 
independent India, as well as the provincial government in West Bengal, the party 
that formed the opposition to the government in West Bengal was an alliance of Left 
parties, who jointly called themselves the Left Front. During the first phase of 
refugee influx from East Pakistan into West Bengal in 1947-‘48, the Left Front, as 
the party-in-opposition, acted as the mouthpiece for the refugees in their fight for 
squatter colonies in West Bengal against the Congress government in power, thus 
creating a strong electoral base among the refugees in the post-partition days of 
1947.18 The second wave of refugees in 1975 furthered the possibility of an increase 
in the Left Front’s electoral base. The Left Front leaders took up their cause and 
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demanded that the Congress government settle them within their ‘native Bengal’19 
rather than scatter them across India on the lands of other people where they were not 
even entitled to affirmative action programmes since their castes were not recognised 
as scheduled castes in the provinces in which they were forced to settle. The Leftist 
opposition played on these grievances to obtain a political base among these 
Namasudra refugees. 20  Left leaders harped on about the utopia of a ‘return to 
homeland’ that the refugees cherished and lured them to settle in West Bengal,21 
especially in one of the islands in Sundarbans22 called Marichjhapi.  
The Left-backed United Central Refugee Council (UCRC) 23  together with the 
Udbastu Unnayanshil Samity (UUS)24 convinced the refugees of a prosperous life 
and access to unlimited resources on their resettlement on the island. The refugees 
sold the last of their belongings to make arrangements for their journey back to their 
'own' land.  
By the time the refugees embarked upon their journey to Marichjhapi in around 1977, 
Bengal had seen one of the most decisive political changes in the post-partition 
phase—the Left Front’s victory in the election of West Bengal in 1977. Having come 
to power in West Bengal, the attitude of the Left Front leaders towards the refugees 
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took a drastic turn.  Refugee resettlement policies began to be reviewed. As the Left 
Front now represented the government, the refugees now became a liability for them 
and the resettlement issue became a political concern. The enormity of the 
responsibility of resettling refugees dawned on the Left Front government. This was 
a burden that it was not ready to shoulder.  
The Left Front government, thus, reversed its policy of refugee resettlement within 
Bengal and adopted the policy of preventing the refugees from reaching Marichjhapi 
and resettling there. To that end, government forces attempted to stop the refugees on 
their way to the island. The position of the Namasudra refugees was legally in an 
arguable state because of the government’s decision to consider refugees after 1964 
as illegal. This made the Left Front government in West Bengal less obligated to the 
refugees than to their already-existing refugee voters in West Bengal, who had a 
prior demand on the state’s limited resources.25  The same Left Front which had 
backed the refugees’ cause for return to West Bengal from Dandakaranya now 
considered the refugees as ‘intrusions’ on state resources. The government made use 
of police forces at the station and at posts which the refugees crossed on their way to 
the island in order to stop them from reaching Marichjhapi.26  
Some of the refugees, nevertheless, managed to escape police resistance at the 
various stations and posts, and reached Marichjhapi in phases throughout the year of 
1978. By this time, the resistance of the Left Front against refugee resettlement in 
West Bengal was in full swing. The leaders of the Left Front who were in the 
forefront in calling the refugees back to West Bengal from Dandakaranya were 
members of smaller allies of the Left Front, namely the Revolutionary Socialist Party 
(RSP) and hence, lacked a strong presence as far as framing refugee resettlement 
policies were concerned. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)], as the 
dominant ally, was at the helm of affairs. It was the CPI(M)'s decision to reverse the 
refugee resettlement policies of West Bengal and, accordingly, not let any more 
refugees into West Bengal. Thus, the smaller allies of the Left Front despite their 
best efforts could not do much for the refugees. The refugees, thus, began resettling 
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on the island all by themselves with an efficacy that is hard to come by in the history 
of refugee resettlement in India. The Namasudras, over years of constantly 
encountering the hostile marshy and forest tracts of East Bengal, had emerged as a 
formidable peasant community.27 Their resettlement efforts at Marichjhapi were a 
reflection of this background. Over the following year, by their own efforts, they 
established a viable fishing industry, salt pans, a health centre and schools—all 
without a trace of government support 28  and in spite of the uninhabitable 
environment of the island. The island, inundated with saline water was unfit for 
large-scale agriculture. That the refugees, at times, had to survive on begging has 
been testified by the villagers of the neighbouring islands.29  
In order to dislodge the refugees from Marichjhapi, an economic blockade was 
started by the West Bengal government in and around the island in January 1979, 
together with the promulgation of the Forest Preservation Act in order to isolate the 
refugees economically, cutting off their access to food, water and other basic 
requirements. The ones who swam to the nearby island to get help were massacred 
by police forces.30  When the economic blockade failed to budge the refugees, a 
violent eviction policy was adopted through the blatant use of firearms between May 
14 and May 16, 1979,31 resulting in the massacre of several refugees. Every trace of 
the settlement built by them was razed to the ground. People were killed and their 
bodies thrown into the rivers. This made the exact count of the number of deaths 
impossible since there was no human settlement downstream to observe the bodies.32 
‘Hired’ gangs were made to assist the police.33 Of the approximately 14,000 families 
who had started on this fateful journey from Dandakaranya to Marichjhapi in West 
Bengal, about 10,000 returned back to their previous settlement at Dandakaranya in a 
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state of complete destitution. Many others found themselves in shanties and railway 
tracks in and around Calcutta and other parts of West Bengal.34 The rest of the 4,000 
families were massacred in their fight against the state. There was a complete denial 
by the state about any firing having taken place.  
Official records fail to throw light on the magnitude of the massacre.35 But the way 
the state machinery came down heavily upon the refugees cannot be termed anything 
less than a massacre, the economic blockade itself having caused a huge amount of 
harm to the refugees' lives and livelihoods. Press coverage or any other intervention 
on the part of the citizens was successfully prevented36 in spite of Marichjhapi being 
at a distance of a mere 75 kilometres from Kolkata, the headquarters of West Bengal. 
The CPI(M) congratulated its participant members on their successful operation at 
Marichjhapi and made their refugee policy reversal explicit stating that ‘there was no 
possibility of giving shelter to these large number of refugees under any 
circumstances in the State.’37 The whole episode was pushed to the backseat where it 
remained largely unheard and unknown for more than two decades.  
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Plate 27. Settlements at Marichjhapi. Photo courtesy: Tushar Bhattacharya.   
 
ii. Official explanation 
The official explanation cited by the government in defence of the massacre and 
forced eviction of the refugees from Marichjhapi was the violation of the Forest 
Act38 by them. In order to make the refugee resettlement at Marichjhapi look like an 
illegal intrusion, the Bengal government made use of the then-ongoing Tiger Project 
campaign and declared Marichjhapi a part of the Reserve Forest area. Chief Minister 
Jyoti Basu declared that the occupation of Marichjhapi was an illegal encroachment 
on Reserve Forest Land and on the World Wildlife Fund-sponsored Tiger Project. He 
declared that further attempts by the refugees to settle on the island would force the 
government to take ‘strong action.’ 39  Accordingly, on January 27, 1979, the 
government prohibited any movement into and out of Marichjhapi under the Forest 
Act and promulgated Section 144 of the Indian Criminal Penal Code, making it 
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illegal for five or more persons to gather on the island at any given time.40 An 
economic blockade was put into place in order to isolate and weaken the refugees at 
Marichjhapi. Access to food, water and other basic amenities was blocked.41 The 
West Bengal government claimed that the refugees were ‘in unauthorised occupation 
of Marichjhapi which is part of the Sundarbans Government Reserve Forest violating 
thereby the Forest Act.’42  
No national political party was ready to take up the cause of the refugees since the 
Namasudras hardly implied a powerful ally in national politics, despite their history 
of struggle and resistance in the nationalist politics of India before 1947. Though the 
Scheduled Tribes and Castes Commission of the government of India was obligated 
to support the refugees’ cause, it did not intervene publicly in the matter.43 The 
restrictions imposed on the press by the government of West Bengal made it difficult 
for the former to publish whatever little news they could gather about the massacre.44 
The economic blockade resulted in a large number of victims of starvation and 
disease on the island between January and May 1979, even before the start of direct 
police action in May 1979.45  
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Figure 5. Sundarbans, with location of Marichjhapi. Source: Wikimedia.  
Ironically, neither the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) nor any of the other 
environmental non-governmental organisations made any declaration in support of 
the government’s claim of Marichjhapi being a part of the Reserve Forest area, nor 
was there any official lobbying on the part of any non-state organisation for the 
government to undertake such eviction policies.46 Even after news of the massacre 
became public, the scale of the evicted population, estimated at 600,000, was found 
to be unrealistic for the NGOs to provide relief. 47 With no aid coming from the 
Central government as well, the Left Front government in West Bengal found the 
forceful eviction of the refugees a far more effective policy than the cumbersome 
process of finding vacant lands in other parts of the state and rehabilitating them.  
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The government made use of the ongoing Tiger Project, which had international 
support and WWF backing. Dr. Karan Singh, Chairman of the Project Tiger steering 
committee, was widely quoted in support of the urgency of the project. Organisations 
wanting to highlight the human cost of such projects were wrongly interpreted as 
being insensitive to ecological concerns. WWF literature which blamed the poor for 
being the ‘most direct threat to wildlife and wildlands’48 was widely quoted by the 
West Bengal government as well. True, there were reports of the refugees cutting 
trees and selling them to middlemen from surrounding islands. Some of the refugees 
themselves were quoted as having done the same. The profiteers of this timber 
business, though, were the leaders who had brought the refugees to the island. Yet 
these acts, instead of being seen as desperate attempts by the refugees to survive, 
were seen as intended encroachment.  Organisational imperatives necessitated 
downplaying and ignoring the human cost paid by the poor people for environmental 
preservation. Loss of lives was accepted as a necessary price to pay for conservation. 
The refugees tried to draw attention to their own efforts at resettlement without 
harming the natural resources by citing examples of the twelve settlements that they 
had, in the meantime, built for themselves, including laid-out roads, drainage 
channels to prevent water-logging, a school, a dispensary, smithies, a pottery, 
cigarette workshops, a bakery, several fisheries, boat-building yards, numerous boats, 
market places and a dyke system to hold back the tide.49  
The eviction of people ready to risk death, even if unarmed, has always been a 
difficult task for the state. Such strength and determination, which would, in many 
instances, be considered heroic, was now seen as ‘anti-state, subversive, and 
environmentally unfriendly.’ 50  In spite of not being directly associated with the 
eviction, eco-tourism-promoting bodies acted as incentives for these governmental 
policies. The prospect of developing Marichjhapi as a profitable tourist destination 
was prioritised over refugee resettlement. The government took efforts to project 
itself as environmentally sensitive. It could reap future profits as long as the 
massacre could effectively be prevented from being exposed.51 The refugees, being 
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falsely portrayed as environmentally unfriendly, failed to garner either aid or support 
for their cause.  
The conflict between environmental preservation and people’s rights has been, for a 
long time, at the heart of the trade-offs between human rights and ecological 
preservation. The laws which secure the Indian state’s ownership and control over its 
forests have always been fraught with an uneasy truce with people's involvement in 
forest resources. During the latter part of the twentieth century, people’s participation 
in forest conservation was being encouraged, at one level, while an opposing force 
was also at play. In the draft bills of the Forest Laws from around the late 1970s, 
‘technologies of control’ were being strengthened rather than the scope for ‘people’s 
participation’.52  The misuse of the law in Marichjhapi was another case of this 
strengthening of control. First, the refugees were lured by the government to leave 
Dandakaranya and settle on the island. Then, on their arrival, the government 
announced that the Tiger Project in Sundarbans was under threat from their 
resettlement on the island. Laws, put to misuse, not just massacred thousands of 
refugees, but also succeeded in covering up the incident behind the larger concerns 
of the preservation of natural resources.  
A number of academics described the Left Front government as providing ‘good 
governance’.53 Such applause for governance can only be possible as long as events 
like Marichjhapi do not come to the forefront. Debates on these massacres are 
especially important in places like India where judicial institutions are often languid, 
if not non-functional. Even after the Marichjhapi incident, the government officials 
of West Bengal, including the Chief Minister, not just made frequent trips to other 
parts of the world without being questioned about the massacre, but the Left Front 
also held the West Bengal government for the next 34 years. The incident did not 
find any mention in academic publications till about the 1990s, more than a decade 
and a half after the incident. All that was ever debated in the academic circuit was a 
misleading representation of the incident. As one of the cadres of CPI(M) later rued 
in an interview: ‘After all, when in opposition during the mid-70s, we were the ones 
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who cried hoarse for refugee resettlement at Marichjhapi. Unfortunately, everything 
changed once we came to power.’54 
This had always been the case, as rightly put by the All Bengal Namasudra 
Association to the Simon Commission in 1929, much before the Marichjhapi 
massacre: ‘It has been seen in more than one case that British members of the Indian 
Civil Service, on account of their living in this country for a long time, and by 
coming into contact with only a section of the people, are mentally captured by the 
ideas of those few people who are in the position of social aristocrats.’ 55  This 
statement holds true for not just the case of the Namasudras in Bengal but for the 
state of subaltern representations in India, especially in the late colonial and post-
colonial era which, ironically, saw a hue and cry about the representation of the 
subalterns in Indian historiography.  
iii. Caste factor 
The presence of castes and sub-castes within the larger frames of class 
categorisations has always been an integral part of the Indian social structure. The 
show of resistance by the Namasudras, one of the many Untouchable castes in India, 
in Marichjhapi highlights one of the strongest yet unpronounced reasons behind the 
massacre.  
Though of a similar ethnic background (Hindu and Bengali), the refugees who came 
to Marichjhapi were the ones belonging to the most lowly-held castes of the Hindu 
Bengali society, the Namasudras. Their agrarian base coupled with their caste 
identities made their efforts at resettlement on the island a matter of serious 
discomfort for the state. Not only were they contesting the state’s role as the sole 
decider and provider, they were also doing it as a community belonging to the lowest 
rung of the social ladder. Their resettlement efforts were not simply reversing the 
state-subject equation; they were challenging the elite-minority equation as well. For 
the Indian state, cultural outcastes have always posed a bigger threat than cultural 
outsiders. The West Bengal government was no different. If ‘the essence of 
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sovereignty remains in the power to exclude,’56 then the Marichjhapi massacre surely 
was sovereignty in its most powerful form. The massacre was a re-emphasis of the 
hard reality that the identities of the subjects are never meant to overshadow those 
allocated to them by the state.  
iv. Ethno-religious factor 
The issue of ethnicity (Bengali) and religion (Hinduism) also played important roles 
in the Marichjhapi narrative. When the state announced an economic blockade on the 
island, there were a few radical groups based in mainland West Bengal who came 
forward in support of the refugees. However, their motives were related to the 
creation of an ethnic homeland rather than resettlement of the refugees. Their 
involvement, therefore, ruined the last hopes for the refugees since it made the 
government all the more apprehensive about their agenda.  
Radical groups known as Amra Bangali (We are Bengalis) and Nikhil Banga 
Nagarik Sangha (Bengal Citizen’s Group) supported the refugees with an aim to 
create a Bangalistan or Bangabhumi— land for the Bengalis. Their goal was the 
creation of a Bengali territory constituting West Bengal, Tripura, parts of Assam, 
Meghalaya, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, the Andamans, Nepal and Myanmar, and the 
whole of ‘Swadhin Bangladesh’57 (Free Bangladesh) at the site of the border between 
West Bengal and Bangladesh. This land, according to these groups, would be strictly 
for the ethnic Hindu-Bengalis, as opposed to the Muslim-Bengalis of Bangladesh. 
These groups, according to intelligence reports, were opposed to the idea of certain 
Hindu-dominated parts of undivided Bengal being made part of Bangladesh as a 
result of the partition. Their creation of a Hindu-Bengali territory would be their 
answer to the hasty partition of Bengal in 1947. 58  Volunteers from these 
organisations helped the refugees by distributing copies of route maps from Calcutta 
to Marichjhapi and a rough sketch of the island even before the exodus started in full 
swing around 1978. Their demand for a ‘Hindu homeland’ including parts of Bengal 
and Bangladesh was corroborated by several demonstrations, which they staged in 
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front of the office of the Bangladesh Deputy High Commission in Kolkata.59 These 
groups also formed their own armed wings called Bangasena (Bengal Army), 
volunteers of which were active members of the resistance movement formed by the 
refugees. Their active involvement in the incident was corroborated later by one of 
their own volunteers, presently living in the outskirts of Calcutta, to a newspaper.60 
These agendas of a free Bengali homeland based on religious majorities had their 
roots in one of the factions of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League before partition, 
when ‘Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim had co-authored a proposal 
for a united and sovereign Bengal, independent of both India and Pakistan’.61 Such 
reflections stand testimony to the fact that the partition was, indeed, a continuous 
process which expressed itself in various forms years after the boundary line was 
drawn.     
The involvement of such radical groups with demands of a Hindu-Bengali homeland 
further added to the complication of the identity politics of which the refugees were 
already victims. The refugees were already being made to pay the price for belonging 
to the Namasudra community in spite of the fact that they were ethnically similar 
(Bengali) to the existing people of West Bengal. They had no reason to be excluded 
from settling in West Bengal on the basis of religion since they were Hindus by 
religion, as well.62 Just because they belonged to a low caste, the refugees became 
the victims of state atrocities. The involvement of the radical ethnic groups made the 
situation all the more complicated. While the refugees were trying to make use of 
their ethnic and religious similarity with the citizens of West Bengal in claiming their 
rightful place on the island, the radical groups ruined this possibility by making a 
political agenda of this ethno-religious issue.  The refugees were torn between the 
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politics of identities which was thrust upon them and in which they hardly had a 
choice.  
v. Territorial implication 
 The border between West Bengal and Bangladesh has always been witness to the 
overlapping of socio-cultural identities.  The premise for the creation of the borders 
could, in the first place, never accommodate the dynamics of identities (ethnically 
similar population on either side of the border) which underscored the process. With 
the passage of time, these identities manifested themselves in far more complex ways 
than the states were ready for. The Liberation War of 1971 in East Pakistan, resulting 
in the creation of Bangladesh, redefined the bordering process in subtle yet intense 
ways. Increasingly, religion as the basis for separation between the two states lost 
ground, with a mix of religious communities inhabiting both sides of the border. 
Moreover, the fact that ethnicity and language (‘Bengali’ or ‘Bangla’) were the main 
bases for the formation of Bangladesh further complicated the process of reinforcing 
the border. With people of identical ethnic backgrounds, identical languages, and 
shared social and cultural histories on both sides of the border, the physical 
reinforcement and manifestation of the state’s presence at the border gained prime 
significance. The borderland spaces and the identities of the people dwelling in those 
spaces became the crucial indices for the enforcement of the state’s presence at the 
border.  
For the refugees, settling in Marichjhapi was symbolic of their return to their 
homeland that they had left behind in Bangladesh, not simply because of the 
similarity in topographical features but also, and perhaps more importantly, because 
of the close proximity of Marichjhapi to Bangladesh, across the border.  Certainly, 
Dandakaranya did not evoke such nostalgia. The location of Marichjhapi near the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border, therefore, played a latent, but nevertheless strong, 
role in the exodus of the refugees from Dandakaranya to Marichjhapi.  
For the state, having control over the island was not simply about appropriating a 
space within its bounded territorial limits. It was about controlling the very ‘limit’ 
that defined the state. Borders, as symbols of containment for the state, are also the 
space for the state’s unquestionable sovereign control. This made Marichjhapi both a 
space of strategic importance as well as a space for exercising complete political 
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control for West Bengal.  And the fact that the people occupying the border spaces 
were simultaneously refugees and Namasudras enhanced the intensity of the 
narrative.  
 
III. The Matua trajectory  
The second narrative brings us to recent years, i.e. 2009, the place being Thakurnagar 
in Bongaon in the North 24 Parganas district of West Bengal and located very close 
to the Petrapole-Benapole border Land Port (LP) between the North 24 Parganas 
district of West Bengal and the Jessore district of Bangladesh. The event we are 
looking at here is that of Baruni Mela—a week-long fair organised by the Matua 
community (primarily consisting of Namasudra refugees from Bangladesh). The fair, 
newspaper reports said, was graced by the presence of political figures (MLAs, MPs, 
as well as candidates for forthcoming elections) paying homage to Barama—the 
religious leader of the 50-million strong Matua community in India, at the Matua 
headquarters at Thakurnagar. More than 10 million Matuas live in West Bengal 
alone, indicating a 10-million strong vote bank for any party in West Bengal who 
succeeds in gaining their support.   
Two aspects are similar in the narratives of the Marichjhapi massacre and the Matua 
trajectory, so far expressed through the incident of the Baruni mela alone. One is the 
nature of the people involved, i.e. Namsudras, on the one hand, and the state 
(represented through political figures), on the other. The second is the nature of 
location of the two incidents, i.e. the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. What has 
changed, perhaps, in the years following the Marichjhapi massacre (between 1979 
and 2009) is the nature of negotiation between outcastes and the state. Studying the 
change in the pattern of negotiation between the people living (or attempting to live) 
along the border, and the state, helps in our understanding of spatial narratives 
created by the reality of the border and the evolution of a border consciousness.  
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Figure 6. Map showing Thakurnagar (the yellow line indicates the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border).  Source: Google Maps. 
 
i. Ideology—organised 
Matuas have their origin in Harichand Thakur who, in the mid-nineteenth century, 
propounded certain ideas in the Oraikandi village of Faridpur district in then 
undivided Bengal.  Born into a Vaishnava Namasudra family (the original surname 
being Biswas),63 Harichand’s ideas spoke essentially in favour of the downtrodden, 
so-called lower castes of the Bengali society. The Namasudras were largely 
influenced by the Bhakti movement of the fifteenth century, which emerged as a 
deviant stream of philosophy within the Vaishnava cult.64 A section of the followers 
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of the Vaishnava cult believed in the upliftment of the downtrodden sections of 
society and, thus, professed an all-inclusive ideological practice. These sects from 
within the Vaishnavas appealed to the low-caste population in India, including the 
Namasudras. The ‘non-formal, equalitarian rural variant’ 65  of the Vaishnava 
ideology became popular within the Namasudra community and it is from such an 
ideological background that the founder of the Matua sect, Harichand Thakur, came. 
The influence of the deviant Bhakti sects on the Matua ideology did not simply give 
an anti-hierarchy stance to their ideology, but also initiated an alternative ‘discourse 
of dignity’66 and tried to create an ‘autonomous social space’ where this discourse 
could be asserted.67 The rise of the Matuas, as an essentially Namasudra community, 
to a position of power in the electoral politics of West Bengal is reflective of the 
creation of such a space. In fact, the very nomenclature Matua bears signs of an anti-
hegemonic stance. The elite Hindu population would ridicule the followers of 
Harichand’s ideology as motto or people drunk with their own spiritual outpourings 
(matoyara). This was a way devised by the upper caste Hindus as well as respectable 
Vaishnavas to distance themselves from the followers of this sect. Harichand used 
this very ridicule in strengthening the solidarity of the sect and named it Matua— a 
word absent in the elite lexicon.68 The flag of the Matuas (red body with white 
borders) is symbolic of their philosophy of combining spiritual devotion (bhakti) 
with material action (karma). ‘The dictum of Hate kam mukhe nam (doing worldly 
duties while chanting His holy name), as Harichand defined it, became the guiding 
principle of the Matua philosophy of life’,69 creating the foundation for the later 
association of the Matuas with the electoral politics of Bengal.  
                                                                                                                           
northern India till about the 17th century. Over the years, it gradually became associated with 
a group of teachers or sants, who taught that caste, religion or ritual should not come in the 
way of unadulterated love for god. Though Shaivites (worshippers of lord Shiva) practiced 
Bhaktism as well, it was the Vaishnava (worshippers of lord Vishnu) stream of Bhaktism that 
gained an immense following across India.  
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The Matuas were organised into a sect by Harichand’s son, Guruchand Thakur, born 
in 1846. Guruchand ‘formalised the doctrine of the sect to suit better the needs of an 
emerging lower caste peasant community’.70 He made his objectives clear when he 
explained that the reason for lack of respect for the Namasudras, in spite of the 
numerical strength of the community, was their lack of power, and that ‘it was power 
alone which could command respect’.71 The Namasudras, as described earlier in the 
chapter, were essentially an agricultural community, tied to the land economy in 
Bengal. The trajectories of most of the Namsudras of Bengal are similar in that they 
were the last ones to leave their lands in East Pakistan after partition and, hence, the 
last ones to arrive in West Bengal as refugees, unlike the elite Hindu professionals. 
The Matuas settled in Thakurnagar off Bongaon in the North 24 Parganas district in 
West Bengal. Like Marichjhapi, Bongaon is a border municipality and at a distance 
of 17 kilometres (15 minutes’ drive) from Gaighata that houses the headquarters of 
the Matuas. The Matuas, like the rest of the Namasudra community, migrated to 
West Bengal in phases, right from 1948 (following the partition) till about 1978 
(following the formation of Bangladesh and renewed violence on Hindus). Over the 
years, the Matua community in Thakurnagar has become stronger in number with the 
coming of new migrant Namasudras from Bangladesh. Over 90% of the Matuas in 
West Bengal are, thus, refugees and migrants from East Pakistan/Bangladesh.72  
The trajectory of promises of a better life and living to these Matuas by the political 
leadership of the time, especially the Left Front, is also similar to that of the 
Namasudra communities who were lured by the Left Front to come and settle in 
Marichjhapi. The ones who came immediately after the partition till about 1963 
attained official refugee status. But the ones who came to West Bengal after  1964 
were officially labelled ‘illegal migrants’, since the then-Congress government in 
power declared that migrants who came after 1964 would be eligible for government 
relief and rehabilitation aids only if they settled outside West Bengal in other regions 
                                            
70
 Ibid., p.37. 
71
 Haldar, Mahananda. Sri Sri Guruchand Charit (1943), as quoted in Bandyopadhyay, 1997, 
p.50.  
72
 Hindu Samhati. (12 April 2008) Hindu Samhati’s exhibition—Thakurnagar, West Bengal. 
[Online] Available from: http://hindusamhati.blogspot.co.uk/2008/04/hindu-samhati-
exhbition-thakurnagar.html. [Accessed: 6 August 2013].  
 192
of India. 73  The peasants, who migrated still later, post-1971, following the 
Bangladesh Liberation War, were labelled as illegal by every definition.74 Still, a 
large number of migrants who migrated after 1964 and well after 1971, preferred to 
settle in West Bengal, mostly in rural areas, associating themselves with the kind of 
work that they were doing all their life, i.e. agriculture. The Matuas were no 
exception. Yet the treatment meted out to these two sets of Namasudra communities 
(in Marichjhapi and in Thakurnagar) by the ruling Left Front varied distinctly, 
despite the similarities in the territorial specificity of the two locations.  
This difference can be traced to the time of migration as well as socio-religious 
issues, apart from the way in which these two communities negotiated their subaltern 
status. Both were initially seen as potential vote banks by the Left Front leaders. But 
while the Namsudras at Marichjhapi failed to hold on to that negotiating power, the 
Matua Namasudras at Thakurnagar successfully organised themselves into a 
community who could make or break any political party’s career. The sheer number 
of Matuas also became decisive. A 10-million vote bank will bring any political 
leader of any stature to their doorstep. And so it did. Moreover, Marichjhapi, located 
in the far southern part of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border in the inaccessible 
mangroves of the Sundarbans, proved to be a wiser location for atrocities— away 
from the glare and knowledge of the urban crowd of Kolkata. Thakurnagar in 
Bongaon is a more strategically located point along the border, with Petrapole in 
close proximity. News of any kind of atrocities, especially physical, would easily 
find its way into the newspapers.  
Though the Matuas did traditionally vote for the Left Front, their grievances against 
the party simultaneously grew. The issue of unfulfilled promises of infrastructural 
development in the region coupled with the grievance of being labelled as 
‘infiltrators’ in public parlance, with the encouragement of the West Bengal 
government, gradually built a strong resistance within the Matuas against the Left 
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Front.75 The turning point was brought about by the then party-in opposition (and 
now the party in power) in West Bengal, the Trinomool Congress (TMC). The TMC, 
headed by Mamata Banerjee, was quick to realise the potential of both the location of 
the concentration of the Matuas (i.e. the border area) as well as the numerical 
strength of the community as far as electoral politics in West Bengal was 
concerned.76  
Beginning with charitable grants towards the Matua community in the form of 
donations and land grants, to becoming a member of the Matua organisation (Matua 
Mahasangha) herself—Mamata left no stone unturned to ensure complete support 
from the Matua voters.77 What is interesting, and this is where their narrative differs 
from the Namsudras of Marichjhapi, is how the Matua Namasudras negotiated their 
position and rose to power.  Religious conceptualisation of the Matua sect played a 
very important role in this negotiation.  
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Plate 28. Matua Dharma Mahamela (religious gathering of the Matuas, 2008. Source: 
Hindu Samhati. 
 
ii. Overlapping of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ 
Historically, the trajectories of the Namasudras have shown an overlapping of ‘being’ 
(jati or caste) and ‘becoming’ (varna or rank— the Hindu hierarchical structure 
based mainly on profession) — concepts which are otherwise sharply separated from 
one another in the Hindu ideology. While jati, in Hindu philosophy, is considered a 
real social group,78 where one can only be born into, varna is a conceptual scheme,79 
based largely on a common profession and ‘a common social language’.80 Varna is 
flexible in nature and one could gain or lose varna status. The overlapping of these 
two concepts in the narratives of caste identities of the lower castes in India shows 
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how these concepts of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ have been ‘selectively appropriated’81 
by these castes ‘to improve their own position’82 within the social set-up.   
iii. Ethno-religious factor 
The Matuas, though essentially a caste-based community, organised and projected 
themselves as a religious sect—as the followers of Harichand and Guruchand Thakur. 
Manjulkrishna, the vice-president of the Sangha, puts it more clearly: ‘It is a religion 
as we have a prophet in Guru Harichand, my great-great-grandfather, whose 
teachings we follow. But it’s more of a movement that seeks to uplift the 
downtrodden and tells you what an ideal family life should be.’ 83  The Matuas 
constructed an ‘ideological community’84 that would submerge the inchoate class 
distinctions within the group and set it against its Other, 85  i.e. the hegemonic 
presence of the elite Hindus in the politics of West Bengal. The moment a religious 
label is tagged onto a community, especially in India, its relation with the state 
becomes a sensitive issue. Thus, the Matuas used religion as a weapon in their 
negotiation with the state, unlike the Namasudras at Marichjhapi whose religious 
factor could not be used to draw sympathy. In fact, the involvement of radical ethno-
religious groups in the Marichjhapi incident worsened their cause. The fact that the 
religious index has been an importance stance used by the Matuas to defend their 
cause, including the betterment of their community and cross-border ties, becomes 
clear during the Matua festivities at Thakurnagar where exhibitions on Hindu 
Samhati (Hindu Unity) are put up in the fairgrounds where thousands of Matuas 
gather.86   The Matua community can, apparently, identify with the cause of the 
exhibition: that of spreading awareness about the atrocities on Hindus by the Islamic 
fundamentalists in Bangladesh because they have themselves been subject to the 
same, especially in the massive Hindu exodus of the years 1947-‘48, 1951, 1964, 
1971 and 1992 from erstwhile East Pakistan and, later, Bangladesh into West Bengal. 
‘As a matter of fact, in the anti-Hindu pogrom in Bangladesh in 2001, many of the 
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victims were actually across-the-border relatives and extended family members of 
the Matuas of West Bengal,’87 says one of the organisers of the exhibition.  
 
Plate 29. Mahabaruni Snan (Holy Bath, Baruni Fair), 2008. Source: Hindu Samhati.  
 
iv. Legal implication 
The time of migration of the Matua refugees also favoured their cause. The first 
influx of these Namasudra Matuas as refugees from East Pakistan was in 1948, when 
Pramatharanjan Thakur, the grandson of Guruchand Thakur, migrated to West 
Bengal, bought forest lands from a local zamindar (landlord) of Gaighata, christened 
the place as ‘Thakurnagar’, built a small house and started living there from the 13th 
of March 1949.88 The Matuas, thereafter, came in phases and gathered mostly at 
Thakurnagar, under the auspices of Pramatharanjan’s descendants, apart from other 
districts in West Bengal such as Howrah, South 24 Parganas, Nadia, Cooch Behar, 
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Malda, North Dinajpur and South Dinajpur. Of the eight districts which host the 
Matuas, seven are border districts of West Bengal (except Howrah) — a factor that 
makes the strategic location of the Matuas all the more prominent.  Their initial 
migration in 1948 ensured their official ‘refugee’ status, though with the lapse of 
time, later migrants came to be labelled ‘infiltrators’. But by the time the issue of 
illegal migration found ground in electoral agendas in West Bengal, the Matuas had 
already organised themselves into a sect. The Namasudras at Marichjhapi came at a 
time (1977-78) when migration from Bangladesh into West Bengal had already been 
officially declared as ‘illegal’, which tagged the Namasudras as an unwanted 
intrusion from the very beginning. They could not claim to have any official refugee 
status, unlike the Matuas who could trace their initial migration to an officially 
recognised migration. The Left Front’s misguided political stance of supporting the 
Namasudras’ cause of settling within West Bengal resulted in the massacre at 
Marichjhapi. The claim over land was stronger for the Matuas since that held by the 
Thakur family had been ‘bought’ by their ancestor, Pramatharanjan, from the then 
local zamindar, unlike the Namasudras at Marichjhapi who did not have any official 
claim over the space (the island of Marichjhapi) that they had appropriated.  
v. Political implication 
The Matua Mahasangha as an organisation is very well-structured with details of all 
its members across the country recorded and tracked. Binapani Devi or Barama, as 
she is known amongst followers, is the wife of Pramatharanjan Thakur, the grandson 
of Guruchand who took the initiative to settle the Matuas in Thakurnagar and 
organise them into a strong community. 96-year old Barama is the chief advisor to 
the Sangha and has the last word in any matter involving the Matuas, while her two 
sons hold important administrative positions in the Sangha. The TMC realised that 
obtaining Barama’s support could decide the support base from the Matuas. 
Therefore, Matua fairs, the construction of temples and gatherings were officiated 
under the banner of the political party.89  
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The Thakurnagar railway station is currently being developed as a ‘model’ one. A 
stadium and a railway hospital are among the other things promised. The foundation 
for a college has already been laid. Mamata, despite not being a Matua herself, took 
membership of the Sangha and eventually was made its ‘Chief Patron’,90 an honour 
conferred on her by none other than Barama herself. Not that the Left Front did not 
try to make amends their faults in dealing with the Namasudra community. Left 
Front leaders have visited Barama, promised land grants for building research 
institutes dedicated to the Matuas, and announced awards in the name of Harichand 
and Guruchand Thakur, the first recipient being Barama’s elder son Kapilkrishna 
Thakur. All this was after the Left Front realised the importance of the Matua voters 
in the preceding Panchayat and Lok Sabha elections (2008 and 2009, respectively) 
where the Matua votes turned against them and in favour of the TMC, resulting in a 
major loss of the vote bank for the Front. But the Left Front lost in the last round of 
the game of wooing Matua support when Barama’s younger son, Manjulkrishna 
Thakur, was chosen as the TMC’s candidate from the Gaighata constituency of the 
Bongaon subdivision (which constitutes Thakurnagar) and eventually succeeded in 
the Assembly Elections (2011), when he was elected as the Minister to the 
Legislative Assembly (MLA) from his constituency. This made him a Namasudra 
MLA from a border constituency—a major departure from the narrative of the 
Marichjhapi Namasudras. This, though, is not too unusual as far as the connection 
between the Thakur family and the politics of Bengal is concerned. Manjulkrishna’s 
father, Pramatharanjan, was also a MLA in the West Bengal Assembly in 1962, and 
later a Congress MP from Nabadwip (in Nadia district, West Bengal) in 1967.91 This 
was the reason cited by the Congress leaders who visited Barama in May 2012 to ask 
for her well-being. When questions of political intentions were raised, the Congress 
leaders were quick to suggest that this was a courtesy visit to the wife of the late 
Pramatharanjan Thakur, a Congress MP, and was not driven by political intentions—
the irony being that it took some 45 years for them to decide on the importance of a 
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courtesy visit to the Matua head. Efforts have not been in vain for the TMC as the 
results of the Panchayat elections in July 2013 suggest.92  
In fact, the spectre of the Marichjhapi massacre, too, keeps haunting the current 
political scenario in West Bengal, where the TMC often uses the incident against the 
Left Front as an electoral agenda.  The survivors and witnesses of the Marichjhapi 
incident also recall the massacre, not just as memories but also through memorials 
held for those killed on the actual day.93 Such occurrences indicate that negotiations 
between the low-caste refugees and/or infiltrators and the state machinery at the 
borders are an on-going process, which evolve and mature together with the 
evolution of the border.  
vi. Territorial implication 
What makes Manjulkrishna’s stance as a political figure different from that of his 
father is the issue of infiltration and citizenship. What needs to be seen is whether 
this rise to power of a downtrodden caste actually makes a difference to the 
(ill)legality of their citizenship status. It is here that the specificity of the 
concentration of the Matuas at the border becomes important.  Illegal migration from 
Bangladesh to West Bengal still continues unabated. A majority of migrants, still, 
settle around the border areas, apart from those who settle in the cities, away from 
the borders.94 In fact, there are existences of whole villages constituted of illegal 
Bangladeshi migrants, who have obtained official documents (ration and voter cards) 
required to prove themselves as legal residents of West Bengal. ‘Most of them are 
Hindus, primarily SC-s and ST-s’,95 says Riazul.  
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A whole range of livelihoods have emerged, which depend on the existence of the 
border, including those related to illegal border-crossing.96 The major portions of 
those who cross the border belong to the lower rungs of the society, including the 
Namasudras—which, in the process, include refugee Matuas. 97  The Left Front 
‘simply overlooked the serious problem of continuous migration or infiltration; but 
began to recognise those people in a sort of clandestine manner by providing the 
migrants with ration cards at least in some areas’.98 While this surely increased the 
vote bank of the Left Front, the issue of infiltration was not effectively solved.  
The issue of citizenship has now been tied up with the Matuas in a decisive way, 
since this is an issue that the political parties are not comfortable addressing while 
the Matuas are a community that they cannot afford to ignore. Even Mamata, with 
her political stance of successfully bringing the Matuas into the political fold of West 
Bengal, remains tight-lipped about the sect’s main grievance: that of the deportation 
of thousands of its members from West Bengal as alleged infiltrators.99 While one of 
the Matua heads fulfils the responsibilities of an important political figure in regional 
politics, the ways of negotiation of cross-border infiltration and citizenship issues by 
the rest of the community make for an interesting study, especially with 
Manjulkrishna ensuring ‘a meaningful change to the lives of the downtrodden and 
the refugees’.100 The narrative of these Namasudras, both in the cases of Marichjhapi 
and the Matuas, is a result of the convergence of their spatial and social identities, as 
they negotiate between the identities of being infiltrators/illegal migrants and a low-
caste community. Such a convergence results in a political narrative, made unique by 
the specificity of its location at the border.  
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vii. Anti-hegemonic aspects in the history of the Namasudras  
Tendencies of accommodating myths and notions related to higher castes into their 
own ideology have been integral to the discourse of identity formation of the 
Namasudras. If attempts to trace their genealogy to a Brahmin origin (as has 
sometimes been done by the Matuas)101 has been one side of this tendency, then 
entering the realm of electoral politics has been the other. Electoral politics in Bengal 
has been, almost exclusively, the forte of the elite Hindu castes (Brahmin, Kshatriya, 
Vaishya), as mentioned earlier. Entering the realm of politics in Bengal has been the 
Namasudras’ way of ‘appropriating symbols of authority and divesting them of their 
symbolic significance’.102 The appropriation of political space and divesting it of its 
elitist exclusivity has been their way of negotiating with the hegemonic order. In fact, 
it was this anti-hegemonic stance that saw the non-participation of the Namasudras 
in the nationalist movements in India in the early twentieth century, since these were 
led by high caste Hindu gentry. 103 
A study of the history of the Namasudras demonstrates that ‘the different 
constituents of the community had been seeking in different ways to reorientate the 
relations of power in indigenous society’.104 This meant that from the very beginning, 
different streams of negotiation were devised by the community. ‘While the 
Namasudra elites desired a share of new economic opportunities and political power, 
as it was gradually devolved in institutional politics through successive constitutional 
reforms, the peasantry cared more for community honour and liberation from 
economic oppression and social discrimination’,105 the common grudge being against 
the elite Hindu gentry of Bengal.  The elite Namasudras aimed to secure a place for 
themselves ‘within the wider community, i.e. the nation’ (and this was being made 
possible by ‘the constitutional reform of 1935 which compelled all the other 
nationalist parties to recognise their position’);106 the peasant community having lost 
their leadership looked for alternative alignments. This pushed their movement into 
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being appropriated by other political streams from 1940s onwards.107 If the history of 
the Matuas reflects the first strand of the Namasudra narrative, the events at 
Marichjhapi are reflective of the second, i.e. the (mis)appropriation of their 
movement. The Namasudra movement took shape in 1872 in the form of the first 
organised social protest of the Namasudras against their social status in Bakargunj-
Faridapur (then parts of united Bengal) and reached its high point during the 
Swadeshi period108 (1905-11). Thereafter, the movement thinned down upon entering 
constitutional politics in the 1930s. While a part of the community remained faithful 
to B. R. Ambedkar’s Scheduled Caste Federation, 109  others either joined the 
Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha against the Muslims,110 or the Bengal Provincial 
Kisan Sabha.111 The partition dealt the final blow to the movement, dividing the 
community geographically. Henceforth, their ‘caste’ identity started overlapping 
with other relationships112—social, political and territorial.  In fact, the continued 
support of the Namasudra elites for the Left Front despite the Marichjhapi massacre 
testifies to the varying aspirations within the community, where the peasant class (the 
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majority of the Namasudras at Marichjhapi being of peasant origin) failed to garner 
the support of the elite Namasudras— political aspirations being the most evident 
cause. While the territorial specificity of the Namasudra settlement in the case of 
Marichjhapi went against their cause, this was precisely what the Matuas took 
advantage of. Both the events stand proof of the intertwining of caste discourses with 
spatial narratives, with or without success. 
It has often been the aim of the dominant socio-political machinery of the state to 
appropriate or suppress subversive movements which might pose a challenge to the 
hegemonic order. The partition and its consequent migration trends made it difficult 
for the state to appropriate the Namasudra movement because of the coupling of the 
aspect of social marginality with that of territorial marginality. The new identity of 
being a border people that these Namasudra migrants now acquired made it difficult 
for the hegemonic orders to either completely appropriate or trivialise their presence. 
The starkness of the difference of ‘dealing with’ the Namasudra presence in the 
border areas between the two major events discussed above, i.e. the Marichjhapi 
massacre and the politics of the Matuas, reflects the dilemma, gradual process of 
realisation and consequent modification of the policies of the state with regard to its 
negotiation with the community.  
 
IV. Caste narratives elsewhere along the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
Border 
 
i. Caste profile 
The border area between West Bengal and Bangladesh abounds in instances of the 
convergence of social identities with territorial marginalities. While the Marichjhapi 
event in the Sundarbans and the concentration of Matuas in the North 24 Parganas of 
West Bengal provide the best examples of such a convergence, the whole length of 
this border is, in fact, marked by the same feature. Migration from East Pakistan and, 
later, Bangladesh of agricultural communities, mostly Namasudras, into India (West 
Bengal being the most affected for being a border province) ensured Namasudra 
settlements, even if not as community-based concentrations, along the length of the 
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West Bengal-Bangladesh border.  Namasudras constitute a large part of that civilian 
population, especially on the West Bengal side of the border, who negotiate the 
border and its various apparatuses. The interviewees (without conscious selection) 
mostly belong to the scheduled or otherwise non-Brahmin castes and scheduled 
tribes of India.  Interestingly, the Muslim respondents often have similar surnames to 
the Hindu castes,113 on both sides of the border. These bear hints of their origin (as 
being one of the castes in undivided Bengal and India, at large), though they may 
have converted to Islam during the expansion of the religion, mostly under extreme 
conditions of socio-economic misery brought about by their status of a low-caste 
within the Hindu religious fold. Narratives of the elite Hindu migrants preferring to 
settle in the flourishing cities and towns in West Bengal and the agriculture-
dependent communities such as the Scheduled Castes (SC)/Scheduled Tribes 
(ST)/Other Backward Classes (OBC) settling, almost by economic compulsion, in 
the rural areas, including the borders, holds true not just for Marichjhapi or the 
Matuas, but along the whole length of the border.  
Most of the Namasudras and Hindu SC/STs living along the border are engaged in 
agricultural jobs.114 They are often concentrated in an area with a majority of the 
people of a neighbourhood sharing the same caste, represented by their surnames, for 
example, Mahato, Bagdi, Mondol, Biswas, Burman, Pal, Haldar, etc. Dinhata in the 
Cooch Behar district of West Bengal is an example. Many of the villages under the 
Dinhata subdivision are caste-based where the predominance of one or the other 
castes prevails. Mahato, Bagdi, Mondol, Biswas and Burman are some of the 
surnames which one frequently comes across, creating such neighbourhoods as 
Burman-para (neighbourhood), Mondol-para, Bagdi-para, etc. Nirendranath 
Burman explains: ‘In this village, everybody is Burman like Santosh Burman, 
Kshitish Burman, Khogen Burman, Babu Burman, Ramesh Burman. On that side of 
the village, the Malakars live, who work as gardeners.’115  
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 Interview with Nirendranath Burman, resident and Deputy Panchayat-head at Kalmati 
village, Dinhata (Cooch Behar district of West Bengal, 16 March 2012).  
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Oraon (one of the scheduled tribes) villages are also seen in Purba Bakhalir Chhara 
Enclave (Bangladeshi Enclave in India), consisting mostly of partition migrants from 
Rangpur district (Bangladesh). The Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 triggered an 
exodus of migration of people belonging to various Hindu castes, and understandably, 
most of them related to agricultural jobs, into West Bengal, adding to the population 
of the various castes along the border. ‘After the Bangladesh War, a lot of Hindus 
have migrated to this place, like the Pals and the Haldars,’ says Kuddus Rahman of 
Jalangi (West Bengal).116 
 Some of the villages in these border areas are found to be inhabited by the Hindu 
Mahishya caste117—that has its origin as a cultivator caste. Some of them have later 
opted for skilled labour. Villages consisting primarily of people belonging to the 
Mahishya caste are frequently found in the border districts of West Bengal. ‘This is 
predominantly a Mahishya village, with a few Brahmin and SC/ST families’, says 
Jasimuddin Mondol,118 reiterating a common response among many of the border 
villages visited during my field visits. ‘There are hardly any SC/ST families here. 
Most of these people are Hindu Mahishya,’ says a respondent from yet another 
border village in Nadia district.119  Similar responses confirming the existence of 
predominantly scheduled caste/tribe villages are also common along many of the 
border villages along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. ‘In general the number of 
Hindus is more here. There are mostly SC/ST families here. In fact, ST-s are the 
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largest in number,’ says Dayamay Datta of Teipur, Nadia district.120 A respondent in 
Goga (Bangladesh) is more specific in mentioning the population profile when he 
says, ‘There are some Hindus in Goga. Besides that, there are the Bagdi, Kumor, 
Kamar’ (scheduled castes).121 Goga is a village on the Bangladesh side of the border 
and shares its border with Gaighata (West Bengal), the headquarters of the 
Namasudra Matuas. This response indicates the similarity between the profile of the 
communities (Namasudras) on both sides of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border and 
explains the cross-border ties between them.   
Some of the respondents of the border villages narrate how they, as a caste-
community, were brought by the British administrators from other parts of India and 
settled in the area that they presently inhabit—that eventually became the border area 
after the Partition. Prasanta Mondol narrates how his ancestors had been brought 
over from Nagpur in Bihar to Char Meghna (which they currently inhabit) as 
labourers in indigo plantations during the second half of the seventeenth century. 
‘Initially, it was just 2/3 families, which later increased to a whole village,’ he 
says.122  
The concentration of various scheduled castes and tribes in the areas which now form 
part of the border between West Bengal and Bangladesh can be largely traced back 
to colonial administration, like the instance above, where tribal populations often 
known for their capacity for hard work as well as for their tradition of agricultural 
engagements were used by British administrators (including indigo planters) as 
cheap labour in their plantations. While most of the plantations were concentrated in 
the area which is now the border (districts like Nadia, Murshidabad and 24 Parganas 
still have ruins of the indigo warehouses beside the rivers which pass through them), 
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 207
cheap labour, mostly from tribals or low-castes (Namasudras in many cases) was 
sourced from the tribal belts of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. These 
labourers settled in these areas, initially as bonded labourers and, eventually, post-
1947, as cultivators and agricultural labourers, thus constituting a large portion of 
what became the ‘border population’. Hare Krishna Mondol confirms the migration 
narrative when he narrates how ‘the British had brought these tribals from 
Midnapore and the Chhota Nagpur area in Bihar to Char Meghna as labourers in 
indigo plantations. A Guru by the name of Jadu Pandit from Bihar had once visited 
this place and confirmed that these tribes were originally a barber caste (Napit) and 
had been forcefully made to engage in agricultural jobs by the British. The Guru also 
added that they were not as lowly a caste as they eventually ended up being, which 
made other higher castes look down upon them.’123  
ii. Livelihood  
The livelihoods of these castes and tribes are still categorised in certain ways. As Md. 
Tafikul Islam says: ‘There are indigenous population (scheduled castes and tribes) 
here. Their relation with the other non-tribal population is cordial. These scheduled 
castes and tribes are mostly engaged as labourers in brick-kilns or other small-scale 
manufacturing businesses, or work as van-drivers or agricultural labourers.  There is 
a Das-locality here and the community mostly works as labourers in brick-kilns and 
in jute fields, or is engaged as labourers in sand dredging.’124 Information like the 
above also suggests that these so-called low-castes rarely ‘own’ land. Land 
ownership in Hindu society has mostly been held by the elite castes. The lower castes 
and, over the years, the indigenous population (including the tribes), have been 
engaged in these lands as labourers. Though some of these castes have gradually 
prospered and also own land, eventually, it is still the Hindu upper castes who 
maintain monopoly. The lower the position of the caste in the social ladder, the rarer 
is their possibility of owning land. Minu Bagdi confirms the trend when she says, 
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‘this is a tribal village and our main occupation is agriculture. Most of us are 
agricultural labourers and there are very few land owners’.125 Apart from informing 
us that the SC/ST-S are primarily engaged as agricultural labourers or as labourers in 
factories, Ranjit also added that the SC/ST-s hardly own any land and mainly work 
as agricultural labourers. In fact, ‘the largest numbers of labourers are sourced from 
these (SC/ST) communities,’ he says.126 Md. Riyaz Mondol confirmed this response 
when he said that ‘the main occupation of the SC/ST is to be engaged as agricultural 
labourers. They rarely own land.’127  
In terms of illegal livelihood practices, it is, again, the Namasudra refugees along the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border who are the most vulnerable. The connections, 
though not spelt out, are nevertheless clear. Since the caste profile of the migrants 
settled along this border is predominantly Namasudra and tribal, responses like 
‘most of the smugglers originate from the refugees who have settled near the 
border’,128 indicate an unstated yet clear association between the migrant Namasudra 
refugees and illegal cross-border practices. ‘The main reason why the refugees take 
to illegal practices is to make money as fast as possible. They have left the last bit of 
their possessions in Bangladesh and, so, are in urgent need of money. While labour-
work fetches them about Rs.150 a day, smuggling fetches them about Rs.300. So 
smuggling is a better and faster way of earning for these refugees,’129 says a BSF 
border guard. These responses are clear indications of the vulnerability of the border 
people with regard to any sort of tags imposed by the state—the Namasudra 
community constituting the major portion of the former.  
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iii. Festivities 
The border areas witness festivals which are exclusive to the various indigenous 
castes and tribes, apart from the usual Hindu religious festivities, such as Durga Puja, 
Kali Puja,130  etc. Sarai is one such festival of the indigenous tribal population 
(Adivasi) held during each full-moon, where a clay idol of a certain deity is made for 
the purpose of the ritual and the tribal population sings and dances in praise of the 
deity.131   
Minu Bagdi informs us that the relation between the tribal population and the 
Bangalis (‘Bengalis’—implying the higher Hindu castes) is cordial. ‘The Bangalis 
come to our parab (festivity) but not during the actual puja (ritual). They come to 
our homes and eat from our hands,’ is how the cordiality is defined by Minu, a 
woman farmer belonging to one of the scheduled castes at Mathurapur village of Hili, 
the border Land Port between West Bengal and Bangladesh.132 
Hare Krishna Mondol also explains another such festivity in a village dominated by 
the Mahatos, Mondols and Sardars: ‘They speak shadri dialect, practice sarna 
religion and worship the branch of Pakor tree. They consume Hariya (a locally-
brewed alcohol) in every festivity, slaughter poultry and goat during Goyal puja.’133 
These people have their origin in Bihar’s Chota Nagpur region from where they were 
brought to Char Meghna by the British planters as labourers in indigo plantations, 
says Hare Krishna.134  
Rupali Mahato talks of Hari Naam Jogya— a 3-day festival of chanting the praises 
of the deity, which is a yearly ritual observed by the scheduled castes concentrated in 
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a village in Char Meghna.135 Or as Binoy Pramanik of Teipur, Nadia district, says, 
‘The SCs observe the Manasa Puja here.’136  
The Tusu festival in Char Meghna is yet another example of such a tribal festival. It 
is a month-long celebration by women belonging mostly to the Kudumi tribe, who 
gather every evening over a month at a particular place in the village and sing verses 
dedicated to a girl named Tusu. Myth has it that a girl named Tusu belonging to a 
Kudumi tribe in Mayurbhanj (present day Jharkhand district in India and a 
neighbouring province of West Bengal) was abducted by Muslim invaders sometime 
in the 18th century. The Kudumis along with the Santhals (another tribe) protested 
against the incident and placed it before the Nawab of Bengal. The Nawab punished 
the abductors and returned Tusu to her family and tribe. Though Tusu, unable to bear 
the shame of being abducted, ended her life, the spirit of protest has ever since been 
celebrated by the tribal people through the Tusu festival, where hymns dedicated to 
Tusu and her struggle for dignity are sung for a month.137 Such customs indicate the 
spirit of resistance among the indigenous people. Apart from confirming the 
migration paradigm of the tribes from other parts of India to what is now the border 
area, the Tusu festival is also indicative of a tradition of resistance posed by these 
indigenous populations against elite domination. Be it the Namasudra movement 
against the Hindu elites, the Marichjhapi narrative or the Matua narrative vis-à-vis 
the dominant political structure in West Bengal, challenging the hierarchy has always 
been their means of making themselves heard.  
In many of these border villages, festivals and rituals of the tribal population are the 
major festivals, if not the only ones. This has largely to do with the high expenditure 
of the Hindu festivals like Durga or Kali Puja, unlike tribal festivities which depend 
more on physical participation (singing, dancing, chanting hymns). Responses 
confirming the predominance of tribal festivities and the rarity of Hindu festivals 
have been recorded in many of the border villages. ‘In this village, the number of 
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Adivasis is more and it is the Adivasis who have most of the big festivities,’ says 
Nikhil Bagdi.138  
The issue of the collection of funds required for organising Hindu festivals like 
Durga Puja is common in many of these villages, indicating the numerical weakness 
of the Hindu higher castes in these predominantly tribal border villages. The few 
Hindu families find it difficult to gather the required funds for organising such 
festivals. ‘We do organise Durga Puja, but not everyone readily gives funds. So we 
have to organise it on a small scale,’ laments Parbati Mohanto.139 In fact, Rupali 
Mahato, while narrating the Hari Naam Jogya ritual, also adds that it is the only 
major festival held in that area since the Hindus are unable to organise Durga Puja  
due to lack of funds. ‘At best they (Hindus) organise Lakshmi Puja140 on a small 
scale, without a pandal, 141  with the limited funds that they are able to collect 
sometimes,’142 she says.  
In the context of festivities along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, a religious 
aspect is also noticeable in the interaction between the border civilians and the border 
guards, apart from the religious aspect of caste-based interactions between the 
civilians themselves discussed so far. Almost all the BSF camps on the West Bengal 
border have small temples/shrines of either Kali or Shiva.143 Over the years, this has 
become a usual occurrence in the BSF camps of the West Bengal border. Religious 
festivals are often celebrated in these small temples within the BSF camps with much 
grandeur where, in some cases, the civilians are allowed to participate (in terms of 
distribution of Prasad144 to locals, participation in the rituals, etc.). At one level, this 
seems a good platform for bonding initiatives on the part of the border guards. At the 
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same time, the religious allusion is more than overwhelming. As it is, religious 
symbols, in any form, should be avoided in any official establishment, which 
includes the defence forces and, thus, the BSF. Moreover, a large portion of the 
border civilians along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border is Muslim. The threat of 
persecution that the civilians consistently deal with is further accentuated by the 
strong presence of the religious overtone amongst the majority of the BSF forces. 
Muslim religious festivals like Eid are celebrated mostly by the locals, and rarely, if 
ever, by BSF initiatives. The few Muslim officials within the BSF battalions observe 
their rituals by themselves (for example, observing the Namaaz) but rarely are 
Muslim religious festivals organised by camp officials on a scale like Hindu festivals 
such as Kali Puja.  
Religion does not evoke sweet memories for the people of undivided Bengal who 
saw the worst form of religious fanaticism during the creation of this border. Ever 
since the partition, religion has been a sensitive issue with the people of both India as 
well as Bangladesh. The complex nature of the mixed religious population on either 
side of the border has made the situation all the more complicated. The 
overwhelming presence of a religious undertone in the camps of the border guards 
adds to the complexity.  In some border areas, such religious festivals in the camps 
are the only initiatives taken by the border guards to involve the locals, as Kuddus 
Rahman points out: ‘The BSF does not otherwise talk to us or enquire about our 
well-being. The only programme that they organise is the Kali Puja inside the camp 
and no other cultural programmes. They enjoy the Puja by themselves and do not 
encourage the entry of local people’, 145  which Nikhil phrases as ‘their (BSF’s) 
personal Puja’,146 Or as Binoy Pramanik points out more clearly, ‘apart from the 
Independence Day celebration in the areas, the only other programme that the BSF 
organise is the Kali Puja within the camp premises. They ask the Hindu community 
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of the area to participate in the Puja.’147 A complex web of patriotism and religious 
affiliation is, thus, at play in the relations between the border civilians and the border 
guards along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.  
iv. Recognition of caste status 
Many of the people belonging to scheduled castes and tribes in a number of areas on 
the border are yet to receive the formal document/certificate from the government of 
India confirming their caste/tribe status. Complaints regarding the negligence of the 
government towards these people as reasons behind their marginal existences at the 
border have been common in the responses. The officials responsible for pursuing 
the official procedures for the certificates to be formally passed and handed over to 
the people keep delaying the process. ‘Most of us here are ST. We are the indigenous 
people of this place. But most of us do not have the certificates because one or the 
other official, who are supposed to sign the papers, is unavailable. If the MLA signs, 
the BDO (Block Development Officer) delays; if the BDO does it, the Panchayat 
Pradhan does not. This means that we, in Karimpur, are yet to receive our 
certificates, while the rest of Nadia have got theirs. The certificate would have helped 
our cause,’ complains Sabitri Mahato.148  
Hare Krishna Mondol is more vehement about this issue when he talks of a 
movement that has been initiated for pursuing the cause of the issue of certificates to 
the people of Char Meghna, almost all of whom belong to the scheduled tribes:  ‘The 
whole population of this village is ST but are yet to receive their certificates. There is 
an on-going movement regarding this issue. Everyone else in the other parts of the 
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district has got their certificates except for this char.’149   In spite of having the 
required proof of their caste/tribe identity (documents issued by the British 
administrators or even local zamindars to their ancestors with regard to their service 
as labourers), these indigenous people are unable to get an official recognition of 
their caste/tribe status from the government of India.  
Bijoy Mondol assumes that political complexities are the reasons for this situation 
where co-ordination between the officials responsible for the processing of these 
certificates is driven by political compulsions. ‘We, still, have not been able to get 
our certificates, in spite of having all the documents. I have visited the Writer’s 
Building (the administrative office in Kolkata from where the West Bengal 
government functions) many times, but the SDO (Sub-Divisional Officer) is not co-
operating. Now that there has been a change in the ruling party, chances have only 
reduced,’ says a visibly-anxious Bijoy.150  
Narendranath Ghosh, the MLA from Karimpur, in an effort to explain the situation, 
points to the confusion in some of the circumstances where the tribes complain of 
negligence: ‘The complaint that official negligence is responsible for delay in issuing 
the certificates is not entirely true.  There is a confusion regarding their caste and 
tribe status. Sometimes they may apply for a ST certificate while, in reality, they may 
be SC. There are debates regarding this issue. Judging their status merely from their 
surnames is not enough. Though their festivities and rituals indicate their tribal status, 
but the official process requires more verification.’151 
This delay in providing the certificates to these people is somewhat of a conscious 
negligence on the part of the government and has largely to do with the issue of 
illegal infiltration. The issue of illegal migrants crossing the borders from 
Bangladesh into West Bengal has an impact on the decisions of the officials when it 
comes to recognition of any kind of identity of the people living along the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border. Ways of dealing with this crisis vary circumstantially. 
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Whether it is the violence against the low-castes in Marichjhapi, or the attempt to 
make use of a politically empowered low-caste organisation (Matuas) or whether it is 
the dilemma and delay in recognising the caste/tribe status of a community, the 
discomfort of the state regarding the border people has always been manifest in the 
various interactions between them. If violence and delay in recognition is one part of 
the trajectory, then issuing fraudulent voter and ration cards to illegal migrants for 
electoral purposes is another integral part.152 The tightrope walk between legality and 
illegality, between being a rightful citizen and an illegal infiltrator, therefore, 
becomes part of the survival trajectories of the people along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border.  
 
V. Conclusion  
Along the length of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, the presence of low-castes 
and tribes among the border civilians is too visible to be denied. Not surprisingly, it 
is these border civilians who face the vulnerabilities associated with living in the 
border areas—being labelled as ‘infiltrators’ is an example. The exercise of the 
sovereign power of the state at the border is manifested through the border guards, 
fences and surveillance mechanisms.  It is the border civilians who negotiate the 
reality of the state’s presence every day. While this is one aspect of the border 
narrative, using the border for a better living is another equally undeniable aspect. 
Various patterns of negotiation between the border civilians and the state have, thus, 
evolved where the socio-political and ethno-religious identities of the people have 
been modified and redefined to suit their survival needs. The same people who are at 
the receiving end of the wielding of the state’s power are also the ones who make use 
of their social and territorial marginality. The narratives of the border people along 
the West Bengal-Bangladesh border make a very pertinent study with reference to 
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this claim. And more so, because it is on this border(ed) space that the border people 
trade caste and ethno-religious identities simultaneously.  
The history of the Namasudra movement in Bengal testifies to an interesting feature 
of this community—that of demonstrating features of caste and ethno-religious 
consciousness at the same time. Even when the Namasudras were striving to create a 
caste identity for themselves with regard to empowering themselves in the field of 
electoral politics (non-participation in the nationalist movements being their chosen 
form of resistance), they were also seen to participate, with much vigour, in class-
based movements like the Tebhaga movement, under the Communist-dominated 
Kisan Sabha leadership and the religion-based movements of the Hindu Mahasabha, 
in and around 1946-‘47. 153    The shift from caste-based alliances to class and 
religious affiliations, or rather the simultaneous negotiation between caste, class and 
religious identities of the lower caste communities, is what is still manifested along 
the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. The clash between ethno-religious sensibilities 
and border realities is an obvious outcome.154 
i. Effect of the border on caste and ethno-religious aspects 
The interaction between the state and its marginal inhabitants has never been easy. 
The social, religious, gendered or geographical marginality of a people brings it into 
conflict with statist agendas of appropriation, either through non-recognition of their 
citizenship status (SC/STs of border villages and enclave residents are examples) or 
through a forceful appropriation of their identities. The borders, as a state’s territorial 
delimitation, are spaces where the sovereign power of the state is the most visibly 
realised and embodied in the border guards, fences and surveillance mechanisms. 
Therefore, the activities, movements and perceptions of the border people become 
issues of concern to the state. The identities of the border civilians become decisive 
in the tactics and policies adopted by the state in securing and sanctifying its borders. 
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Ethno-religious and caste identities are some of the aspects which become integral to 
the narrative of negotiation between the border civilians and the states concerned. 
The West Bengal-Bangladesh border is an important study in the understanding of 
the nature of such negotiations.   
The creation of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border has had a direct effect on the 
profile of the border people along it. As a natural culmination of the partition and 
refugee movement, the Namasudras have become the predominant caste along the 
border. As outcastes, they not just represent the border space but also redefine and 
re-appropriate it. The Marichjhapi incident, the Matua trajectory and the 
predominance of Namsudras in the livelihood practices and festivities along the 
border are examples of such representation and re-appropriation.  
The ethno-religious aspects of the identities of the border people have, since partition, 
been integral to border narratives, albeit in different intensities, forms and contexts. 
Religion as a basis for partition had an immediate effect on the partitioned people in 
terms of their movements across the border to settle in states of their choice. 
Gradually, the overwhelming reality of surviving the border united the people living 
along it, across religion or other socio-economic identities. Yet ethno-religious issues 
and narratives were not completely lost, as is evident from various border narratives. 
Be it the radicalisation of an event (the involvement of Hindu Bengali radical groups 
in the Marichjhapi event), be it through empowering a caste-based sect into a 
political force (the projection of Matuas as a religious sect), or be it the nature of 
festivities along the border (the predominance of tribal festivities over Hindu 
religious festivals; the presence of Hindu shrines in the camps of the border guards), 
ethno-religious narratives have existed all along, albeit in a latent form, in the 
creation of border narratives along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.  
The uniqueness of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border lies in its uniqueness of 
concentration of Namasudra castes along its entire length and on both its sides. On 
the Bangladesh side, the aspect of lower caste fails to become visible because of the 
religious factor, in spite of a major portion of the Bangladeshi border civilians 
sharing a similar caste (mostly Namasudra) with their counterparts across the border.  
On the Bangladesh border, religious identity takes over caste identity. But on the 
West Bengal side, caste identities are an unpronounced but overwhelming presence 
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in the profile of the people. This also explains the pattern of responses from the 
interviewees in terms of religious or caste identities on the West Bengal border. In 
instances where Hindu villages are surrounded by Muslim villages on the West 
Bengal border, the presence of caste identities within them are overshadowed by the 
religious aspect of their existence. ‘We are surrounded by a Muslim village’155  is the 
kind of usual response in such cases. At other times, when two or more 
predominantly Hindu villages exist side by side, issues of castes appear in the 
responses (Das para, Mondol para, Bagdi para, etc.).156 Thus, religious and caste 
identities decide the creation of the ‘Other’ for the border people.   
ii. Uniqueness of caste and ethno-religious narratives along the West Bengal 
Border 
Caste and ethno-religious aspects in the negotiation between a state and its people are 
not unique to the West Bengal border and, in fact, are a widespread occurrence in 
other parts of India and Bangladesh. Yet the uniqueness of caste and ethno-religious 
questions along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border is manifested in the effect that 
this border has on such narratives. It is the reality of the border that moulds and 
reshapes certain aspects of these narratives to make them spatially unique, by tying 
them to the specificity of the border milieu. The Marichjhapi event, including the 
involvement of radical ethno-religious groups, the political empowerment of the 
Matuas using their spatial identity and cross-border ties, and the overwhelming 
presence of Namasudra culture and involvement in the border milieu, are indications 
of such unique border narratives along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.   
The caste and ethno-religious profile of the people on both sides of this border also 
make the narrative unique when compared to the other Indian or Bangladeshi borders. 
A mix of religious communities, similar ethnic composition, language and culture on 
both sides of the border not just make this border unique but also, in many ways, 
weaken the purpose of its existence—as a line of separation and containment. The 
links, movements and exchange patterns across the border are largely based on such 
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caste and ethno-religious links and are, perhaps, what contests the unquestionable 
sovereign power that the states of India and Bangladesh attempt to wield along it.  
iii. Border as thirdspace 
Caste and ethno-religious narratives of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border are some 
of the better examples of the conflict between the conceived and perceived notions of 
the border people and the state regarding the border space. Creation of the 
thirdspace157 finds resonance in caste and ethno-religious narratives—as voices of 
the ‘subaltern counter-publics’, 158   and offers a logic ‘which goes against the 
convention of rational either/or choices’.159 The simultaneous presence of caste and 
ethno-religious aspects in the border narratives are indications of that logic. The ‘hot 
margins’ of this thirdspace, as exhibited by the dynamics of the caste factor along the 
border, exhibits a solidarity—whether it is forced by the urgency of the situation 
(Marichjhapi) or organised as a sectarian force (Matuas). The sense of solidarity is as 
pronounced in the responses of the other border inhabitants across caste, even if they 
themselves are unaware of this unorganised solidarity. Solidarity over a spatial 
question and in the practice of subalternity ‘becomes the fundamental language of 
political action against hegemonic languages’.160 The Marichjhapi event, the Matuas 
or the caste-based livelihood practices and festivities along the border are such 
subaltern practices in being alternative ways of gaining access to resources otherwise 
denied by the state.  
Caste and ethno-religious subaltern narratives, like the ones discussed above, also 
indicate ‘an accommodation with the structure of domination’,161  much like the 
livelihood practices and enclave narratives along this border.162 The narratives are 
not directly intended towards a refusal or denial of the framework of the state but 
rather towards accommodating their own survival needs within the dominant 
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structures. The striving for recognition as citizens by the Marichjhapi refugees, the 
engaging in electoral politics of the state by the Matuas or the striving to survive 
within the structures of the state machinery at the borders are indications of such 
accommodations.  What, nevertheless, makes these narratives unique are the ways 
the civilians re-interpret and redefine the space of the borderland to suit their survival 
needs. In the process, alternative ideas and techniques of gaining access to resources 
are reproduced by the border civilians.  
iv. Border consciousness 
Years of production of such subaltern narratives along the border crystallise into a 
pattern of consciousness among the people living and surviving the border every 
day—a consciousness that has been termed here as a border consciousness. A spatial 
feature is what constitutes this border consciousness where the reality of the border is 
recurrent in all the activities, perceptions and negotiations between the border people 
themselves, and between the border people and the border guards on both sides of the 
border, although in varying forms.  
The border inhabitant ‘is a figure of enormous potential, as her multiplicity allows a 
new kind of consciousness to emerge’163  —a consciousness that ‘moves beyond the 
binary relationships and dichotomies that characterise traditional modes of 
thought’.164 The Marichjhapi refugees, the Matuas and the various other lower castes 
trading their border(ed)-status— whether as passive victims or as active 
perpetrators— subvert the predominant statist definitions of such binaries  as centre-
periphery, us-them or legal-illegal.  
Border consciousness as a form of subaltern consciousness is also characterised by a 
‘common sense’,165 constituted of two, often contradictory, types of consciousness—
the one which has been imbibed from the past and the other which is the real ‘lived’ 
circumstance. 166 This is what makes subaltern consciousness ‘an ambiguous, 
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contradictory and multiform concept’167—features which also characterise the border 
consciousness. The imbibed history of culture (including caste and ethno-religious 
identities) clash with the lived realities of nation-building (creation of the border) and 
drive the people to absorb ‘new ideas, new techniques, new ways of living, which 
constantly modifies and enriches common sense by adapting to new conditions of 
life and work’. 168  Caste and ethno-religious narratives along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border discussed so far are the manifestations of such adaptations.  
The Marichjhapi narratives, Matua narratives or the concentration of caste-based 
villages and livelihoods along this border are also examples of micro-level spatial 
consciousness in themselves, where the concentration of a specific community over a 
space and the appropriation of the space by the community can be said to have 
crystallised into a unique spatial psyche or consciousness—manifested through 
diverse social, political, economic and religious narratives. Yet the spatial uniqueness 
of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border has engulfed these micro-level spatial 
consciousness into its fold and has modified the smaller narratives into the larger 
framework of border consciousness—a spatial consciousness characterised by the 
overwhelming presence of the border.  
This chapter provides yet another building block towards the construction of the 
thesis that aims to study the evolution of border consciousness manifested through 
the various strands of border narratives. The chapter analyses how caste and ethno-
religious narratives converge at the border to produce the complex fabric of border 
consciousness and, thus, contributes towards the understanding of the border psyche 
along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.  
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Gender Narratives along the West Bengal-Bangladesh Border  
 
I. Introduction 
This chapter aims to look at various forms of interaction between the civilian border 
people and the state personnel, represented by the border guards along the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border in the context of gendered practices. The interaction 
between the male, female and other gendered categories of civilians, and the largely 
male border guards, throws light on certain gendered aspects, which are both 
physical and social in nature. These gendered narratives attain a unique nature in the 
backdrop of their spatial specificity of being border narratives. A few aspects of 
these gendered narratives have been discussed in the previous chapters. This chapter 
aims to analyse, in-depth, some more of these gendered border narratives along the 
stipulated border.  
Borderlands between two states are the space where the presence of the latter’s 
sovereign power is most strongly felt. Border fences, border guards and various 
surveillance mechanisms deployed by the respective states are the visible 
manifestations of this power machinery.1  Negotiating these is integral to the daily 
lives of the people who live and work along the border. Interaction with the border 
guards are a fundamental aspect of these negotiations, be it in terms of movement 
(from one border area to another or across the border), pursuing a livelihood or 
organising and participating in socio-cultural engagements.2 A close observation of 
this interaction suggests a clear gendered aspect to it, which, otherwise, may seem a 
simple civilian vs. state narrative. The nature of interaction between the largely male 
border guards, on the one hand, and the male civilians, female civilians and 
transgendered civilians, on the other, depends both on the physical as well as the 
social aspect of gendered discourses. Likewise, the nature of interaction between 
these categories of people varies according to the particular gender context at a given 
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time. The overwhelming presence of the spatial specificity of the borderland is hard 
to miss in the production of the narratives which follow such gendered interactions.  
Gendered interaction between the state and the civilian is not uncommon in other, 
non-border parts of India. However, the kind of interaction seen along the said border 
exhibit certain features which are unique to border areas, and often specific to the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border.    
This chapter proposes to establish that the spatial marginality of the borderland 
affects social constructs, such as gender, to form a larger spatial narrative. This 
narrative is characterised by the overwhelming presence of the borderland milieu in 
the responses of both the civilians and border guards. It also proposes to establish the 
fact that gendered border narratives contribute towards the shaping of border 
consciousness.  
The complex nature of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, in terms of its planning 
and execution, ethnic and religious composition, economic structure and social set-
up, has been studied by scholars. 3  Trying to understand the nexus between the 
civilian population and the border guards in the light of gender relations has been one 
of the more common aspects of such studies.4 An overview of these studies brings 
out two very visible aspects of gender relations on this border: 
1) The physical abuse of women civilians by the male border guards. 
2) The physical violence perpetrated by the border guards on the male civilians.  
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While the first aspect has been studied more in terms of sexual violation or gendered 
abuse, the latter has been seen as acts of human rights violation.5 While these studies 
do, in fact, bring out the more blatant features of gender relations on this border, they 
overlook the finer nuances of such relations. A closer look at the various ways of 
interaction between the border guards and the civilians brings out the complex nature 
of gender narratives that the West Bengal-Bangladesh border produces. The 
condition of women at this border is no different to many other backward areas in 
India, especially some of the more isolated rural areas.6 But what makes the lives of 
women living along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border doubly miserable is the 
spatial aspect of their existence, i.e. their bordered lives.  
 
II. Education 
The literacy rates of the districts of West Bengal suggest that some of the lowest, as 
per the Census of India 2011, have been recorded in the border districts,7 though the 
overall literacy rates among Indian women has seen a rise in the last decade.8 The 
2001 Census reveals that the literacy rate among rural women in West Bengal, 
53.16%, is much below that of rural men (73.13%), urban women (75.74%) and 
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urban men (86.13%).9 The border areas of West Bengal constitute a substantial part 
of these rural areas, apart from the non-border rural ones, and, thus, contribute 
towards the general backwardness in literacy rates, especially that of women.10   
Various border regulations laid down by the government of India, including 
restrictions on movement near the fence, use of the border road by the civilians 
especially in times of emergency, use of the fence gates, and restrictions on the 
gathering of more than five persons at a time near the fence after 5PM, coupled with 
a sense of insecurity brought about by the sensitized ambience of the border, has had 
a direct effect on the literacy rate of people living along the border. Women are 
doubly affected—for being border inhabitants and for being women.11 
Anxiety over the safety of girls associated with travelling along the border areas on 
their way to educational institutions is an obstacle to education. The lack of higher 
educational institutions near the border implies that those wanting to pursue higher 
education have to travel to the nearest towns or cities (the average distance being 
anything between 12/13 kilometres12 to 24/25 kilometres13) for this purpose. The 
decreasing rate of education in the higher schools and colleges in the border areas, 
compared to that of primary education14 explains how travelling distances in the 
border areas poses a threat to the people. For women of the border areas, the anxiety 
is doubled, given the chances of physical/sexual abuse by other male civilians and/or 
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border guards.15  This explains why most of the girls in these areas are married off 
right after school and instances of girls pursuing higher education are negligible.16  
The condition of male education in the border areas seems comparatively better, 
given the higher number of male border residents travelling to higher education 
institutions at distant places.17  But the persistent fear of persecution looms large 
among the male border civilians in response to my questions regarding travelling to 
distant places for education. Moreover, the lack of employment opportunities, on the 
one hand, and the lure of fast income through cross-border illegal practices, on the 
other, acts as disincentives to education for many of the boys in the border areas.18  
The recurrent concern among both the male and female respondents regarding 
restrictions on movement in the border areas clearly indicates the mostly negative 
role that the border plays in issues of education among them.  
 
III. Marriage 
The usual age of marriage for girls in the border villages is between 13/1419 (which is 
below the legal age20) and 18/19.21 Anxiety over abuse by border guards is one of the 
main reasons why girls are married off at this young age.22  
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has also been indicative of the general sense of insecurity among the border people and 
specific sense of insecurity among women. The fact that a woman travelling around 
interviewing people in the border areas, unaccompanied by male family members, has 
warranted often unwanted curiosity and warnings from both the civilians and the border 
guards. The risk of ‘travelling around in the border areas and that, too, as a woman’ has been 
conveyed to me numerous times in the course of my field studies.    
16
 Interview with Parbati Mohanto, resident of Dhumron village (South Dinajpur district of 
West Bengal, 25 January 2012).  
17
 Interview with Animesh, resident of Bindol village (North Dinajpur district of West 
Bengal, 26 January 2012).  
18
 Interview with Parbati Mohanto, resident of Dhumron village (South Dinajpur district of 
West Bengal, 25 January 2012). 
19
 Interview with Minu Bagdi, resident of Mathurapur village (South Dinajpur district of 
West Bengal, 24 January 2012) 
20
 The legal age for marriage in India is 18 for females and 21 for males. In 2012, the High 
Court declared that Muslim women could marry at 15. Additionally, the report declared that, 
‘In spite of these legal provisions, child marriage is still widely practiced and a marriage 
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Moreover, girls are not allowed to travel to far-off places by themselves to earn a 
living, except when they are victims of trafficking. Parents prefer them marrying off 
to places, preferably away from the border areas, rather than keeping a non-earning 
family member at home. The demand for dowry23 by the groom’s family from the 
bride’s parents increases automatically if the groom is a resident of a non-border city. 
Thus, it is often not possible for parents/guardians of girls living in the border areas 
to marry them away from the border into cities or towns because of the amount of 
dowry demanded. Those who can afford it try their best to send their daughters off to 
cities even if that means an expenditure of almost their entire life’s savings.24  
Interestingly, a common response of the male civilians living along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border with regard to marriage is that it is difficult to get women from 
non-border areas to marry into a family living in a border village.25  This has been a 
pressing issue for male civilians on this border since they are unable to marry girls 
from non-border areas, even if they themselves earn well and the other customary 
requirements for arranged marriages are met.26 Prospective brides realise the difficult 
life that they will be thrust into after marriage, so they reject the proposal.27 Incidents 
                                                                                                                           
solemnized in contravention of these provisions is not void even under the new PCMA, 1929, 
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and also under the Muslim Law’. Source: 
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report205.pdf. 
21
 Interview with Riazul Mondol, resident of Balurghat (South Dinajpur district of West 
Bengal, 24 January 2012).  
22
 Interview with Parbati Mohanto, resident of Dhumron village (South Dinajpur district of 
West Bengal, 25 January 2012). 
23
 Payment of dowry is now prohibited under the 1961 Dowry Prohibition Act in Indian civil 
law and, subsequently, by Sections 304B and 498a of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Despite 
anti-dowry laws in India, it is still a common illegal practice. 
24
 Interview with Sabitri Mahato, resident of Char Meghna (Nadia district of West Bengal, 
21 October 2011)  
25
 Interview with Gokul, resident of Kalmati village (Cooch Behar district of West Bengal, 
16 March 2012). 
26
 Though girls who are comfortable with their husband’s involvement in illegal livelihood 
practices do marry into the border areas, the general scenario is bleak.  
27
 Interview with Gokul, resident of Kalmati village (Cooch Behar district of West Bengal, 
16 March 2012).  
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of harassment of guests attending marriages in border areas are common, according 
to the interviewees.28  
The West Bengal-Bangladesh border used to be a porous one where civilians on 
either side could move uninhibitedly before the border fences were constructed (from 
1986 onwards).29 In fact, marriages across the borders, though illegal because of 
citizenship differences and visa requirements, were common occurrences before the 
fencing.30 Sometimes even the border guards would know of these events but would 
hardly ever interfere, as long as they did not pose security risks. These marriages 
would have been merely inter-village events before the border was created in 1947.  
Such age-old practices die hard, even if international borders emerge abruptly for 
political reasons. Generations take time to realise the unfeasibility of the age-old 
practice of inter-village marriage in the context of the sensitivity of border zone. 
Likewise, the reality of the border between West Bengal and Bangladesh, made 
visible by the fences, gradually seeped into the lives of the border residents. 
Eventually, inter-village marriages reduced in number, given the risk associated with 
cross-border movements across the fences, till they almost ceased to exist.31  
Experiences of organising the marriage ceremonies of the civilians of the Indian ghoj 
shed light on the complications which the fencing has created. The residents of 
Daulatpur ghoj32 narrate their experiences of organising marriage ceremonies. Most 
of the girls from this Indian pocket are married to Bangladeshi villages around it. The 
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 A bus carrying a bride’s family and relatives was stopped at a BSF check-post on its way 
to a border village in Nadia (West Bengal), where it had to remain for the night, and was 
allowed entry into the village and, subsequently, to the groom’s house only the next morning. 
Interview with Prasanta Mondol, resident of Char Meghna (Nadia district of West Bengal, 21 
October 2011).  
29
 Interview with Sabitri Mahato, resident of Char Meghna (Nadia district of West Bengal, 
21 October 2011); fencing details—discussed in the Introduction; for further details of 
sanctioned and completed border fences, see http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/BM_MAN-IN-
BANG(E).pdf.  
30
 Interview with Bikram, resident of Lakshmidari village, Bhomra (Satkhira district of 
Bangladesh, 12 February 2012).  
31
 Interview with Bikram, resident of Lakshmidari village, Bhomra (Satkhira district of 
Bangladesh, 12 February 2012); italics—my own, to highlight the fact that cross-border 
marriages have not completely ceased to exist. They still occur, though illegally.  
32
 Belonging to North 24 Parganas district of West Bengal but surrounded on three sides by 
the Jessore district of Bangladesh.  
 229
official complications associated with marrying these Indian girls into Indian villages 
across the fence result in them preferring to marry into the Bangladeshi villages 
around them for easy access as well as because of already-existing acquaintances.33 
If a marriage has to be organised across the fence, the BSF officials must be 
informed beforehand. They then inform their seniors. The senior officials verify the 
information provided about the groom’s or bride’s family. Only if they are satisfied 
do they allow the groom’s relatives to come into the pocket.34 This explains the 
practice of marrying Indian girls from these pockets into Bangladeshi villages, 
although the hassle over citizenship status does not end there. These Indian girls, thus 
married into Bangladeshi villages, have to face the hassles of obtaining Bangladeshi 
citizenship. The means of obtaining the citizenship is, often, illegal since it involves 
cross-border marriages and, hence, involves complicated official procedures for 
obtaining legal citizenship.35   
The very definition of a cross-border marriage has changed after the construction of 
the fence. Bijon, a journalist in Jessore (Bangladesh), clearly states that cross-border 
marriages nowadays only indicate a cross-border smuggling network. Those in 
search of a foothold on the other side of the border for the purpose of expanding their 
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 With no border guards’ outposts between this Indian ghoj and the surrounding 
Bangladeshi territory, movement between the ghoj and Bangladesh is easier than accessing 
the Indian mainland due to the BSF outpost at its entrance.  
34
 Interview with Asha, resident of Daulatpur village belonging to North 24 Parganas of 
West Bengal and located in Chougachha, Jessore district of Bangladesh (16 February 2012). 
I accessed the ghoj from the Bangladesh side of the border, having travelled through the 
Jessore district to reach this Indian pocket. This means I crossed the border without much 
fuss from Bangladesh to an Indian village inside the ghoj. I was driven from the Jessore town 
through the surrounding areas of the ghoj and we parked our car outside the ghoj. I walked 
inside the ghoj, interviewed its residents and was also shown the geographical specificities of 
the gho by themj. The Indian territory (of which the ghoj was a part) could be seen across the 
farmland, at the entry to which was a BSF outpost. Starting from the outpost, a narrow 
stretch of land extended towards the ghoj till it widened to become the ghoj surrounded by 
Bangladeshi territory (creating a chicken’s neck formation). But there was no BSF or BGB 
outpost on the other side of the ghoj where it was surrounded by Bangladeshi territory, 
which made it possible for me to enter it from the Bangladesh side without any obstacle. The 
ghoj extended into the Bangladeshi territory in such a way that a single courtyard was 
divided into the Bangladeshi territory, on one side, and the Indian territory, on the other. The 
two sets of huts facing each other belonged to two different states.  
35
 Interview with Asha, resident of Daulatpur village belonging to North 24 Parganas of 
West Bengal (Chougachha, Jessore district of Bangladesh, 16 February 2012).  
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smuggling network marry across it. In fact, a groom’s prospects are measured in such 
terms, where living near the border indicates that he is earning well through cross-
border smuggling networks.36  
There are huge mansions near the border areas mostly belonging to those involved in 
smuggling networks.37 The fact that a man lives near the border and owns some 
property indicates that he is economically well-off. 38  It is these men who are 
prospective grooms for many families. This is especially true of the Land Port of the 
Petrapole-Benapole border between the Jessore district in Bangladesh and the North 
24 Parganas of West Bengal— a border that thrives as much on smuggling networks 
as it does on legal trading. A feature like ‘the boy lives in Benapole’ doubles the 
prospect of the groom instantly, says Bijon with a meaningful smile39.  
The issue of dowry is closely related to the reality of the border.  The Indian custom 
is that the bride’s family gives dowry to the groom’s. Yet, as most of the male 
respondents in the border villages complain, it is often the groom who has to give 
dowry to the prospective bride’s family for them to give their daughters in marriage. 
This, as the tone of the male respondents suggested, was an embarrassing situation 
for them. While the responses from the women pertain more to the issue of 
affordability (brides have to pay huge dowries for convincing non-border dwellers to 
marry them), the issue of dowry is more a matter of embarrassment and insult rather 
than affordability, when it comes to the male respondents.40 The fact that the groom 
‘fails to’ find himself a bride ‘even after earning a handsome living’ is a matter of 
serious concern for the men.41 ‘The very word “border” evokes a Bangladesh-like 
feeling and indicates a distanced existence from the Indian mainland,’ is how Bilal, a 
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 Interview with Bijon, resident and journalist with a Bengali daily in the Jessore town 
(Jessore district of Bangladesh, 16 February 2012).  
37
 Interview with Ujjal Ghosh, resident of Bongaon (North 24 Parganas district of West 
Bengal, 20 September 2011).  
38
 Interview with Bijon, journalist with a Bengali daily in Jessore town, (Jessore district of 




 Interview with Hare Krishna Mondol, resident of Char Meghna (Nadia district of West 
Bengal, 21 October 2011).  
41
 Hossain, A. (19 May 2010) Brides wanted: across the fence. The Telegraph. [Online] 
Available from: http://www.telegraphindia.com/archives/archive.html. [Last accessed: 11 
September 2013].  
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prospective groom, phrases it.42 Some of the male respondents choose to stay with 
their in-laws (a custom observed by the brides after their marriage in most parts of 
India) in non-border areas even at the risk of it being labelled ‘unmanly’ behaviour, 
since their wives cannot be made to stay in the border villages.43 Finding better 
livelihood opportunities is also cited as a reason for this step.44  
 
Plate 30. Women from India and Bangladesh at a border river. India’s border fence 
is to the left. The bank on the right is Bangladeshi territory, 2012.  
  
                                            
42
 Interview with Bilal, resident of Basirhat (North 24 Parganas district of West Bengal, 17 
January 2012).  
43
 In the Indian culture and marriage custom, it is considered ‘unmanly’ and shameful for 
men to stay with their in-laws after marriage, other than visits of a few days.  
44
 Interview with Md. Kamal Hussein, resident of a Bangladeshi Enclave in India (Cooch 
Behar district of West Bengal, 17 March 2012); the lack employment opportunities in the 
border areas have been discussed in Chapter 1.   
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IV. Migration and Trafficking 
Almost all the leading newspapers and reports prepared by human rights 
organisations in West Bengal and Bangladesh report incidents of illegal border-
crossings along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.45  The focus of attention in 
newspaper reports mostly pertains to issues of economy and security for the states 
concerned. Issues of physical abuse also find mention, especially in the reports of 
human rights organisations. Yet the reports hardly highlight the gendered nature of 
such abuse—both for the male and female border crossers.  
The partition of Bengal in 1947 was marked by a refugee exodus across the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border. Thousands of refugees, both men and women, migrated 
from one side to the other of the newly-formed West Bengal-East Pakistan (later 
Bangladesh) border. The gender-specific harassment of refugees by border guards 
has, since, been integral to the evolution of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.46 
What started with the partition and the consequent creation of this border continues 
unabated and, in fact, in new forms, all along its length even after six decades of the 
partition.  
The reasons for migration have changed over the years. While political turmoil was 
the main one between 1947 and 1971, the current streams of migrations are mostly a 
result of the lack of livelihood opportunities in the border crosser’s own state and the 
prospects of better living on the other side of the border. 47  Sadly though, the 
treatment meted out to illegal women migrants remains the same.48 For male border 
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 Between October 2009 and December 2012, at least 85 cases of illegal border crossing 
(including infiltration, illegal migration, smuggling and trafficking) have been reported in 
just one Bengali daily, Ananda Bazar Patrika, printed from Kolkata, West Bengal. These 
reports are also reported in other national and regional newspapers of India and West Bengal, 
respectively. Reports of Odhikar, a human rights organisation in Bangladesh, also throw 
extensive light on border crossings along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border 
(www.odhikar.org); some forms and aspects of border-crossings have been discussed in the 
previous chapters.  
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 Menon, R. and Bhasin, K. (1998) Borders and Boundaries. Women in India’s Partition. 
New Delhi: Kali for Women; Butalia, U. (1998) The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the 
Partition of India. New Delhi, London: Penguin; Fraser, B. (2006) Bengal Partition Stories: 
An Unclosed Chapter. (trs. Sheila Sen Gupta). London: Anthem. 
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 Samaddar, 1999, p.61.  
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 Banerjee, and Basu Ray Chaudhury, 2011, p. 31.  
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crossers, firing and/or imprisonment is the usual way of control.49 For women border 
crossers, physical abuse and harassment is the usual path followed by the border 
guards.50  
The physical abuse of male border crossers has lately been seen to attain a gendered 
nature as well. A number of incidents of forced nudity followed by abusive attacks 
on their sexual organs by the border guards have been reported in recent years51— a 
trend rarely seen till about 5 years ago, when the physical abuse of male border 
crossers of such a gendered nature was rare to come across.   
The area which now forms the borderland on either side of the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border reportedly had no incidents of human trafficking before the 
partition of India. Since the partition and the creation of the border, the trafficking of 
women has increased a hundredfold in the last six decades.52 This clearly establishes 
the link between the creation of the border and the emergence of the trafficking of 
women in this area.  
Over the years, trafficking has become rampant all along the border region.53 It has 
evolved into one of those economies which thrive on the existence of borders and 
which have largely contributed to India’s entry into the watch-list of countries 
around the world involved in human trafficking. 54  In most cases of trafficking, 
women are duped or coerced into this trade. Male domination coupled with endemic 
poverty and land alienation results in the large-scale destabilisation and displacement 
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 Reports by Odhikar and Human Rights Watch, as well as newspaper reports from both 
West Bengal and Bangladesh throw light on incidents of firing by border guards on border 
crossers, the majority of whom are male crossers.  
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 Banerjee, and Basu Ray Chaudhury, 2011. p.35.  
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 Staff Reporter (19 January 2012) Pacharkari ke nogno korey prohar, oshontushto 
mukhyamantri. Ananda Bazar Patrika. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.anandabazar.com/archive/1120119/19mur1.html. [Last accessed: 11 September 
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of women in this region. A direct result is an increase in the trafficking of women 
across the borders.55  
Trafficking on this border is almost a one-way flow, i.e. from Bangladesh to India.56 
This largely has to do with India’s stronger economy compared to Bangladesh. 
Women from the Indian side of the border are mostly trafficked internally, i.e. to 
other provinces of India. While the international flow of trafficking from India is 
mostly to the Middle East,57 and rarely to Bangladesh, women from the border areas 
(and also from some of the more interior parts) of Bangladesh are almost always 
trafficked to India, both as an entry point to other international destinations of the 
trade as well as for trafficking within India.58 
Trafficking being a less risky and more profitable business than drug smuggling has 
increased alarmingly every year, giving birth to an organised network of traffickers, 
both at the national and international levels.  The network is spreading at great speed, 
and the border areas between West Bengal and Bangladesh are the most important 
platforms for this network.59 The involvement of some of the public representatives 
and border guards has provided a safe haven for traffickers along this border.60  
The pimps or dalals (in local parlance) allure the women into prospects of better 
living, luxurious lives and often good marriages, following which they are ‘trafficked 
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 Banerjee and Basu Ray Chaudhury, 2011, p.31. 
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 This trend also helps us to understand the nature and flow of certain commodities (women 
are commoditized in the process of trafficking) across the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, 
discussed in Chapter 1.  
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 Anti-Trafficking Programs and Promoting Human Rights: A Grassroots Initiative (2002). 
Sponsored by Royal Danish Embassy. Jessore: Rights Jessore. 
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 According to reports gathered by one of the biggest human rights organisation in 
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at a convenient period with the help and assistance of a section of dishonest members 
of law-enforcing agencies and border guards.’61  
Ironically, it is often a woman who plays the part of actually pinpointing the target in 
the village and initiating the process of trafficking, which includes making 
acquaintance with the target, obtaining her confidence, putting forward future 
prospects of better living/better marriage, and leading her on to the next level of the 
trafficking network. In most case studies, the person to have led the victim into the 
trafficking network has been a woman or a few women, posing as a friend/group of 
friends. For example, Anima, aged 17 years, was led into a network functioning 
around the Hili border (between South Dinajpur in West Bengal and Dinajpur in 
Bangladesh) in December 2011 by a woman who called herself Rina (aged around 
mid-40s, as guessed by Anima). Rina came to the Mathurapur village in Hili (she 
was not a local resident of Hili) and after having decided on her target, established 
friendly relations with Anima. One day, when Anima’s parents (who work as 
agricultural labourers) were away at work, Rina led Anima to the local railway 
station from where they travelled to Delhi in India.  While in Delhi, Anima was kept 
in a house with several other girls, mostly older than her, and made to perform 
domestic work. They were often beaten up for their mistakes. After some days, each 
of them, including Anima, were sent off to other houses to be employed as domestic 
helps. Fortunately, Anima did not have to undergo sexual abuse in this case. On the 
basis of the complaint that her parents had lodged with the police, Anima was 
rescued and brought back to her home by organisations working against trafficking 
in Hili.62  
Nilufer Rahman, a lawyer with the Dinajpur District Court in Bangladesh, narrated 
the case of a woman who was taken to the Khanpur border area in Dinajpur 
(Bangladesh), by a man and was made to establish acquaintance with another man on 
the Indian side of the border with the help of a mobile phone.  She was kept in one of 
the houses in that area, near the border, while the pimp was arranging for her to cross 
over to the other side at an opportune moment. However, the lady of the house where 




 Interview with Minu Bagdi, resident of Mathurapur village, Hili (South Dinajpur district 
of West Bengal, 24 January 2012).  
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she had been kept suspected the plan and informed the police, who then arrested the 
girl as well as the Bangladeshi pimp. The Indian counterpart could not, however, be 
apprehended.63  
Yet another woman, aged 35, was trafficked from a village in Dinajpur (Bangladesh) 
all the way to Rajasthan (western India). The pimp who took her to the Bangladesh 
border was a woman, who claimed to have come from Rajasthan to sell clothing 
accessories. Her Indian counterpart received her at the border and led her to 
Rajasthan. Even after her rescue and return to her village in Bangladesh, the woman 
found it difficult to undo her training in the Rajasthani language and customs, which 
she had acquired during her stay in Rajasthan. She took some time to revive her 
language (Bengali) and lifestyle after her return.64 
In a number of cases, the pimps are locally-known faces and well acquainted with the 
border guards. This is why many of the cross-border trafficking incidents happen in 
the presence of and, in fact, the co-operation of the border guards. The duty timings 
of the border guards are also often utilised by the pimps to cross the border. The 
names and details of the border crossers are noted by a border guard (in cases where 
the border crossers ‘promise’ to return after a visit to their relatives on the other side). 
If the duty of the concerned border guard changes, in the meantime, it often becomes 
difficult for the subsequent guards to verify the details of the crossers who finally 
come back.65   
The festival of Durga Puja is a time when certain points along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border are opened for the public, mostly Bengali Hindus, from 
Bangladesh to cross over to the Indian side to attend the festival and then go back.  
The Hili border at Dinajpur (Bangladesh) is one such site. The details of people 
crossing over for the festivities are often not properly recorded, given the immense 
rush that these occasions create. Such occasions, as Ms. Nilufer Rahman points out, 
are opportune moments for traffickers.66   
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 Interview with Nilufer Rahman (original name), lawyer in Dinajpur District Court 
(Dinajpur district of Bangladesh, 7 October 2011). 
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Disabled children are mostly trafficked for organ transplantation or for begging, or 
even for the sex trade. A huge number of the trafficked Bangladeshi children are 
serving terms in Indian custody. These children are mostly deceived into this 
network by a person promising to take them for a day out. They are mostly 
kidnapped from their schools, especially in border areas like Hili and Jaypurhat, 
which act as easy transit points for traffickers.67  Ms. Rahman narrated a case where 
a group of children had been taken to Rangpur, a Bangladeshi district bordering West 
Bengal, to be trafficked. The children somehow became suspicious of the pimp’s 
motive and started crying. The pimp, for fear of being suspected by the other 
passengers on the bus disappeared, leaving the children behind. The driver of the bus 
took the children to Raniganj from where they were rescued. Some sections of 
borders are ill-reputed for child trafficking, like the Hili border, which supplies 
children to the various shipping docks and other places to be used as child labourers 
and sex workers.68 In some cases, they are used as sex workers by the border guards 
themselves, and the children are often physically abused for disobeying the 
commands of the latter.69   
Reasons ranging from poverty to preference for a son (thus selling the daughter to a 
trafficker for a few thousand rupees), displacement due to natural calamities, 
consumerism (desire for luxury items), unemployment, availability of cheap and 
bonded labour, false adoption, fraud, coercion, kidnapping and deceitful marriages 
are some of the more common ones for trafficking.70 Both men and women are 
trafficked to be used as camel jockeys (mainly boys), for pornography, organ 
transplant, sex tourism, begging and drug trafficking, and as domestic child servants 
and for work in sex parlours and liquor bars,71 apart from the most usual reason of 
forced prostitution. In the case of women, physical vulnerability in the form of sexual 
abuse often becomes the prime concern, whereas being involved with a drug network 
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or being duped into organ transplant is usually a bigger threat for men being 
trafficked. Deceitful marriages,72 domestic violence and dire poverty make women 
more vulnerable to trafficking.73   
Some of the points along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border have developed as safe 
and convenient transit points for trafficking, namely the border between South 24 
Parganas (West Bengal) and Jessore (Bangladesh), South Dinajpur (West Bengal) 
and Dinajpur (Bangladesh), and Jalpaiguri (West Bengal) and Panchagarh 
(Bangladesh).74 The unauthorised routes in these border areas used as transits for 
trafficking are locally known as ghats (meaning ports). The existence of busy 
markets and towns is the reason why some places, like the ones mentioned above, 
become important trafficking sites. The pimps hand over the victim to the next level 
in the network (i.e. the pimp’s counterpart on the other side of the border) as soon as 
they get hold of the target. One pimp does not hold on to the victim for too long for 
fear of being traced. Busy towns or markets near the border ensure that the victims 
easily gets mixed up in the crowd and the pimp can swiftly hand over the trafficked 
person to his/her client.  
The direct relation between trafficking and prostitution is not difficult to establish, 
given the flourishing of brothels along this West Bengal-Bangladesh border.75 In a 
red-light area in Changrabandha, one of the important border points along this border, 
more than sixty per cent of the women said that they had come from Bangladesh.76 
About twenty per cent of the inmates in Indian brothels at any given point of time 
come from Bangladesh and Nepal.77 The actual number is much higher, since not all 
trafficking cases are reported. The Bangladesh Manabadhikar Samannya Parishad, a 
human rights organisation in Bangladesh, reported, in 2000, that there were 30,000 
Bangladeshi women who made up a chunk of the total number of sex workers in 
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Kolkata, and that 10,000 child sex workers of Bangladeshi origin were found in 
various brothels in Mumbai and Goa in India.78  One of the reports by Sanlaap79—a 
developmental organisation in West Bengal working in the field of violence against 
women and children, revealed two very important things. One was that women 
prostitutes migrate from one red light area to another; and two, that ninety per cent of 
the red light areas that these women identified as having worked in are located along 
the Bangladesh border. In Dinbazaar, yet another red light area in West Bengal 
bordering Bangladesh, many sex workers had mothers coming from Bangladesh.80 
This also suggests the viciousness of the circle of prostitution.  These women mostly 
ended up in these red light areas after being duped or coerced by pimps who survive 
on cross-border trafficking. Illiteracy increased their vulnerability, while for some, 
their mothers’ entry into these areas automatically pushed them into it, due to the 
social stigmatisation and discrimination that accompanies prostitution.   
The rise in prostitution along the border is also indicative of the general scenario of 
deprivation in the border regions, in terms of the lack of opportunities for education 
and livelihood, and this affects women the most. While the male population in this 
region moves to cities and towns or even abroad in search of a livelihood, the women 
fall prey to or are forced into prostitution. The added disadvantage for these women 
prostitutes in the border region is that they are caught between the police, on the one 
hand, and criminals, on the other. Being located near the border, they are often 
forced to give shelter to criminals and smugglers who cross the borders illegally and 
take refuge in the brothels. The police not just harass these women in the process of 
looking for these criminals, but also demand unpaid sex from them. 81  The 
involvement of the border guards and the police in this trafficking is widely-known 
in this region, though not much reporting in the newspaper is noticed in this regard.82  
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 Tanya, a girl charged and convicted under the Foreigner’s Registration Act 1946, and 
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A large number of sex workers, domestic helps and labourers from Bangladesh are 
found working in India and elsewhere, illegally, in spite of the existence of regular 
outposts of border guards.  
The 'foreign’ tag for the women who end up in prostitution after having crossed the 
border illegally makes them doubly vulnerable since they are left out of whatever 
little help or rescue and rehabilitation work that is done by the NGOs or from state 
initiatives and programmes because of being foreign nationals. All these women are 
made to cross the borders without proper papers or proofs of citizenship. They end 
up being stateless, without recourse to any legal resort.83  
A large number of cases go unrecorded simply because the victim families do not 
encourage filing a case with the police or it does not fall under the legal definition of 
trafficking. As long as any sort of physical abuse has not been proven, cases of 
trafficking are difficult to prove even if the reason for them has clearly been the sex 
trade. This means that hundreds of women and children are trafficked every year 
without officially being recognised as such.84  
Even after being rescued, acceptance into the family and society becomes difficult 
for the victims.85  Trafficked victims are re-victimised upon their return by way of 
social stigma and are often forced to end their lives.86 Rupali Mahato87 talked about a 
festival that is celebrated by women mostly belonging to the Kudumi tribe, who 
                                                                                                                           
dalal (pimp),who frequently took her and her family from Bangladesh to Mumbai (India) to 
work as domestic helps, used to negotiate with the border guards while crossing the border, 
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gather every evening over a month at a particular place in the village and sing praises 
for a girl named Tusu.88 The mythological story that she narrated was related to the 
kidnapping of a girl and her return to her society.89 The story was narrated to point to 
the fact that social stigmatisation has accompanied elopement and abduction from 
time immemorial and continues to do so in cases of trafficking.  
Ms Rahman, who is also associated with the government-run trafficking cell in 
Dinajpur (Bangladesh), explained how the prospect of earning quick money and 
obtaining luxury items in the form of gifts from customers also act as factors, besides 
the fear of stigmatisation, for victims not wanting to be rescued.90 Remittances to 
families happen to be bigger prospects for these victims than being able to return to 
family life.91 
Diseases like HIV/AIDS form an integral part of the vicious circle of 
underdevelopment, poverty, trafficking and prostitution in the border areas. Such 
diseases follow the same path as the trafficked women and men.  Illegal migrant men 
and women carry the diseases with them across the border and spread them in the 
places where they settle (the brothels being the organised shelters of such diseases) 
from where other men and women carry them to other places. Ironically, the border 
guards form a significant proportion of those infected with HIV/AIDS—an 
indication of not just their visits to the local border brothels,92  but also of their 
awareness of and involvement in the whole process of trafficking.   
Some organisations, both government as well as non-government, run shelter homes 
for trafficked women and children, 93  though most of these NGOs operate from 
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Dhaka (the capital of Bangladesh) instead of the border areas.94 The rescued women 
and children who are not accepted back into family life are supported by these 
organisations until they find themselves a suitable and legal job or till they decide to 
marry.95 
Advocate Dilwar Hussein, Public Prosecutor in the Dinajpur High Court, gives more 
importance to the lack of manpower in the border camps as reason for such 
widespread trafficking incidents96 rather than the nexus between the traffickers and 
the border guards. The number of police officers serving a judicial area, he says, is 
also far less than the situation demands. 97  On an average, about 20 cases of 
trafficking are reported every month.98  Infrastructural gaps coupled with the BGB’s 
involvement in the trafficking practice act as obstacles for the NGOs, as well as for 
some of the government-run organisations that are struggling to stop cross-border 
trafficking practices. He emphasises more on the involvement of the BSF in the 
trafficking network, rather than the BGB. The BSF, he reminds me, has a better 
communication system and surveillance mechanism than the BGB. 99  Thus, the 
involvement of the BSF in trafficking practices is amply clear, given that cross-
border movement across the fence and along the border road should ideally be easier 
for it to track.100  
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Though trafficking is rampant in every part of India and Bangladesh, as reports 
suggests, the West Bengal-Bangladesh border still remains significant to the 
understanding of gendered border practices in this context. The fact that most of the 
trafficked victims found in India originate in Bangladesh and that issues of state 
sovereignty (in terms of the failure to prevent such trades) and citizenship are 
involved in cross-border trafficking makes the West Bengal-Bangladesh border 
specifically significant.  
 
V. Lands outside the border fence  
The border fencing101 affects women and men border residents in different ways. The 
attitude of the BSF differs when it comes to issues of crossing the fence for 
agricultural purposes by men and women.   
The issue of fenced-out lands pertains to those border people who have their 
farmlands outside the fence. Though working in the fenced-out farmlands implies 
that the farmers are still within the territorial boundaries of India, the presence of the 
fence 150 yards before the ‘zero point’ makes these farmers’ lives and livelihoods 
vulnerable to border regulations and the whims of the BSF.  
Presenting identity cards (voter cards, in most cases) at the gates which open to the 
fenced-out farmlands is a regular chore for the farmers.102 The condition is even 
more miserable for those whose homes have been fenced out. Presenting voter cards 
at the gates for travelling to educational institutions, hospitals or the families of 
relatives and friends constitute their daily routine.103 For the farmers, this is a long 
process where the BSF cross-checks the identity cards with the persons using, them 
as well as the tools and cattle which the farmers carry for farming.104 There are 
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scheduled times for the BSF to open the gates.105  The process often delays the 
farmers’ work and becomes a serious concern in the summer months as they prefer 
tilling their lands in the early hours of the morning to escape the afternoon heat.106 
But the fencing regulations often force them to begin and continue their work till the 
late hours of the day. Farmers falling prey to heat strokes and dehydration are not 
uncommon.107  
In the case of women, the concerns are different and restrictions more stringent. In 
most of the border posts, they are rarely allowed to go to the other side of the fence. 
Though there are no official rules regarding this, it is the BSF officials who devise 
such unofficial rules. The reason they cite is that of women’s safety. They fear that if 
these women are let outside the fence, then there is a possibility of them being 
harassed by the Bangladeshis.108  As Bangladesh does not have fencing along its 
border with India, there is a gap between India’s fence and the Bangladesh territorial 
jurisdiction, called No-Man’s Land in official parlance. And since there are no 
border guards posted at the ‘zero point’ for either of the states, it means that the 
Bangladeshi people can actually move right up to India’s fencing.  The BSF fears 
that once outside the fencing, the women (as well as the men) are outside its direct 
jurisdiction and, hence, prone to harassment by the Bangladeshis.109 ‘Women do not 
go to the other side of the fence. They do not work there. Hence, they do not need to 
go. We try to make them feel secure,’ states a BSF official at one of the border 
camps.110 Most of the civilian men also agree on the point of security hazards when it 
comes to the question of women moving beyond the fence. 111  Some also raise 
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questions of the vulnerability of women in terms of falling prey to smuggling 
practices once outside the fence. The lack of women BSF constables makes it easier 
for women to smuggle items, points out one of the former heads of a village 
Panchayat in a border village.112  However, for women who work hard to earn a 
living in these impoverished border areas, this unwritten rule often poses a major 
problem. They complain of being prohibited by the BSF from taking food across the 
fence to the male members of their families working in the fenced-out farmlands.113   
Sabitri Mahato of Char Meghna complains: ‘They would not let me go to the other 
side because I am a woman, whereas they let the men go.’114 She owns 2 bighas115 of 
land outside the fence, which she, along with her husband and two children, depend 
on for their living.  The BSF does not let her go to the field along with her husband, 
which, she emphasises, is quite a problem for people like them (farmers) because 
‘here, women work as much as men do. How else would they earn a living?’116  
The situation is all the more difficult for those women who either do not have a male 
member at home or have male members who are incapable of farming (due to 
physical disabilities or medical conditions). These restrictions on women’s 
movements across the fence act as reminders of their incapability to fend for 
themselves in the absence of a male member in the family.  The border, especially 
the fence, thus contributes towards the maintenance of gendered hierarchies.  
The BSF also prohibits young male members (below 18 years of age) of families to 
take food to the fenced-out farmlands because they do not possess voter identity 
cards.117 Sabitri, at the time of the interview, was considering leasing out her fenced- 
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out land to a Bangladeshi farmer. In that way, she could at least earn, though illegally, 
from the produce of her land.118 In fact, this is something that many of the Indian 
farmers who happen to have their land outside the fence are considering as an option, 
despite knowing the illegal nature of such an action.119 Instead of going through the 
ordeal of getting past the fence every day, having to show one’s card at the outpost 
and working under such restrictions, many of the farmers feel that leasing out the 
land might be a better option. They, of course, risk either losing their lands or having 
it become a political issue between the two states, leading to the possibility of greater 
securitisation of the borders.  
The theft of crops by Bangladeshi miscreants from the fenced-out lands is another 
important reason why farmers with such lands complain and even consider an illegal 
leasing out. 120  Imtiaz Mondol complains of the BSF’s inactivity in helping the 
civilians prevent such thefts: ‘The BSF claims that since the fields from where the 
crops are stolen are outside the fence, they are outside the jurisdictional area of the 
BSF.’121  Officially, the land till the actual borderline or the ‘zero point’ is Indian 
territory. The BSF, as India’s border security force, has legal powers of surveillance 
and necessary action till the ‘zero point’, including the lands outside the fence. But 
the fence, as the responses and daily chores of the civilians suggest, has redefined 
binaries such as inside-outside for both the civilians as well as the border guards.  
 
Complaints about the BSF not wanting to help the farmers or residents outside the 
fence are common.122 Dayamay Dutta, while confirming these complaints, is also 
careful to point out that the BSF might not always be in a position to help, given its 
                                                                                                                           
lunch for the farm workers is a very common and widespread rural practice in agrarian 
communities in rural South Asia.  
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rigorous duty timings.123 Such responses are indicative of a sense of fear among the 
locals regarding the BSF. Interestingly, the act of fencing itself poses no problem for 
the civilians. It is just the way the border guards manage the gates which is of 
concern to them. 124  This re-emphasises the role that the border fence plays in 
creating border narratives.  
 
Plate 31. Civilians from beyond the border fence. Photo courtesy: Shib Shankar 
Chatterjee. 
 
VI. Physical and verbal abuse 
Incidents of physical abuse, including the killing of civilians by border guards, have 
become characteristic of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border. It is replete with such 
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occurrences.125  Reports of firing by border guards, mostly the BSF, do not fail to 
make their presence felt in the newspapers of both West Bengal and Bangladesh, 
though the official figures released by the BSF shows a much lower number of these 
incidents than the actual ones.126  Suspected smugglers and intruders are brutally 
beaten up and, in many cases, shot dead. Civilians often fall victims to cross-border 
firing between the BSF and the BGB.127  
Complaints about bad behaviour and verbal abuse by the border guards are not 
uncommon among the border people. ‘Treating like dogs’ is the kind of phrase used 
by some of the civilians for describing the nature of behaviour meted out to them by 
the BSF.128 Border restrictions regarding use of the border road by civilians also 
invite abuse from the BSF.129 ‘Unnecessary abuse’ has, over the years become a part 
of the border peoples’ narratives, who negotiate the fence and the border guards on a 
regular basis.130 Complaints to police regarding these abuses rarely bear fruit and are, 
often, met with threats and further abuses.131  
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Often the border guards shoot a person and leave his body near the fence132 or hang 
him in the camp133—an act of cautioning others about the extent of power held by 
them. Examples of false cases filed against civilians by the border guards are not rare. 
Rashid Haq narrates how one of the BSF constables, in order to fight allegations of 
his involvement in smuggling practices, shot a smuggler with whom he otherwise 
had regular smuggling involvements. This act was justified on grounds of self-
defence by him.134  
One border resident, Saiful, whose legs had already been damaged by a polio attack, 
was wrongly nabbed by the BSF when they found him roaming near the fence and 
they beat him up after tying his hands with a handcuff and his legs with a rope.135  
Yet another person, wrongly arrested by the BSF after being brutally beaten, was 
about to be shot when one officer showed pity and left him to die near the riverine 
border. Unable to move, he was stuck in the riverine mud for hours till one of the 
BSF officers tied a pumped-up air pillow round his neck and threw him into the river. 
The tide brought him back to the Bangladesh side of the river, where he belonged.136 
Physical and verbal assaults of innocent locals of all social and economic standing—
from farmers to teachers, to doctors, anybody for that matter, are integral to living 
near the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, laments Gourab Sarkar.137   
One way of torturing cross-border cattle smugglers by the BSF especially the ones 
who use the river to smuggle cattle138 is of attacking the smuggler while still in the 
river with the BSF’s own patrol boat. The smugglers are hit by the speedboat till they 
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are badly injured and are forced to surrender.139  Incidents such as these are often 
preceded by a clash over the bribe money that the border guards demand from the 
smugglers.140  
 
Plate 32. BSF speedboat. Photo courtesy: Shib Shankar Chatterjee.  
While citing such responses are not to be seen as attempts to generalise the 
essentially violent or dishonest nature of the border guards, it is, nevertheless, worth 
noticing the recurrence of words such as ‘dishonest’ and ‘brutal’ in the description of 
the border guards by the civilians who negotiate the former everyday—legally or for 
illegal purposes.  
Such incidents of violence are very common in riverine borders, since violation of 
the borderline by the civilians, especially fishermen, is easier here. Fishermen often 
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mistakenly cross the ‘imaginary’ borderline in the river and fall prey to brutalities by 
the border guards.141 
Children as young as 10-12 years are also not spared from the violence. Zakir Sharif, 
aged 11, has been a victim of BSF brutalities. In an incident where the BSF had been 
chasing a group of smugglers, Zakir happened to come across a BSF border guard 
involved in the chase, quite by chance. While the smugglers escaped, Zakir bore the 
brunt of the BSF guard’s wrath. His pleas of innocence were met with abusive 
language. It was the collective plea of the local people which saved Zakir’s life on 
that fateful day. An innocent child bore the brunt of the BSF’s frustration for its 
failure to deal with the real culprits.142  There are incidents of children spending 
significant parts of their lives in jails for being wrongly accused by the border guards 
of taking part in suspicious activities near the border.143  
By far the most brutal incident has been that of a 15-year old girl, Felani Khatun, of 
the Kurigram border area, Bangladesh. She and her father, Nurul Islam, used to work 
as a domestic help and a labourer, respectively, in India. Having her marriage fixed 
for 8 January 2011, Felani and her father were crossing the border fence from the 
Indian (West Bengal) side on the morning of 7 January 2011 to return to their home 
in Kurigram, Bangladesh. While Nurul Islam successfully crossed the border with 
the help of a ladder that he had arranged for crossing the fence, Felani’s dress 
(kameez) got entangled in the barbed wire of the fence. She screamed out in fear, 
hearing which the BSF constables on duty came there and fired at Felani from point-
blank range. Felani, shot and hanging from the fence, pleaded for water but to no 
avail since none of the witnesses working near the border area dared to help her out 
of fear of the BSF. She bled to death and remained hanging in the same way for 
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nearly 5 hours before her body was finally taken away by BSF constables and 
handed over to the BGB the next day.144 
Most of the incidents of violence on women by border guards pertain to cases of 
border-crossing for smuggling or other purposes.145 In the context of violence, it is 
mostly the women involved in petty-smuggling on a day-to-day basis who face the 
lathi146 and sometimes the gun. One of the BGB officials in a BGB camp at the Hili 
border confesses to the use of the lathi as a way of disciplining the women involved 
in smuggling.147 He also adds that most of these women smugglers are also sex 
workers in these border regions and survive on smuggling and/or prostitution for a 
living.148 
Illegal border crossers also include those who cross the border for availing of 
medical services. A number of Bangladeshi people from the border areas cross the 
border without valid documents. These poor and resource-less people living along 
the border are an easy catch for the pimps who earn their living by helping them to 
cross the borders illegally.149 Incidents of brutalities by the border guards on their 
being apprehended are, thus, common occurrences among the illegal border crossers. 
Incidents of rape and abuse of women crossers (even if accompanied by men) 
indicate the violent nature of the treatment of illegal practices by the BSF.  
                                            
144
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 Interview with Ratan, resident of Debhata village (Satkhira district of Bangladesh, 12 
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On one occasion, a woman accompanying her husband across the border was raped 
by the BSF and her husband killed for protesting against the act.150  On another 
occasion, a woman suspect was strip-searched by the BSF and raped in the presence 
of her family. Her complaints went unheard.151 Punishments, if any, for the border 
guards for such violent actions amount, at best, to a suspension followed by a 
transfer to a different posting, although promises of ‘strict actions’ are made by 
higher officials.152 The trial of the concerned BSF officials in the Felani Khatun case 
serves as an example of the weakness in the legal system for punishing accused 
border guards. Even though the alleged BSF official, Amiyo Ghosh, was tried in the 
Felani case under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code (unintentional killing) and 
Section 146 of the BSF Act,153 he was acquitted because of the lack of required 
witnesses who could have proved the accusation. Though human rights organisations 
have slammed the verdict as a sham and Felani’s father has vowed to take the case to 
the international court of justice, any better outcome seems unlikely in the current 
scenario.154 The verdict also highlights the weakness of state-devised border laws in 
bringing justice to the border dwellers. These laws often fail to address the gap 
between statist definitions of justice and the realities of border lives.  
Border residents clearly state that both women and men are equally abused by the 
BSF.155 Minu Bagdi agrees that the BSF guards abuse border civilians irrespective of 
their sex,156 although local representatives of political parties and the heads of the 
                                            
150
 Ibid.   
151
 Ibid.; Staff Reporter (8 March 2003) Migrant rape charge on border troops. The 
Telegraph. [Online] Available from: http://www.telegraphindia.com/archives/archive.html. 
[Last accessed: 11 September 2013].  
152
 PTI. (19 January 2012) B'desh demands immediate action against BSF personnel. IBN 
Live. [Online] Available from: http://ibnlive.in.com/generalnewsfeed/news/bdesh-demands-
immediate-action-against-bsf-personnel/952929.html. [Last accessed: 23 July 2013].  
153
 BSF Act and Rules (March 2004) Available from: http://bsf.nic.in/doc/bsfActRules.pdf. p. 
156.  
154
 Islam, M.S (8 September 2013) Felani verdict a big disappointment. The Financial 
Express. [Online] Available from: http://www.thefinancialexpress-
bd.com/index.php?ref=MjBfMDlfMDhfMTNfMV85Ml8xODI1OTg=. [Last accessed: 11 
September 2013].  
155
 Interview with Amol, resident of Kodalkati (Murshidabad district of West Bengal, 11 
November 2011).  
156
 Interview with Minu Bagdi, resident of Mathurapur village (South Dinajpur district of 
West Bengal, 24 January 2012). 
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local village Panchayats in the border areas claim that these trends of abuse by the 
border guards have decreased considerably in the last few years.157 Such responses 
might be understandable in the context of the failure of the political and 
administrative heads to curb border-related violence.  
 
VII. Sexual intonation in the treatment of women civilians by border 
guards  
If the physical and verbal abuse of men and women is a common occurrence in the 
border areas, so are occurrences of border guards demanding sexual favours from 
women civilians along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.  Some women gather the 
courage to defy the offer. Some are forced to give in, either for fear of persecution or 
because such favours ensure the smooth operation of cross-border smuggling 
practices.158 Male civilians are often helpless in these instances of indecent offers 
made by the border guards to their women, for fear of persecution. 159  In a 
conservative patriarchal society like India, this aspect has a deep impact on the male 
civilians along the border and is integral to the spatial consciousness that is produced 
in the process. Yet women border civilians are not entirely innocent victims in all 
cases. Women offering sexual favours to border guards in return for co-operation in 
smuggling are not entirely unknown along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.160 
While cash bribes are the usual trajectory for male smugglers, sexual favours are 
often an option chosen by the female smugglers for ensuring co-operation from the 
border guards. However, women border residents belonging to professions not 
directly related to the border, i.e. not trafficked women, prostitutes or farmers 
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district of West Bengal, 25 January 2012).    
 255
negotiating the fence, but associated with other professions (like teaching, law, 
medicine, etc.) also do not escape sexual harassment by the border guards.161  
Women respondents involved in cross-border smuggling practices speak of the 
‘lenient’ or ‘sympathetic’ attitude of the border guards towards such practices, which 
is indicative of the gendered nature of interaction between the latter and some 
women border civilians.162  The relation between the border guards and these women 
is more personal in nature, including sexual or even culinary favour (asking the 
women to cook food for them since the food that they are given in camps is not as 
good),163 and is as integral to understanding gendered border narratives as are violent 
negotiations. Sympathy hardly finds a place in negotiations between the male 
civilians and the male border guards.   
 
VIII. Pradhans as patriarchs 
A visible feature in the border villages is the role of the heads and members of local 
village governments, i.e. the Panchayats in West Bengal and the Union Parishad in 
Bangladesh, as mediators between the civilians and the border guards. The 
Panchayat/Union Parishad heads (Pradhans), mostly male, communicate with the 
border guards on behalf of the civilians living along the border. The Panchayats and 
Union Parishads do have elected female members in the council body,164 but the 
Pradhans/Chairmen are almost always necessarily male. And this is a feature 
common to almost all the village-level local governments in India and Bangladesh. It 
is these heads that the civilians resort to in case of an issue or a complaint. The heads, 
in turn, convey the issue to the border guards.  
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The heads are the paternal figures in a village, which is evident from the way the 
villagers express their reverence as well as their dependence on them. Md. Rashidul 
Haq admits that the border guards do not encourage direct interaction with the  
civilians and prefers to interact only with the Pradhans.165 The Pradhans are aware 
of their roles as local patriarchs and, in fact, take pride in it.166  
The Pradhan’s ability to understand the paraphernalia associated with administration, 
his ability to convey the issues clearly and his ability to understand the limitations of 
the border guards are posed as reasons by the border guards themselves when 
explaining their preference for interacting with the former.167  
But the role of the Pradhans as mediators and local patriarchs is limited by the 
stronger patriarchal position of the border guards. The influence of the Pradhans on 
the border guards is not just non-binding but also largely dependent on the individual 
attitude of the border guard concerned. Complaints from some of the Pradhans 
regarding the arrogant attitude of the border guards towards them168 throw light on 
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the relation between the two categories of local patriarchs in the border areas—the 
Pradhans and the border guards.  
 
IX. Unstated patriarchy 
The kind of forced reverence that border guards expect from the civilians indicates 
the idea of the strong patriarchal position that they imagine themselves to be in. The 
unstated rule of giving right of way to the vehicles of the border guards and 
dismounting from one’s own vehicles when a vehicle of the border guards passes by 
indicates the existence of such forced reverence. Fear of persecution and abuse forces 
the civilians to abide by these unstated rules.169 ‘Why (should we comply with these 
rules)? Are they kings?’ asks an angry Sabitri Mahato, after explaining how such 
rules have evolved in the border areas, especially after the construction of the fence 
and the border roads.170  
Responses like ‘go and complain to your father’ are common among the border 
guards in cases of complaints from civilians over such unauthorised but stringent 
rules.171 Examples of similar responses from border guards like, ‘is this your father’s 
road?’ are also narrated by other civilians.172 
The free use of the civilians’ resources without payment173 is an integral part of the 
patriarchal undercurrent that runs below the formal and legally sanctioned protector-
subject relation between the border guards and the civilians. The local police stations 
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avoid taking complaints from the civilians, citing jurisdictional formalities as the 
reason.174  
Interestingly, even the police and other administrative bodies accept the role of the 
border guards as the patriarchs in the West Bengal-Bangladesh border areas, as an 
Officer-in-Charge (OC) at the Murutia Police Station in Nadia district (West Bengal) 
admits. ‘Locals depend more on the BSF than the administration because the BSF is 
an armed force,’ he says. When asked why the police, despite being an armed force 
like the BSF, fails to gain the faith of the locals, he quickly admits that, ‘BSF knows 
better how to handle the border.’175 
These responses hint towards a clear prioritisation of the BSF at the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border over the regular police mechanisms.176 In the context of border 
control, the regular police mechanisms are marginalised. The patriarchal nature of 
the state in the context of the borderland is, thus, not limited to a theoretical 
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construct 177  but manifests itself in real visible forms—embodied in the border 
guards.178 
 
X. Other forms of gendered border narratives  
A unique form of gendered border narrative can be witnessed in some parts of the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border where a large number of hijras are seen to be 
actively involved in illegal cross-border activities. 179  They involve themselves 
mostly in smuggling drugs across the border. The Hili border between West Bengal’s 
South Dinajpur district and Bangladesh’s Dinajpur district is a case in point.  
Fearlessly squatting along the railway tracks running along the Bangladesh border, 
mostly in an intoxicated state and in very close proximity to the camps of the border 
guards, they unabashedly talk about their involvement in cross-border smuggling 
practices. They also mention how their unique gendered status helps them in their 
work. The fact that they are hijras saves them from the physical abuse perpetrated by 
the border guards on the other ‘normal male and female’ smugglers. The fact that 
they are ‘neither male nor female’ helps them in their work.180  
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Contradictory factors like ‘dislike’ and ‘sympathy’ come up spontaneously in the 
narratives of the hijras when it comes to explaining why the border guards do not 
want to mingle with them or even stop them from dealing in illegal activities.181 
Sheena, a hijra working in the Hili border area, points to the sheer dislike that the 
border guards have for the emasculated status of the hijras,182 while Rajib, another 
hijra working in the Hili border area, explains that the border guards are actually 
sympathetic towards the hijras since they lack social support in terms of family and 
friends. ‘They spare us on humanitarian grounds,’ he quips.183 This explains why 
more than 200 hijras are involved in cross-border smuggling practices in the Hili 
port alone.184  
Such contradictory versions of ‘dislike’ and ‘sympathy’ are further verified through 
the responses of the border guards regarding the widespread involvement of the 
hijras in illegal activities. The question of dignity is clear in responses like ‘it does 
not look good if we interact with hijras, which is why we generally avoid arresting 
them. Moreover, their families do not accept them. If we stop them from doing these, 
how will they survive?’ 185 Even the sincerest efforts from the border guards to 
highlight the humanitarian aspect of the matter fail to hide the disrespectful pity in 
their tone of speech.   
The earning of hijras has, over the years, become profitable, especially in and around 
the Hili border area.  Instances of men choosing to undergo the emasculation 
operation or even of disguising themselves as hijras have increased at an alarming 
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rate. 186  The lives and livelihood practices of the hijras on the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border cannot be overlooked if one has to understand gendered border 
practices—practices which show how gendered identities evolve into a spatial 
narrative on the margins of the state.  
 
XI. Women border guards 
The border guards, on both sides of the border, are essentially a male force. While 
the BGB has, so far, no women recruits in any of its battalions,187 the BSF has only a 
few women constables in non-combat roles like searching women smugglers and 
infiltrators.188 The first batch of women to be recruited in combat roles passed out on 
28 July 2012 and moved on to their training phases.189 Women under and up to the 
age of 25 may be recruited as direct-entry officers in the rank of Assistant 
Commandants (ACs), and are eligible to lead their troops along the Pakistan and 
Bangladesh border.190  
A male Company Commander of a BSF camp in Nadia (West Bengal) is 
simultaneously hopeful and apprehensive about the decision to recruit women 
officers. He says that while they will strengthen the force by their presence, the 
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infrastructural hazards would also be a serious concern,191 referring to the lack of 
basic facilities and privacy required for them.  
I met two of the six women constables in one of the BSF camps in Murshidabad 
(West Bengal). They informed me that all six of them originate from other places in 
West Bengal and are Bengali-speakers192 unlike the male BSF recruits, most of who 
come from other parts of India, far away from their postings on the West Bengal 
border, and are Hindi-speakers. The main job of the female border guards is to frisk 
the women border crossers, crossing for any purpose. 193  Ironically, women 
smugglers, some of the witnesses confirm, find it easier to ‘deal’ with women 
constables posted at the fence gates rather than male constables, since the former are 
‘easier to convince’ in the matter of letting them cross the border.194 
 
XII. Restriction on the use of lethal weapons by border guards 
In an effort to reduce violence along its borders, the government of India decided to 
arm the BSF with non-lethal weapons in 2009, following requests from BGB chiefs 
to prevent the killings of Bangladeshis by the BSF on the India-Bangladesh 
border.195 The need to abide by the internationally-followed Rules of Engagement 
(RoE) that calls for maintaining peace at the border ‘at any cost’ has been the focus 
of the meetings between the BSF and BGB over the issue of the use of weapons.196 
While the effort of maintaining peace at the borders is a laudable one, responses from 
the BSF Commanding Officers in the border outposts bring out the undercurrents of 
such decisions.  
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The BSF, under this regulation, is to use pump-action guns with rubber bullets in the 
first-fire and challenge-fire rounds. Firing from regular guns would be the next step, 
though the ‘sanctity and security of the Indian border would be the first in any 
case’.197  
However, the decision has encouraged more illegal activities across the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border. ‘The smugglers used to be more afraid of BSF earlier, 
but now they are less so,’ says a Company Commander of a BSF camp at Shikarpur 
in Nadia (West Bengal).198  Attacks on the BSF by smugglers and other miscreants 
have increased following the decision199— a fact corroborated by the BSF officials 
themselves.200 This is, indeed, an irony that plays out all along the length of the 
border, where the ‘armed’ border guards evoke a sense of security and threat, 
simultaneously. This dilemma is amply expressed in the responses of the border 
civilians where, on the one hand, they speak of the violent attributes of the border 
guards with regard to the use of weapons and, on the other, of their diminishing 
power with regard to ‘protecting’ the civilians in the context of their use of non-
lethal weapons. These ambiguous narratives of protection and violation of human 
rights are integral to the narratives and consciousness of the border people, including 
the border guards themselves.   
Rupali Mahato admits that there has been an increasing sense of insecurity among 
the border civilians following the decision. It is the threat of firing from the BSF that 
keeps the miscreants away and ‘this policy is creating a lot of problems’201  by 
making the smugglers more emboldened.202  Not just the smugglers but the civilians 
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wronged by the border guards also sometimes resort to the physical abuse of the 
guards, as an act of resistance to years of abuse by them.203  
The possession of weapons and the nature of weapons, in the case of the border 
guards, produce two parallel strands of narratives on the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border. The power to use weapons gives the border guards a chance to exercise 
patriarchal dominance along the border. It also brings in the issue of the violation of 
human rights with regard to the abuse of border crossers, and especially those 
involved in some sort of illegal activity. The restriction on the use of lethal weapons, 
on the other hand, has a derogatory effect on the border guards’ sense of dominance 
over the civilians. It also brings in the issue of the loss of security for civilians, 
especially those who are not directly associated with border crossing. The powerful 
patriarchal presence of the border guards are, interestingly, misused by miscreants in 
threatening or even robbing civilian households. Miscreants ‘dressed as BSF’ have 
been reported to have made its way into civilians’ houses and robbed them off.204 
Narratives of patriarchal dominance and symbolic emasculation become integrally 
linked to the border narratives with reference to gendered interactions between the 
border guards and the civilians.  Plans for observing the joint ceremony of ‘lowering 
of the flags’ by the BSF and the BGB in Petrapole-Benapole border (as is currently 
held between BSF and Pakistan Rangers205 in Wagah on the India-Pakistan border) 
can be seen as efforts to restore the powerful patriarchal image of the border guards 
along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border.206  
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XIII. Mixed reaction of the civilians towards the border guards 
An interesting mix of responses from the civilians regarding the border guards makes 
it difficult to label these interactions as purely those of domination or subjugation. 
Two categories of civilians are seen to be favourable towards the border guards. The 
first category is those who have not been directly victimised by the BSF but whose 
lives and livelihood, nevertheless, depend largely on the efficient patrolling of the 
border by the border guards.207 ‘The attitude of the BSF is generally good. They are 
only bad with bad people (indicating smugglers),’ says Subodh, an employee at a 
currency-exchange counter at the Petrapole border, North 24 Parganas (West Bengal). 
People like him feel that it is the efficient border management of the border guards 
that makes honest ways of lives and livelihoods possible along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border.208   
The second category is of those involved, directly or indirectly, in cross-border 
illegal activities and is largely dependent on the co-operation of the border guards. 
They, too, feel that the co-operation of the border guards ensures the smooth running 
of their businesses and livelihoods.209  
Unfavourable responses regarding the border guards come from those civilians who 
pursue honest means of livelihood, like farming, but have to deal with the BSF 
daily210 and from those associated with professions not directly related to the border, 
like teachers, doctors, tailors and labourers.211 This category of people is probably 
the worst sufferers in terms of being the victims of violent dominance by the border 
guards, as well as of the nexus of illegality functioning along the border, without 
being party to it.  
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While the nature of interaction between the BSF and the civilians on the West 
Bengal side of the border highlights complex narratives of patriarchal domination, 
co-operation and resistance, that between the BGB and the civilians on the 
Bangladesh side of the border reveals some more unique features of control and co-
operation.  
 
XIV. Relations between Bangladeshi border civilians and the BGB: 
language as a decisive factor 
The nature of interaction between the BGB and the Bangladeshi border civilians is 
symbolic of a pattern of co-operation and complicity that is not seen on the West 
Bengal side of the border. Vicious forms of hostility and violence are rarely seen on 
the Bangladesh border, unlike on the West Bengal side.  
The BGB is as much a representative of the sovereign power of the state in the 
Bangladesh border areas as is the BSF on the West Bengal side.  But the attitude of 
the BGB officials patrolling the Bangladesh border is visibly protective, even lenient, 
towards the Bangladeshi border civilians. More like a guardian, the BGB uses 
warnings and, at best, admonitions while dealing with civilians involved in unlawful 
activities. Instances of direct physical abuse or even the use of abusive language are 
rare.212  
This is not to suggest that unlawful activities are any less on the Bangladesh side of 
the border. Nor is physical abuse completely absent here. Residents of Hili narrate 
how the BGB, though only in rare cases, beats up those caught smuggling drugs or 
other items across the border. ‘How much more would they tolerate?’ wonders 
Jumaira—indicating the BGB’s general tendency towards being tolerant and lenient, 
and reverting to violent means only when situations go out of control.213  
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Language plays a very important role on both sides in the relation between the border 
guards and the civilians. Most officers of the BSF originate from other parts of India 
and are mostly Hindi-speakers, while the native language of West Bengal (including 
its border areas) is Bangla (Bengali). This results in an obvious communication gap 
between the Hindi-speaking border guards and the Bangla-speaking local 
civilians.214 Most of the civilians on the West Bengal border do not speak or even 
understand Hindi, while few BSF officials are able to learn Bangla during their 
assignments on the West Bengal border, due to their temporary postings in the region 
and their transferable service. The BSF finds it difficult to identify itself with the 
local Bangla-speaking civilians and, thus, easier to use abusive language.215  
There are a few Bangla-speaking BSF officers along the West Bengal border. But 
complaints about them from civilians are, ironically, even more than of the Hindi-
speaking officers. These officers avoid using Bangla while interacting with 
civilians.216 This seems to be a common occurrence on the West Bengal border and 
can only be explained by the attempt of the BSF to carefully maintain a distance 
between itself and the civilians.217  
Sabitri Mahato explains that, often, the Hindi-speaking BSF constables are still easy 
to interact with (in whatever broken Hindi the locals can manage to speak), 
compared to the Bangla-speaking BSF constables. Preventing the civilians from 
taking advantage of the language affinity is the reason behind the avoidance of using 
Bangla by the Bangla-speaking BSF officers. ‘Bangla-speaking BSF officers does 
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not use Bangla, they use Hindi, so that we do not ask for any help,’ explains 
Nirendranath Burman. 218  Such complaints indicate the fear among the Bangla-
speaking BSF officers of being seen as biased towards ‘their own people’.  
Interestingly, these very Bangla-speaking BSF officers, who converse in Hindi at 
other times, resort to Bangla while negotiating with smugglers. 219  Thus, the 
preference of the border guards for a particular language varies according to the 
needs of the situation.  
Complaints by women civilians often involve the issue of sexual insinuation in the 
use of language by the BSF. Hatred for the Bengali-people and the Bangla language 
is cited as a reason for the mistreatment of women border civilians.220 On the other 
hand, narratives of the BSF in the form of poetry reveal its reverence for Hindi as a 
mother tongue—as being symbolic of love for the motherland and human 
empowerment in general.221  
The need to recruit more co-operative Bangla-speaking BSF officers on West Bengal 
border are felt by civilians across genders and professions. Narendranath Ghosh feels 
that having Bangla-speaking BSF officers on the West Bengal border would help the 
civilians to better convey their problems to the border guards. 222  Issues of 
miscommunication over language have failed to gain the required support of the 
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Indian government, though the erstwhile Left Front government in West Bengal had 
placed this issue before the central government.223  
Though the BSF officers deny that language differences are an important issue,224 the 
responses of the civilians clearly reveal the nature of miscommunication that 
language creates in their interaction with the border guards. It also re-emphasises the 
fact that while language plays an important role in preserving cross-border links 
between the people of West Bengal and Bangladesh, it creates a cultural difference 
between the West Bengal border civilians and the BSF. This acts as a very important 
factor when it comes to the issue of how border narratives along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border question the role of the concerned states not simply as the 
political containers but as the cultural containers as well.   
The BGB, on the other hand, can comfortably communicate with the Bangladeshi 
border civilians by virtue of sharing a common language, i.e. Bangla. Language 
plays an important role in bridging the gap between the BGB and the Bangladeshi 
civilians. Sharing a common language, interestingly, prevents frequent instances of 
the use of abusive speech by the BGB.225  
Civilians on the West Bengal border are often heard speaking favourably of the BGB 
rather than of the BSF. ‘The public would rather take BGB as a friend and consider 
the BSF as their enemy,’ says Nirendranath Burman of Kalmati village in Cooch 
Behar (West Bengal).226  This is yet another example of a cross-border cultural link 
between the West Bengal border civilians and the Bangladesh border guards that 
questions the role of the state as a cultural container.  
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The use of Bangla by civilians on both sides of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border 
often poses a challenge to the border guards, especially the Hindi-speaking BSF 
officers and constables. Distinguishing an illegal infiltrator from a legal resident 
becomes difficult for the border guards due to the use of a similar language by 
both. 227  This has forced the Indian government to consider introducing Bangla 
lessons for the BSF in order to ‘improve relations with the locals’.228  The plan to 
recruit Bangla-speaking local civilians from border areas into the BSF service is yet 
another step towards resolving the issue of communication gap.229 
Responses from some of the BGB constables on the general violent attitudes of the 
BSF throw light on some more factors which, the BGB officers feel, contribute 
towards the unfavourable relation between the BSF and the civilians. While 
communication gap is a major factor, alcohol consumption230 and staying away from 
their families for too long are other factors that contribute towards the general violent 
nature of the BSF. 231  BGB officials, the majority of whom are Muslims by 
religion,232  consider alcohol consumption within the BSF (a large majority of who 
are non-Muslims) a reason for its abusive mentality. Some of the civilians on the 
West Bengal border agree to the fact that alcohol consumption is often a reason 
behind BSF’s abusive attitude.233 Talks about the BSF’s military failure on the Indo-
Pakistan and Indo-China border followed by the BSF’s recourse to violence on the 
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Bangladesh border are common among the Bangladeshi border civilians and the 
BGB. 234  Such responses indicate the BGB’s ideas about the BSF’s misguided 
patriarchal domination. Alcohol consumption (leading to an unstable emotional 
condition) and the lack of family life (resulting in a social and emotional vacuum) 
coupled with the failure to exercise domination in other borders are reasons for the 
BSF’s misuse of power along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, feels the BGB.235 
Higher BSF officials also consider alcohol consumption among the constables as a 
reason for their misuse of power and the miserable conditions that the BSF 
constables find themselves in.236  
It has taken away your means of living 
Your life shall offer no compensation 
But force you to your doom each day 
And anarchy will consume the nation.237 
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Increasing suicidal tendencies among the BSF supports such views.238 A social and 
emotional vacuum, coupled with the imposition of restraints on the use of power, has, 
recently, increased the number of suicide cases in the BSF.239 Such tendencies also 
highlight the fact that the border guards are as much under the strain of surviving 
border life as are the border civilians.  
The BGB also has its own narrative of the possession and eventual loss of patriarchal 
power. While the decision on using non-lethal weapons resulted in narratives of the 
loss of power for the BSF, the mutiny in the Bangladeshi border forces serves as the 
BGB’s own narrative of loss of power.240 ‘The BGB has become somewhat weak 
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after the mutiny. It has almost become like children, who live at the mercy of others 
(indicating both the Bangladesh state and the BSF). Gradually, though, it is regaining 
its old vigour,’241 says a BGB official. He also points out how restrictions on firing 
back at the BSF, following the mutiny, has dampened the BGB spirits.242  
For the BGB, the idea of wielding power pertains more to the nature of its interaction 
with the BSF rather than its own border civilians.243 For the BSF, the wielding of 
power relates more to disciplining its own border civilians rather than its interactions 
with the BGB.244 This also explains the difference in opinion among the civilians 
about the border forces on the West Bengal and the Bangladesh border.  
 
XV. Bonding attempts 
Unfavourable responses towards the BSF from the border civilians on the West 
Bengal border explains the recent attempts made by the BSF to bond with the local 
people on the border. Cultural events, sports events and educational programmes in 
some of the border villages along the West Bengal border characterise these 
efforts.245 Civic Action Programmes organised by the BSF, including medical check-
ups, computer training, canteen facilities, and tourist site-seeing are also part of its 
efforts in this regard.246 Border guards also make use of festivals like Durga and Kali 
Puja, organised by local clubs, to create a platform for interaction between the border 
people of both sides—when civilians and border guards from the other side are 
invited, good wishes and sweets exchanged and fireworks and cultural programmes 
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enjoyed together.247 Friendly-matches between the BSF and the BGB constitute yet 
another way of creating platforms for bonding between the border guards and the 
civilians on both sides.248 Some of the poems composed by BSF guards, hint towards 
bonding initiatives by hinting at the pride in being ‘offered a soldier’s hand’.249 
 
And the song is left unheard 
And the lyre is left untouched 
Benumbed I watched the events unfold 
Restless I tended my soul 
Seeking friendship whenever I offered my hand 
I am proud and honoured 
To be offered a soldier’s hand. 
 
One of the aims of the educational programmes organised by the BSF is to increase 
awareness among the civilians, especially students in school, about the role of the 
BSF as the protector and patriarchal figure of the border areas. 250  Attempts to 
introduce Hindi language courses in local primary schools by the BSF have, 
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nevertheless, not seen much success.251 What needs to be seen is whether BSF’s 
plans of recruiting local youths from border areas into BSF services have a fruitful 
outcome of improving the relation.  
These bonding efforts have not necessarily been popular with all the BSF officers 
posted along this border.252 During some of the cultural events organised by the BSF, 
especially during religious festivals, there have been attempts of illegal border 
crossings and smuggling by the border people, as pointed out by the BSF officials 
themselves.253 ‘We have to control them. Civilians are emotional. They might end up 
cutting the fences or may climb up the fences in excitement. They are illiterate and, 
hence, difficult to control,’ says a BSF officer in BRC-pur BSF camp in Nadia (West 
Bengal).254  The equation of illiteracy with emotional instability and the need to 
control is clearly revealed in such responses. On a number of occasions, planned 
border fairs have been cancelled by border guards255 or have been held under strict 
surveillance. 256  The suspicious nature of the BSF is also clearly revealed in its 
journals, where one of the challenges of the BSF border guards has been pointed out 
as ‘being suspicious of the people’.257 The persistence of the threat factor in the 
bonding attempts is clearly spelt out when even by the drinking water kiosks 
arranged by the BSF officers during festivals, the identity cards of the civilians are 
asked to be presented.258   
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i. Forms of control 
One of the significant characteristics of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border is the 
fact that its entire length is densely populated, unlike the borders that India shares 
with either Pakistan or China.259 Numerous villages, including farmlands, rivers and 
lakes, characterise the border. Thus, controlling the West Bengal-Bangladesh border 
implies controlling not just natural boundaries or deploying armed forces but, more 
importantly, controlling people. The nature of governance that has been established 
by India and Bangladesh along this border in the last six decades reveals two levels 
of operation—the totalising or en masse 260  control of the border civilians, and 
negotiations with individual persons261 depending on the context and situation. En 
masse control over the border is manifested in various surveillance mechanisms, 
patrolling by the border guards and even the bonding attempts by the BSF. But it is 
the pattern of individual control that sheds light on the complexity of governance 
mentalities. The gendered forms of violence between the male civilians and the male 
border guards (including both the use of weapons on one another, as well as the 
sexual abuse of suspected smugglers by the border guards), the interaction between 
the male border guards and the hijras, and the sexual insinuation in the various 
interactions between the male border guards and the female civilians—are symbolic 
of such individual patterns of control. While en masse control mechanisms reveal the 
more generally known forms of gendered practices along the border, the individual 
patterns point towards the least recognised but no less significant gendered border 
narratives.   
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ii. Uniqueness of gender narratives along the West Bengal-Bangladesh Border 
The study of interactions between the border guards and the civilians on the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border in existing literature has, so far, highlighted the state as 
the oppressor, the border civilians as the victims, and the border area as merely a 
periphery where all sorts of marginalisation and victimisation occurs. The interaction 
between the women civilians and male border guards has been the only index for the 
study of gendered narratives along this border. This chapter shows that there are 
many more complex strands of narratives beneath such linear narratives of 
perpetrator-victim discourses. It also shows that gendered border narratives on the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border are not limited to male perpetrator-female victim 
binaries but played out in all sorts of gendered combinations across varied levels of 
social standing. The variation in the gendered aspect in the relation between the male 
border guards and the male civilians on both sides of the border, between the male 
border guards and hijras, between the male border guards and female civilians on the 
West Bengal border, between the male border guards on both sides of the border, and 
the role of women pimps in women’s trafficking—reveal the complex web of 
gendered relations operating along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, apart from 
confirming some of the more generally studied aspects of the border in question, like 
the general condition of women civilians along it and the general abusive tendency of 
the BSF towards border civilians. Gender narratives are not unique to borderlands. 
They are witnessed in varying forms and nature in non-border areas as well. But the 
specificity of a borderland moulds gendered narratives in a way so as to give them a 
spatial dimension. The West Bengal-Bangladesh border, likewise, adds new 
dimensions to gendered narratives seen elsewhere in the non-border parts of both 
India and Bangladesh.  
iii. Border as thirdspace 
Any narrative that acts as a disruption of the predominantly hegemonic discourse is a 
subaltern narrative in nature. Evolving alternative ways of gaining access to 
resources and a different perspective of the context in question are manifestations of 
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subaltern narratives.262 This chapter concludes that the gendered border narratives 
along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border are also subaltern narratives, like the other 
forms of border narratives discussed in the previous chapters. The civilians evolve 
ways of gaining access to resources and livelihoods by negotiating and utilising the 
border—ways which are different from the available ones in the non-border areas. 
The perspectives of the border guards and the civilians regarding the gendered 
locations of themselves and of each other also question the men-women and 
perpetrator-victim dichotomies of gender relations in India and Bangladesh.  
In the process of redefining gendered ideas in the context of the border, the border 
people redefine the very space of the borderland. While the states produce a certain 
version of their borderlands (as spaces of separation from the neighbour, as container 
of their own civilians and as the space for the exercise of unquestionable sovereign 
control), the border people, including the civilians and the border guards reproduce 
the space through questioning and redefining the state’s version. The space of the 
borderland becomes the platform for the clash between the perceived and 
conceived263  notions of the borderland by the states and by the border people—
making the border the thirdspace264 of lived reality. The reproduction of the border 
as the thirdspace is characterised by the ways it is utilised by both the border 
civilians and the border guards. The state perceives the border as a space of non-
fluidity, containment and sovereign power. The border guards, despite being the 
embodied representations of the state, conceive the border as a space both for 
establishing a patriarchal presence and for personal gains. The border civilians 
survive the reality of the border, both by being victimised at times and by utilising 
the border to the best of their needs at other times.  Conflicting perceptions of the 
border, thus, converge in the borderland making the border the platform for unique 
narratives. Subalternity, in the context of this border is, thus, not an urban-rural or 
poor-middle class divide but more a re-interpretation and reproduction of the border 
space. A spatial dimension engulfs the smaller socio-cultural subaltern narratives to 
be crystallised into a larger border narrative.  
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iv. Border consciousness 
Years of production of such border narratives crystallise into a pattern of 
consciousness among everybody who negotiates the border in their daily lives. This 
thesis aims to study the evolution of border consciousness manifested through the 
various strands of border narratives. This chapter provides the final block towards the 
construction of the thesis by studying gender as one of the four strands of narratives 
which converge at the border to produce the border consciousness. Border 
consciousness is characterised by the omnipresence of the border in all sorts of 
gendered practices—right from questions of women’s literacy, issues of dowry 
related to the marriage of both men and women, trafficking and prostitution, 
negotiating border guards for cultivating fenced-out lands, issues of violence and 
abuse, interactions between the local heads and border guards, and interactions 
between the border guards and hijras to interactions between the border guards on 
both sides of the border. Border consciousness is, thus, produced by the simultaneous 
convergence of smaller narratives, such as the ones mentioned above, and the 
crystallisation of those narratives into a larger spatial consciousness. The spatial 
character of border narratives across caste, class, gender, ethnicity and religion, and 
characterised by a re-interpretation of the border space, is what makes these 
narratives subaltern as against non-border narratives. Studying gendered border 
narratives along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border helps in our understanding of 
not just the evolution of border narratives as a subaltern narrative but also the 






‘Borderlanders hardly think of themselves as living in the margin. The borderland is 
the centre of their world’1— says Willem van Schendel in the conclusion of his 
seminal work on the Bengal borderland. This expression aptly defines the basic 
premise of the preceding chapters where border narratives along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border have been used as evidences to highlight, yet again, the 
overwhelming presence and centrality of the border in the lives of the border people. 
Border narratives have also been used as evidences to highlight the production of a 
border consciousness which results from years of negotiating this overwhelming 
reality of the borderland by the people living on both sides of the border.  
Borders as delimitations of the sovereign powers of the state have evolved 
historically—from the flexible porous nature of the feudatories of middle age-Europe 
through their role as marked demarcations of nations following the Treaty of 
Westphalia (1648), to their later avatars as delimitations of the sovereign powers of 
modern-day state systems. The nature of the study of borders has, likewise, evolved 
from political to geographical and, eventually, sociological, ethnographical and 
economical discourses. Each border around the world has a unique story to tell. The 
stories contribute in their own ways towards the larger discourse on borders, offering 
new perspectives to understand their uniqueness.  
The preceding chapters have looked at some of the unique aspects of one of the most 
interesting and complex international borders in the world—the border between West 
Bengal (India) and Bangladesh. The research had set out to: 
• Look at the evolution of border narratives as a spatial phenomenon. 
• Examine how certain social, cultural, political and economic 
narratives are modified by the spatial specificity of the border to 
crystallise into a spatial narrative. 
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• Understand if such everyday border narratives are subaltern in nature, 
i.e. if they question predominant statist definitions of notions like 
inclusion, exclusion, legal, illegal, citizenship, rights, etc. 
• Understand if such years of production of border narratives transform 
into a spatial consciousness, which has been termed here as a border 
consciousness.  
The overarching theme of the evolution of border narratives and the creation of a 
border consciousness have been discussed as sub-themes related to the narratives of 
livelihood, enclaves, caste and gender, as witnessed along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border. The aim of the chapters has been to knit the four above-
mentioned themes into the larger theme of border narratives and to show how these 
narratives are affected by the reality of surviving the border. The people living along 
the border, including a wide range of civilians across gender, caste, professions and 
religion, including the border guards as well, were interviewed in order to capture the 
essence of border narratives, expressed through their everyday negotiations and 
interactions. The preceding chapters have shown: 
• How livelihood, enclave, caste and gender narratives are 
‘territorialised’, reproduced and affected by the reality of surviving 
the border. These narratives can rightly be considered as evidences of 
border narratives because of their spatial uniqueness (i.e. such 
narratives are not seen in non-border areas) and also because of the 
overwhelming presence of the border in the responses of the narrators 
which have been considered here.  
• How the border narratives acquire a subalternity through the 
production of alternate access to resources, and by questioning 
predominant statist notions. R.D. Sack has rightly observed that the 
content of a territory can be manipulated and its character designed 
simply by controlling access to it through boundary restrictions.2 
While the above quotation very aptly describes the role of the state at 
the border, the alternate access which the civilians themselves design 
reveals the subaltern nature of the border narratives produced through 
                                                          
2
 Sack, R.D. (March 1983) Human territoriality: a theory. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers. 73(1). p. 59.  
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everyday interactions between the state, the civilians and the border 
guards. Experience-based narratives, as expressions of the agency of 
the narrator,3 indeed reflect the patterns of re-interpretation of the 
agency of the border people. The cynicism that the border people 
have developed over the years towards the official ideologues of their 
respective states are manifested in their attitude—an attitude that the 
states are inclined to regard as subversive.4 The narratives discussed 
in the preceding chapters provide ample evidence of the attitude of 
the border people as well as the state’s perception of these narratives 
as subversive.  
• How the border narratives crystallise into a spatial consciousness, 
expressed through the recurrence of the reality of the border in the 
responses, where every day practices and negotiations are produced, 
decided, and affected by the border.  
 
I. Experience-centred narratives 
Human action and experience, according to Paul Ricoeur, always has a narrative 
structure.5 Thus, experience-centred everyday forms of narratives have been chosen 
as the basis of analysis because they bring out the spontaneous and real nature of the 
experiences of the people rather than secondary materials, most of which look at 
such narratives from a statist perspective, consider such narratives as mere security 
issues of the state or highlight certain specific crises of the border like smuggling or 
trafficking as an issue of border management. The ‘small stories’6 of border life ‘may 
concern unfolding, anticipated, imaginary, habitual and indefinite events and states, 
as well as past, singular “events”; they may also involve repeated content or themes 
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spread out across interviews or other data.’7 But they are the narratives which reveal 
the ‘naturally-occurring’ stories and the natural language of expression.8 Most 
importantly, they pay ‘attention to the “social” in its most microsocial versions, as 
well as in its wider, cultural variants’.9 Experience becomes part of consciousness,10 
especially over a long period of time. Hence, such experience-centred narratives have 
been used as evidences in the study of the border consciousness along the stipulated 
border.  
 
II. Role of language 
Language plays a significant role in the study of these narratives11 (discussed in 
Chapter 4). Responses of the border guards as well as civilians on both sides of the 
West Bengal-Bangladesh border, both in terms of their expression and language, 
have been integral to the border narratives and thrown light on how the border people 
see themselves in the larger scenario of border life.  
 
III. Cognition 
Cognitive behavioural patterns of the border people along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border, including their own perceptions of inclusion-exclusion, here-
there, inside-outside, us-them, ideas about the limits of their movements (enclaves) 
and settlements (Marichjhapi), also have a significant role to play in the evolution of 
border consciousness along this border. Such cognitive maps and ideas of the border 
people cut across a wide range of socio-cultural, political, economic and territorial 
narratives, while also pointing towards the undeniable role of the reality of the border 
in their lives. My own experiences during field studies opened my eyes to the 
cognitive (dis)orientation of the borderland when I ended up confusing which side of 
the border I was on at a particular time, given my continuous movement across it 
                                                          
7
 Andrews, Squire and Tamboukou, 2009, p.8.   
8
 Ibid., pp.8-9.  
9
 Ibid.   
10
 Squire, C. (2009) From experience-centred to socioculturally-oriented approaches to 
narrative. In Andrews, Squire and Tamboukou, 2009, p.48.   
11
 Ibid., p.9.  
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over a period of six months.12 This experience was, in fact, a strong hint towards the 
kind of cognitive disorientations that the border people, negotiating the border over 
years, might have to deal with.   
Neil Brenner’s (2001) idea of scalar structuration helps in explaining such cognitive 
patterns of perception and negotiation. It, in fact, helps in the understanding of the 
convergence of varying and conflicting spatial perceptions of the state, the border 
guards and the border civilians along the space of the border. That ‘processes of 
scalar structuration are constituted and continually reworked through everyday social 
routines and struggles’13 are amply proved by the everyday border narratives 
produced along the said border by the border people. Cognitive disorientation or 
scalar structuration becomes all the more strongly visible in ‘partitioned 
geography’,14 as is the case with the West Bengal-Bangladesh borderland where 
politics of scale comes into play in the societal structuration processes—involving a 
web of ethnic, religious, social, political and economic ties across the border. 
Enclave narratives, as outcomes of a partitioned geography, constitute a fine example 
of such scalar structuration and cognitive disorientation along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border.  
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IV. Narrator and listener 
The convergence of the divergent emotional, cognitive and social life of the narrator 
and the listener (me) has often been difficult in the process of understanding and 
interpreting the narratives. Moreover, certain parts of the narratives, especially the 
ones to do with anxieties, desires, etc., almost always ‘remain outside the 
narrative’,15 no matter how rigorous the process of recording and analysing the 
narratives are. ‘The factual details of “lived life” obtain an emotional aspect in the 
“told story”, which constitutes the underlying emotional experience that the narrator 
goes through in negotiating the lived experiences.’16 These emotions cannot be 
expressed clearly by the teller nor can the listener do complete justice to such 
expressions. Yet in spite of these drawbacks, experience-centred everyday narratives 
have been the primary foundation of this research for understanding the evolution of 




The choice of experience-centred everyday narratives as support for my arguments 
has also to do with the aim of the research to capture this evolution of border 
narratives beginning from the partition and the creation of the border in 1947. The 
period following the partition has been crucial in the transformation of cultural 
identities of the Bengali people into a border people and in crystallising their 
narratives into a border consciousness. The everyday narratives almost always 
capture the essence of time. Corinne Squire, Molly Andrews and Maria Tamboukou 
have aptly observed: ‘Time, psychically processed, is thought to make us into 
subjects through its articulation in narrative. Transformation is also assumed to be 
integral to narrative, in the story itself, in the lives of those telling it; even in 
researchers’ own understandings of it.’17 This explains the choice of such small 
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stories as the basis for the study of the reproduction of border space and the evolution 
of border consciousness over a long period of time of about six decades.   
 
VI. Life-cycle approach 
The ‘life-cycle’ approach of borders suggested by Willem van Schendel and Michiel 
Baud18 provides important tools for understanding the evolution process of the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border from its genesis to its present form, which, in the process, 
provides tools for understanding the evolution of border consciousness. The six 
stages of evolution of the border suggested by them are embryonic, infant, 
adolescent, adult, declining and defunct. The characteristic features laid out for each 
of them help us in understanding the stage that the various parts of the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border is in, as well as highlighting its overall ‘coming of age’.19 The 
changing form and nature of the border at various phases of its evolution affect the 
patterns of negotiation practiced by the border people. The negotiation between the 
state, the border guards and the border civilians change according to the 
quite/harmonious, unruly, half-unruly or rebellious nature of the borderland, 
depending on the phase of life-cycle that the border is in.20 This, in turn, affects the 
psyche of the people which, over a certain period of time, crystallises into a 
consciousness tied to the reality of the border.  
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Unquestionable acceptance of the reality of the border by the people who live in the 
borderland21 is an important feature of the adult phase of border evolution and is 
what constitutes the fundamental nature of the border consciousness along the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border.22 This is not to suggest that the border affects its people 
uniformly. While it strengthens some, it disempowers others.23 The preceding 
chapters have highlighted the vast range of effects that the border has on the people 
living along its length. But it is the undeniable presence and the indubitable effect of 
the border on the people that forms the crux of the border consciousness.  
 
VII. Border identity 
The unique spatiality of the borderland produce a new identity for the people who 
live along the border—that of the ‘border people’—an identity that is produced by a 
modification of their other primary identities, such as their ethnic, religious, 
gendered or economic identities. The location of the border modifies these identities 
to produce an overwhelmingly spatial identity—that of the border people. While 
responses bring out the presence of other identities throughout the narrative, they 
also reveal how the border affects such identities to transform their nature into a 
spatial category of identity. The production of the identity of the ‘enclave people’ is 
integral to the creation of the identity of the ‘border people’. The narratives of the 
border guards speak amply of their inclusion into this spatial identity. Border issues 
affect the lives of both the border civilians and border guards equally.24 In fact, some 
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of the narratives of the border guards do not just reveal their perception of 
themselves as a border people, but also reveal the nature of the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border as a space of meeting of the states, rather than a space of clear 
demarcation of the sovereign delimitations of the concerned states, i.e. India and 
Bangladesh.  
 
My twelve hundred and ten brothers25 
We have no name, but numbers 
Just like milestones 
Here and there 
We are called border pillars 
We have a few children 
They are called subsidiary pillars 
Training pillars at crossroads 
Pillar riverines upon rivers and streams 
A duty to call by various names 
We are born of parents, born of two states 
Together, they provide for us 
We look the same 
Our structure, weight, measure, all the same 
We stand straight, on attention 
We are born of partition 
It is a wonder 
None fights for us here 
 
The fact that India and Bangladesh have started realising that both the states need to 
come together at the border in order to reform and maintain the border rivers26 is also 
indicative of the border’s role as the meeting space of the states, despite the states’ 
efforts to project the borders as a line of separation. It is the border that also brings 
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 Moitra, S. (10 March 2010) Holo jautha samiksha, sighrai suru hochhe Ichhamati 
samskaar. Ananda Bazar Patrika. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.anandabazar.com/archive/1100310/10jibjagat1.htm. [Last accessed: 17 
September 2013];  
289 
 
together people from both the sides of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border in 
celebrating Bangla as Mother Language or in assuring support and co-operation for 
anti-fundamentalist movements.27 Narratives such as these contribute towards the 
thesis of the creation of border narratives and their crystallisation into a border 
consciousness, especially in the view that the border people on both sides are called 
forward by their states in the mission to restore border landscapes, including rivers.28 
The reference to the border guards as ‘border man’29 by the border guards themselves 
also speaks amply about their identification more as border people than as 
representatives of the state. Seeing themselves as the ‘border man’ is the common 
aspect of both the civilians and the guards. The fact that BSF has been planning to 
recruit local youths from border areas into BSF services30 also indicate that border 
people trade between everyday survival practices and state machineries. Recruitment 
of local civilians into BSF services adds a new dimension to border narratives.   
Narratives from both sides of the border fit into the larger scheme of border 
narratives, binding the civilians and the border guards on both sides of the border 
into a common border milieu, often distinctly different in nature from the non-border 
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There is often a ‘tendency to confuse the sharing of a culture with the sharing of an 
identity’.31  The inhabitants of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border highlight this 
notion very clearly. Although the inhabitants on both sides of the border share a 
similar culture with the non-border or mainland inhabitants (Bengalis), the border-
status of the border inhabitants gives them a different identity with which the non-
border inhabitants often do not identify. They are, as Homi K. Bhabha puts it, 
‘estranged unto themselves—in the act of being articulated into a collective body’,32 
resulting in a collective mentality, a unique existence. It is the border inhabitants on 
both sides of the border who share the same culture (Bengalis) as well as the same 
identity (that of being border people)—which renders them similar to one another 
across the border (identifications)33 and different from their respective countrymen 
(disidentification).34 Disidentification is more a process of ‘distancing oneself from a 
certain identifying character’ and less of an ‘opposite of the process of 
identification’.35 Disidentification, as Jose Esteban Munoz suggests, is a ‘strategy of 
resistance against dominant paradigms of identity’36— not in the form of a counter-
stance but rather as a positive action,37 enabling one to understand this unique 
mentality as something not limited to traditional binaries.38 Border mentality and the 
border culture of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border is, thus, much more than a 
mere reaction to state-centric narratives; it is a discourse in itself, often spontaneous 
in origin and as important in understanding the nuances of state-building as are the 
state-centric narratives.  While still being attached to history, border culture evolves 
its own politics of resistance, as Suzanne Bost very aptly puts it. This (border 
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culture) ‘transcends its potentially tragic origins and enables resistance to hegemony, 
a critique of imperialism, and powerful reinterpretations of self and culture’.39  
Moving beyond its origin in the partition, the border culture along the West Bengal-
Bangladesh border does, indeed, re-interpret traditional notions of socio-cultural, 
political and economic identifications and disidentifications. The border creates an 
invisible but nevertheless strong bordering between the border and non-border 
people on both its sides. Because of its spatial uniqueness, life and living strategies 
of the border and non-border people differ vastly. Nor are the non-border people 
much aware of the ways of life of the border people. This creates a distinct difference 
in mentalities and ways of thinking between them. ‘The very word “border” evokes a 
Bangladesh-like feeling and indicates a distanced existence from the Indian 
mainland’,40 is how a border civilian on the West Bengal side expresses this angst. 
For the non-border people, there is always a (stereotypical) sense of mystery and 
criminality associated with the border, which often varies in nature from the real 
experiences of the border people.   
The idea of identification/disidentification questions and contests the purpose of the 
border as set out by the state by revealing the socio-spatial distance between the 
border and non-border people within a single bounded territory while questioning, at 
the same time, the role of the state as both the political and ‘social container’.41  
In the specific context of the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, such 
identifications/disidentifications acquire an altogether unique dimension given the 
complex web of social relations on both sides of the border and the territorial 
predicaments of the states concerned. Evidences for the complex nature of such 
socio-cultural identifications along this border have been provided in Chapter 2 
(enclave narratives) and Chapter 3 (ethno-religious and caste narratives). The illegal 
use of Bangladeshi telecommunication networks on the West Bengal side of the 
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border due to the unavailability or poor service of Indian networks,42 as well as for 
cross-border links,43 provides an interesting example of how the border people 
question the purpose of the border and, hence, the sovereign presence of the state at 
its delimitations.  It also points towards a disidentification from the non-border 
people (non-border people do not have easy alternate access to networks of 
neighbouring states) as well as towards a subaltern narrative of gaining access to 
resources which are available to non-border people (availability of a choice of 
networks) but denied by the state at its peripheries.  
The idea of the centrality of the border in the life of the borderlanders, as propounded 
by Van Schendel,44 also finds resonance in the identification of the border people on 
both sides and their virtual disidentification from the non-border people for whom 
the borderland symbolises a marginal space. Cognitive behavioural patterns of the 
border people, yet again, become decisive in such identification/disidentification 
narratives along this border.  
 
IX. Contribution to knowledge 
My research contributes to the existing understanding about borderlands, in general, 
and the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, more specifically, by:  
• Re-emphasising the significance of understanding the territorial 
predicaments of a state against the backdrop of a globalised world. 
Border narratives indicate that in spite of increasing cross-border 
global transactions, the territorial delimitations of states do not lose 
their importance in any way. Right from the premises of partition to 
the recurrence of the border in current narratives, territorial 
predicaments act as the foundation. In fact, visible and active cross-
border interactions along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border hint at 
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the territorial predicaments of the borderland, rather than hinting at 
the blurring of borders. Studies such as this, as Joachim Blatter 
argues, ‘offer useful insights into contemporary processes of state 
spatial restructuring and the changing operations of borders, 
boundaries, and territories in global capitalism.’45  
• Showing that in an age of increased championing for borderlessness 
and globalisation, the border still holds its place as the most important 
factor in questions of state sovereignty. It shows how borders and 
border narratives are still the linking factors between states. It reflects 
how through the process of being meeting spaces for people with 
similar experiences from both sides, borders question the sovereignty 
of the state, question its role as the ‘bordered power container’46 and 
its ‘ability to contain social relations’.47 Border narratives, as seen 
along the West Bengal-Bangladesh border, reveal the changing nature 
of the border from being the ‘front lines’ of sovereign states to 
socioeconomic ‘contact zones’ for neighbouring societies.48 And it 
does this not through refusal or even through active resistance but 
through everyday survival practices. This is what makes it difficult for 
the state to either gauge or discipline such practices.  
• Contesting the dominant understanding of the roles of the state 
machinery and the people. The roles of the state as the active user and 
the people as the passive victims are put to test by the perceptions and 
negotiations of the border people. Ways of surviving the border and 
surviving on the border, which the border people innovate upon, 
question the prevailing understanding of the roles of the state and its 
people. The role of the border guards adds a significant dimension to 
the interpretation of the border as a thirdspace of lived reality. The 
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inviolate nature of the borders49 is violated by the sheer re-
interpretation and reproduction of the border space by the border 
people. Narratives of the border guards in the scheme of reproduction 
of the border space hint towards their location within the border 
milieu rather than simply locating them as parts of the state machinery 
or as detached from the survival narratives of border civilians.   
• Suggesting new indices for a better understanding of borderland 
culture. It stresses on the need to take ‘border psyche’ into 
consideration in studies of borderlands. Instead of merely looking at 
borders as issues of bilateral affairs between states and as 
delimitations of the state’s sovereignty, it calls for an observation of 
how border people use their common sense in strategizing their 
everyday survival needs. Such an understanding might be useful for 
states in envisioning their governmentalities50 while framing the 
regulations and policies for administering their borderlands. The 
designs of the state and the demand of the so-called mainland people 
for securing the borders and making them impermeable need to 
consider the ‘everyday transnationality’51 of the lives of the border 
people. Borderlanders, as Van Schendel puts it, are active partners in 
the re-territorialisation of states52 and, hence, as important as any 
other part of the state as factors in the narratives of state-building.   
The sheer range of media coverage of border issues in West Bengal and Bangladesh 
hints at the ways states choose to address or ignore their borders. Border questions 
are state concerns for both India and Bangladesh. This means that any decisions 
regarding the borders need to be ratified and passed by the parliaments of the states. 
Moreover, the border guards of both India and Bangladesh are centrally deployed 
paramilitary forces. Bangladesh does not have a provincial governance structure, 
unlike India which has a central government and separate state (provincial) 
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governments in its twenty-eight53 odd states. The central government in Bangladesh 
addresses situations in any of its borders, be it with India or Myanmar. However, 
India prioritises its borders according to the sensitivity associated with them, which 
thus makes the Pakistan and China borders more important strategic concerns than 
the Bangladesh one. The Bangladesh border has become concern of the provincial 
governments of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura over the 
years. The central government in India concerns itself with the Bangladesh border 
only when it becomes a national issue related to security, terrorism, etc. The recent 
debates over the enclave exchange bill or the recurrent ones about the use of the 
Bangladesh border for terrorist activities by fundamentalists are examples. It is no 
wonder that border issues of the India-Bangladesh border are far more frequently 
addressed in the Bangladesh national and regional media than in the Indian media, 
especially the national media. Regional media is seen to report Bangladesh border 
issues in West Bengal, Assam and other Indian provinces with which Bangladesh 
shares a border. But the national media hardly reports Bangladesh border issues 
unless it is of national importance. Thus, while border disputes between West Bengal 
and Bangladesh affect the electoral agendas of the central government of 
Bangladesh, they only affect the electoral agendas of the provincial government of 
West Bengal in India.54 It also explains the lack of interest and awareness among the 
common people in India about the India-Bangladesh border (especially the non-
border inhabitants of the Indian state) than those in Bangladesh, irrespective of their 
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residence near or far away from it. This perhaps is the most visible evidence of the 
kind of disidentification between the border and the non-border people discussed in 
the preceding paragraphs.  
 
X. Significance of the research 
My research, thus, contributes towards a better understanding of border lives and 
border culture, especially in a complex border such as the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border. It contributes towards border studies, as being primarily empirically 
constructed narratives based on experiences, rather than seeing the borders as mere 
political delimitations of a state. It also enhances the understanding of unique spatial 
identities in the context of borders and helps to identify certain aspects of these 
identities that are not seen in other spatial contexts. The pattern of ‘scalar 
structuration’55 produced by the border people constitutes an integral part of the 
study of such spatial identities, since it is the border where the national scale of a 
bounded landscape (fences, surveillance mechanisms, customs offices, intelligence 
services, passport systems) encounters the geographical imaginations of 
borderlanders.56 It is, thus, the border that sees its people moving between the 
national and state-defined rhetoric of citizenship, inclusion, the portrayal of 
patriotism (in the form of claims for citizenship, territorial inclusion, hoisting of 
flags, concerning oneself with security questions of the state) and everyday local 
narratives of survival along it. The negotiations between the civilians and the border 
guards provide still more interesting narratives of the encounters. The mosaic of 
scalar structuration and spatial narratives produced in the process of these encounters 
‘may crystallise into scalar fixes’,57 thus reflecting the production of a spatial 
consciousness. The encounters create geographies of ‘inclusion/exclusion and 
domination/subordination which empowers some actors, alliances and organisations 
at the expense of others, according to criteria such as class, gender, race/ethnicity and 
nationality’.58 The preceding chapters highlight certain aspects of such encounters.  
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Instead of being considered merely as a transition zone, or even a crush zone 
between centres of sovereign territorial power, borders need to be considered in their 
own right.59 The smaller stories of the borders need to be considered as the missing 
links between the grand narratives of state building, transnational linkages and 
globalisation discourses— or statism60, as Ranajit Guha phrases it. Through their 
complexity, these smaller narratives question the statist discourses and are, thus, 
often ‘drowned in the noise of statist commands’.61 The everyday small stories of 
border lives not just form the missing links between statist discourses, but also 
‘provide us with valuable clues as to the magnitude and limitations of the most 
powerful mental construction of the present-day world, the nation-state’.62 These 
significant missing links, thus, call for careful exploration and patient understanding. 
The preceding chapters have been an attempt to that end.   
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The interviews have been semi-structured in nature. Beginning with the following 
questions, the rest of the interviews have been left to follow their own course, 
depending on the issues and the socio-cultural, gender and economic profile of the 
interviewees. Questions to the Bengali-speaking participants have been asked in 
Bengali by myself. English has been used when interviewing non Bengali-speaking 
border guards.  
General questions for all the participants 
• Your name (will be anonymised in the text, unless otherwise specified)  
• Your age 
• Your profession 
• Information on the rest of your family members 
• Your views on daily life at the borders 
• Ways in which the presence of the borders affect your social and cultural 
activities 
• How do you perceive the people on the other side of the border? 
• Does your belonging to a particular caste, class, gender or religion has any 
direct influence on you being an inhabitant at the border? 
• How does the border affect your livelihood or how much are you dependent 
on the existence of the borders for your livelihood? 
• Are you aware of any cross-border smuggling activities in this area?  
• If yes, what is your view on that?  
• What is your view on the decision to fence the entire stretch of the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border? How has it effected your live and livelihood?  
• Do the border guards interact with the local population? If so, in what ways? 
• What are the customs, rituals, festivals which you observe and celebrate? 




• Do you have myths, stories, anecdotes and recollections regarding the people 
on the other side of the border which are prevalent among the local 
population? 
• What have you heard from your elders and older members of your 
community about life before and after partition?  
• How has the partition and the border affected your local customs and 
festivals?  
Specific questions for the border guards (besides the above-mentioned ones)  
• Which region do you belong to?  
• Do you understand the language of the local people?  
• What is your view on the decision to fence the entire stretch of the West 
Bengal-Bangladesh border? How has it affected the local people as well as 
your duties?  
• Do you interact with the local people? If so, in what ways?  
• Do you, in any way, collaborate with the local NGOs towards improving the 
conditions of the local people, in terms of the basic health and sanitation, 
education, food and water supplies? 
• What are the indices you use to differentiate the people on either side of the 
border, given that they dress similarly, speak the same language and observe 






Brief description of interviewees  
(The names of all the interviewees have been anonymised, unless specified 
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50 Shakil Ali  M Resident of a 
Bangladeshi 
territory located 























F Resident of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India, 
which has been 











mainland by the 
Tinbigha 
Corridor. Has 
been living in 
the enclave for 
the last 16 
years. Husband 
works as a van-
driver 
Bangladesh 
lying in Cooch 
Behar district 
of West Bengal  
52 Akbar Alam  M Resident of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India, 
which has been 
connected to the 












lying in Cooch 
Behar district 
of West Bengal 
Bengali Yes 
53 Rabiul Islam  M Resident of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India, 
which has been 
connected to the 












lying in Cooch 
Behar district 
of West Bengal 
Bengali Yes 
54 Shahid Haq  M Resident of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India, 
which has been 
connected to the 












lying in Cooch 
Behar district 




M BGB Customs 





















. Witness to 
interaction 
between border 






























van.  Witness to 
interaction 
between border 









M Resident of a 


























F Resident of a 
border town on 
the Bangladesh 
side. Lawyer in 
Dinajpur 
District Court. 
Works in the 
human 
trafficking cell 













60 Md. Zia-ul 
Haq  
M Resident of a 
border town on 
the Bangladesh 





























operating in a 















operating in a 


































F Smuggler in a 
border Land 
Port area on the 
Bangladesh 

























Bengali Yes  
66 Name 
Withheld 















67 Jumaira  F Resident of a 
border Land 
Port area on the 
Bangladesh side 












68 Fakruddin  M Original 
resident of a 
border village 
on the 












resident of a 
border village 
on the West 
Bengal side. 










70 Julekha  F Resident of a 
border village 
on the 









71 Bilal  M Resident of a 
border village 















72 Md. Tafikul 
Islam  
M Original 
resident of a 
border village 
















M Resident of a 
border town on 
the West Bengal 
side. Volunteer 
in the local 
branch office of 
a human rights 
organisation—
APDR.  
Involved in the 
movement for 
the betterment 
of wages and 
working 
conditions of 
the labourers in 
the brick-kilns 












M BSF official on 
patrolling duty 
at the border on 


















resident of a 
border village 
on the West 
Bengal side. 

















F Resident of a 
border village 
on the West 
Bengal side. 
















as a mechanic in 
a border land 
port 
77 Ranjit  M Resident of a 
border village 
on the West 
Bengal side. 

















78 Minu Bagdi  F Resident of a 
border village 




along with her 
husband, works 
in fields outside 
the fence. 










79 Nikhil Bagdi  M Resident of a 
border village 





seasons. Runs a 

















80 Hirak Kanti 
Munshi  
M Original 
resident of a 
border village 
on the West 
Bengal side. 
Secretary of the 
local committee 
of a political 
























the labourers in 
the brick-kilns 




M Resident of a 
border town on 
the West Bengal 
side. NGO 














82 Md. Riyaz 
Mondol  
M Resident of a 
border village 


















F Resident of a 
border village 


















resident of a 
border Land 
Port area on the 
West Bengal 













85 Animesh M Resident of a 
border village 













outside fence.  
Victim of theft 
of crops by 
Bangladeshi 
miscreants  
86 Md. Anisur  M Original 
inhabitant of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India. 
















district of West 
Bengal 
Bengali Yes 
87 Md. Iqbal 
Ali  
M Original 
inhabitant of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India. 

















district of West 
Bengal 
Bengali Yes 
88 Fatema Bibi  F Resident of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India. 





















F Resident of an 
Indian counter-
enclave within a 
Bangladeshi 











F Resident of a 
Bangladeshi 


















resident of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India. 

























resident of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India. 
















district of West 
Bengal 
Bengali Yes 
93 Phulmoni  F Resident of a 
Bangladeshi 




















M Deputy-Head of 
Panchayat of an 
Indian village 
located beside a 
Bangladeshi 












95 Gokul M Resident of a 
border village 
on the West 
Bengal side. 
Farmer. Victim 







West Bengal  
Bengali Yes 
96 Md. Iqbal 
Ali Sheikh  
M Resident of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India. 
Victim of BSF 











district of West 
Bengal 
Bengali Yes 
97 Md. Kamal 
Hussein  
M Original 
inhabitant of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India. 
Farmer. Victim 











district of West 
Bengal 
Bengali Yes 
98 Md. Karim 
Baksh  
M Resident in a 
Bangladeshi 

















district of West 
Bengal 
99 Saif Ali  M Original 
resident of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India. 
Farmer. Victim 












district of West 
Bengal 
Bengali Yes 
100 Md. Anisur 
Miah  
M Resident of an 
Indian village 
located beside a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India. 
Witness to 
abuse of the 
enclave 











resident of a 
Bangladeshi 


















resident of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India. 
Farmer. Victim 



























resident of a 
Bangladeshi 


















104 Dalim Bibi  F Resident of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India 






















F Resident of a 
Bangladeshi 





















F Resident of a 
Bangladeshi 
enclave in India. 
























M Resident of a 
border town on 






















M Resident of a 



































side. Victim of 
violence by 
miscreants from 
the West Bengal 
side of the 
border. Husband 
is a farmer 
Bangladesh 


































side. Involved in 
cross-border 
smuggling of 




























































116 Bani F Resident of a 
border village 













117 Bikram M Resident of a 
border Land 
Port on the 
Bangladesh 













118 Bibek M Resident of a 
riverine border 
village on the 
Bangladesh 
side. Witness to 














































M BGB official 
posted at a BGB 











122 Abedin M Resident of a 
riverine border 
village on the 
Bangladesh 
side. Witness to 
cross-border 
smuggling and 










123 Hari  M Resident of a 
riverine border 
village on the 
Bangladesh 
side. Works as 













124 Asif  M Resident of a 
riverine border 
















125 Niru F Resident of a 
riverine border 
village on the 
Bangladesh 












126 Aurangzeb M Resident of a 
riverine border 
village on the 
Bangladesh 













M BGB official in 

































M BGB official in 















Bengali  Yes 


















side. Trader in 












M BGB official in 
a border Land 
Port on the 
Bangladesh 















133 Asha F Resident of an 














134 Jahangir  M Resident of an 















135 Bijon  M Journalist with a 
local daily in a 












Bengali  Yes 
136 Pradip  Resident in an 






Affected by the 
use of the ghoj 
as a transit by 











M NGO worker 
and journalist 
with a Bengali 
daily 
16 February 
2012 
Jessore town, 
Jessore district, 
Bangladesh 
Bengali Yes 
 
